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"ET QUASI CURSORES VITAE LAMPADA TRADUNT."

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THE MODERN REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1880.

THE STORY OF NINETEENTH CENTURY REVIEWING.

“UPON calculating the Number of News-Papers, 'tis found that (besides divers written Accounts) no less than 200 Half-sheets per Month are thrown from the Press only in London, and about as many printed elsewhere in the Three Kingdoms; a considerable Part of which constantly exhibit Essays on various Subjects for Entertainment; and all the rest, occasionally oblige their Readers with matters of Public Concern, communicated to the World by Persons of Capacity thro' their Means: so that they are become the chief Channels of Amusement and Intelligence. But then being only loose Papers, uncertainly scatter'd about, it often happens, that many things deserving Attention, contained in them, are only seen by Accident, and others not sufficiently publish'd or preserved for universal Benefit and Information.

“This Consideration has induced several GENTLEMEN to promote a Monthly Collection, to treasure up, as in a Magazine, the most remarkable Pieces on the Subjects above-mention'd, or at least impartial Abridgments thereof, as a Method much better calculated to preserve those Things that are curious, than that of transcribing.”

So ends the Introduction to the Gentleman's Magazine :

Or, Monthly Intelligencer, of which Number I. was published in January, 1731, price sixpence. The *Gentleman's Magazine* gave a new significance to an English word and a new taste to cultivated society. Twelve months hence "*Sylvanus Urban, Gent.*," will have issued his serial without break or pause for a hundred and fifty years.

Defoe's *Review*, begun in 1704, was the father of the *Tatler* and the *Spectator*, and was in no sense the progenitor of those more solid monthly publications of which the *Gentleman's Magazine* was the first conspicuous example. But in May, 1716—five years after the issue of the *Spectator*—Defoe began a monthly of six octavo sheets under the sounding title of *Mercurius Politicus*. In November, 1722, appeared both Earbury's *Monthly Advices from Parnassus* and the *Monthly London Journal*, by "Cato, Jun." Presently, again, in January, 1725, was begun the *Monthly Catalogue of Books, Sermons, Plays, &c.*; and this was followed, in March, 1728, by the *Monthly Chronicle*.

Edward Cave, the projector of the *Gentleman's Magazine*, and its editor for more than twenty years, infused into it a character and a power far exceeding the pretensions of any of its forerunners. It was the first great literary review. It did not, indeed, assume that form immediately. The first number fulfils no more than the modest promise of the introduction. It consists mainly of extracts in prose and verse from the *Craftsman*, the *London Journal*, *Fog's Journal*, the *Grub Street Journal*, and other newspapers, and a diary of the month's events, with a mere list of books and a Scotch ghost story, which reminds us that Cave himself, "though he did not like to talk of it," told Samuel Johnson that he had seen a ghost. In November, 1734, however, Johnson wrote to him, under the feigned name of S. Smith, suggesting a "literary article" of extended and varied criticism. The printer of St. John's Gate was not the man to neglect a sagacious hint. It was not long before

the rich contributions of Johnson himself were spreading far and wide the fame of the magazine. The responsibility of Editorship was realised by Cave more vividly than by the Editor of the *Britain* newspaper, who advertised in the *Flying Post* of May 23, 1713: "The author of the *Britain*, being at some distance from Town, during the Summer Season, that paper will only be published occasionally till the Winter." "Sylvanus Urban" soon received famous members of Parliament at his office, who came to proffer authorised reports of their great speeches in place of those which Guthrie or Johnson compiled so freely from scraps of notes jotted down in the House, and the ambitious publisher printed them, at the risk, as the centenary volume has it, "of fearful penalties." Under his vigorous management the sale of the magazine rose to 10,000 copies. How many of our present quarterlies or monthlies boast such a circulation? Yet when rumour said that a single subscriber was dissatisfied, Cave was eager to "have something good next month."

John Nichols, who took the helm after Henry and the second Cave had steered the magazine through the intervening years, surpassed the original "Urban" himself in the skill and success of his pilotage. The magazine gradually receded from political discussion, though the conductors, celebrating its hundredth birthday, proudly proclaim on its behalf "an undeviating adherence to Church and State, a warm attachment to the Crown, Laws, Establishments, and Religion of our country, a distrust of theoretical experiments upon what the experience of ages has taught us to reverence, an abhorrence of the fanciful ravings of enthusiasts, religious or political, and a desire to preserve unchanged those Institutions of our forefathers, under which England has acquired the highest renown among nations." "The political atmosphere is free from clouds to excite alarm," it is added. So wrote the Tory Editor six weeks

before the "Three Days of July" in Paris, six months before the installation of the Reform Ministry at Westminster.

It was impossible to begin the story even of Nineteenth Century Reviewing without a glance at that remarkable serial which, after braving so many storms and gliding over so many waters which other literary craft have found becalmed, continues still its unchecked voyage across the sea of years. To relate the history of the host of periodicals that sprang up and ran their course and died between the first publication of the *Gentleman's Magazine* and the great outburst of Review literature which marked the early years of our century would detain us too long from our purpose. Yet the full significance of that new birth cannot be grasped without a previous word on some of the chief of these. While the *London Magazine* (1732) was the most formidable competitor of "Sylvanus" during the earlier part of his career, the *Monthly Review*, with its four successive series, was, in longevity, his only respectable English rival; though the *Scots' Magazine* (1739) has run him hard in the Land o' Cakes. Begun in May, 1749, the *Monthly Review*, bearing on its bead-roll the names of Smollett, Goldsmith, Johnson, Sterne, and Hume, lived till 1845. Southey, one of the most prolific reviewers of later times, esteemed the early days of the *Gentleman's* and the *London* the Golden Age of Magazines, for then "their pages were filled with voluntary contributions from men who never aimed at dazzling the public, but came each with his scrap of information, or his humble question, or his hard problem, or his attempt at verse." Keats and Kirke White are said to have been killed by critics; but few men ever suffered more than Southey himself from the "dazzling" propensities of nineteenth century reviewers. Edinburgh, that prolific mother of reviewing energy and talent, which has supplied even England with half her most distinguished editors, gave

early token of what she had in store in her *British Magazine*, her *Magazine*, her *Magazine and Review*, and her *Magazine and Literary Miscellany*, which lived to be killed by no less a foe than mighty Blackwood himself; while in the hapless *Edinburgh Review*, born in 1755, to die at its second number, with the fame of Adam Smith alone to rescue it from oblivion, she anticipated the name of the most illustrious of all her children. In England, Smollett, under "royal licence," tried his hand at editorship on the *British Magazine*, and at least three several attempts have since been made to establish a serial under this luckless name. But the *European Magazine and London Review* and the *Monthly Magazine* are, perhaps, in this period, the most germane to our purpose. The one illustrates the manner of literature from which the great Reviews sixty or seventy years ago were a reaction, the other that of which they were a development.

The *European Magazine* made its first appearance in January, 1782, during the momentary lull before that splendid storm in which the "vain boy," Pitt, Charles Fox, and disasters in America drove North from his twelve years' premiership. But the *European* had a soul above politics, save in the most dainty form. Was it not conducted by "the Philological Society of London"? Was it not inscribed to "the first gentleman in Europe"? That prince was then but twenty years of age, yet portly withal, if the portrait opposite the opening page deserves our trust; for the *European* was "embellished with elegant engravings." Its purpose was summed up in its familiar motto, "Simul et jucunda et idonea dicere vitæ." "If we do not improve, we may at least engage the mind, and if we do not detain the busy, we may be praised for giving an innocent employment to the idle." To this end we have gossiping anecdotes about the authors and the artists whose works are noticed, a feature of which the Philological Society is

evidently proud ; the plays for the month (a fresh one every night !) at Drury Lane and Covent Garden are regularly announced ; and music is published in score "for the voice, harpsichord, violin, guittar, German-flute, and bass." The *European Magazine* fought its way through the period of the rise of the great Reviews in the first generation of this century, and it was only in 1825 that it tried that "New Series" experiment, the despair of the bibliographer, which is compared by Campbell, in his introduction to the *Metropolitan*, to "the false hair and teeth of an antiquated beau, a deceitful exterior, which covers, but does not prevent, inevitable ruin." How long the *European* continued to court the aid of voluntary contributors by maintaining letter-boxes in four several places in London for the reception of "their favours," history, so far as we know, records not.

Very different in aim and conduct was the famous *Monthly Magazine*, which, issuing its opening number under the patronage of Richard Phillips, in February, 1796, with Dr. Aikin for editor, ran down to 1843. It was in 1826 that this periodical, also compelled, no doubt, by the tremendous pressure of the competition at that time, and by the panic in the book trade, began the New Series plan ; and the experiment was repeated no less than four times in the remaining seventeen years of its career. No political sympathies dictated the signal compliment paid to the *Monthly Magazine* by a *Blackwood* reviewer in November, 1824, on the score of its literary merit. Indeed he is amply justified, amid his vituperation of the other eighteenth century periodicals, in praising its improved intellectual status and its honest endeavour to promote, by queries and answers and other methods, the general information. Yet the *Monthly Magazine* could engage in very pleasant banter,—witness the mock letter from Sydney Smith, piled up with incongruities and

absurdities, in which the great clerical satirist is made to write: "Julius Cæsar would, I think, have favoured pluralities, had he been born in our Church." *

But even the *Monthly Magazine* never touched the level of literary excellence which was to be attained by so many competitors in the brilliant period extending a dozen years on either side of Waterloo. The prevailing matter of all the serials that ran through the period of the American War and the French Revolution was trivial to a degree that now would be intolerable. Great writers passed them by and sought no admission at their doors. "Even if they could have condescended to transmit [their writings] to the old magazines," says *Blackwood* a generation later, with characteristic energy, "to be there degraded and defiled by papers on an obscure tombstone, on a polish for furniture, or the blacking of shoes, they would have been deterred by the reflection that there they would be overlooked and undervalued, and never reach the perusal of those who alone were able to understand their purport and appreciate their value." †

In 1802, a brilliant group of young men enlivened the society of the Scottish capital. Francis Jeffrey, the central figure from our present point of view, was in his twenty-ninth year. Sydney Smith was about two years older; Francis Horner was twenty-four; Henry Brougham was twenty-three. The extraordinary literary feat which these four men, aided by allies of less importance, achieved, forms one of the most fascinating and one of the most familiar episodes in the history of books. Sydney Smith's paragraph is the basis of all historical accounts of the start of the *Edinburgh Review*. "One day we happened to meet in the

* January, 1826. Without loading this article with references to sources sufficiently obvious, we have thought it right to supply the means of verifying actual quotations. References not otherwise specified are to original editions.

† November, 1824.

eighth or ninth story or flat in Buccleuch Place, the elevated residence of the then Mr. Jeffrey. I proposed that we should set up a Review; this was acceded to with acclamation. I was appointed Editor, and remained long enough in Edinburgh to edit the first number." Jeffrey substantially corroborates these sentences. The jealous Brougham, it is true, declares that "nothing can be more imaginary," and solemnly argues that, "in the first place, there never was a house eight or nine stories high in Buccleuch Place."* Probably, had Brougham been concerned in the history of *Fraser*, instead of that of the *Edinburgh*, he would have disputed the historical validity of the anecdote of "Father Prout" in his old age singing his "Bells of Shandon," "in a Parisian *salon* half-way up to the skies," on the score that there never was a Parisian *salon* half-way up to the skies.

The amazing success of the *Edinburgh* from that 10th October morning of 1802, when it burst upon the world, to days within the recollection of men now no older than the projectors were then, not only confounded the gloomy prognostications of Jeffrey, but immeasurably surpassed Smith's own bold hopes. That success had its causes easy enough to perceive after the event. Foremost among these must ever stand the splendid ability of the youthful writers who filled the early volumes with their critiques on books, on measures, and on men. Brougham himself, "the cleverest man of the nineteenth century;"† Jeffrey, "the greatest of British critics;"‡ Sydney Smith, allowed even by Brougham to be "an admirable joker;"§ Francis Horner, upon whose countenance, according to Sydney Smith, were stamped the Ten Commandments—these constituted at once as varied and

* Memoirs of the Life and Times of Lord Brougham, i. 246.

† Gilfillan's Literary Portraits. First series. Second ed., 124.

‡ Lord Cockburn's Life of Jeffrey, i. 1.

§ Memoirs of Brougham, i. 247.

as powerful a quartet of writers as ever stood at the centre of a great enterprise; and they were well supported by John and Thomas Thomson, Murray, Webb-Seymour, and the rest. The second prevailing cause of success was, no doubt, the ripeness of the times for the discussion of political reform. Both Smith and Brougham have rapidly summarised the evils which the *Review* found current and helped to remove. Of these, the toleration of the slave trade and the denial of counsel to men on trial for their lives, will seem to the reader of this day the most flagrantly wicked; but it was in the discussion of Catholic Emancipation that the young Reviewers won their political spurs. As an organ of literary criticism, its independence of the bookselling trade was one main condition of the *Review's* usefulness and popularity; hitherto the line between review and advertisement, literary notice and literary puff, had been very indistinctly drawn. The Edinburgh Reviewers were the first to set the fashion of making the title of a book rather the text for an independent essay than the introduction to an analysis of its contents,—a practice which subsequently called forth the sarcasm of *Blackwood* that “we are made acquainted with the talents of the Reviewer, but those of the author are not exhibited.”

Sydney Smith was soon called south, and the *Review* was no longer edited in *junto* by conspirators who stole by secret ways to Willison's office. The magnificent reign of Jeffrey as formal and salaried editor began, probably, at the fourth number. He was sole editor from 1803 to 1829, when Mr. Macvey Napier succeeded him. Sir Walter Scott talks of “my little friend Jeffrey.”* He was of diminutive stature, but made the most of his appearance by careful dressing. Of all editors that the world has seen, he was surely the prince, unless it be Buloz. No other man ever held so mettlesome a team so well together with so

* Lockhart's *Life of Scott*, ii. 124.

free a use of the whip. He slashed the contributions sent to him unscrupulously, yet kept even Brougham's *amour propre* unwounded—or only scratched on the surface now and then. Nothing is more amusing than Brougham's chagrin to find himself moralising, like any preacher, in sentences of which he had never dreamed, in the midst of an otherwise rather wicked article; and Scott described how, when the merits of an article were rather in matter than in manner, Jeffrey never failed in "throwing in a handful of spice." * Of Jeffrey's private character the love and pride with which his associates regarded him testify enough. Even Scott, the prime mover in Scotland towards the establishment of its great London rival, long afterwards wrote an article for the *Edinburgh Review* "for the love of Jeffrey, the editor," † and the tender strain of his heart is exquisitely revealed in a letter to his successor, written in 1833, when the terrible cholera had found its way to the Firth of Forth:—"I cannot tell you how much I am disturbed by the thoughts of that frightful pestilence being in my beautiful and beloved Edinburgh, and so near my best and dearest friends. When I lie awake at night I can scarcely help weeping over you, and feeling as if I ought to be among you, and a sharer of your perils." ‡ His very failure as an orator in the House of Commons is a measure of his consummate ability. "He fired over all our heads," said Sir Robert Peel after the new Lord Advocate's maiden speech. Under Jeffrey the circulation of the *Review* rose in its first six years from 750 to 9,000, and in 1813 it was from 12,000 to 13,000. According to the *Analectic Review* (Feb. 1819), five years later it had further risen fifty per cent.

Looking at the career of the *Edinburgh Review* after it has been published for three-quarters of a century, all must admit that, for two-thirds of that period at least, it exercised

* Lockh. ii. 208. † Lockh. iv. 209.

‡ Correspondence of the late Macvey Napier, 126.

an extraordinary influence over policy and letters. In its early days it was guilty of many grave errors. Its literary criticisms were not only often unjust, but sometimes pernicious. Witness its insensibility to the gentle genius of the Lake poets, and its laugh at Dr. Young, the discoverer of the law of Interference of light,—a laugh which cost Young a thousand pounds previously proffered to him by a publisher, and so set the public against him that he could sell but one single copy of his grave reply. Its judgments on men and movements were sometimes, doubtless, grossly unfair; yet while no plea can justify the sweeping invective of the opening paragraphs of Sydney Smith's third article on Methodism, it is to be observed that that tempest of scorn was the rejoinder to an attack, ignorant, vulgar, and fanatical, while the first two articles, dealing with a theme tempting to the author's unbounded power of ridicule, are a monument of self-restraint and serious remonstrance. Notwithstanding all its faults, the Review was written not only with power, but with conscience, no less in the days of Horner and Sydney Smith, than in those of Macaulay, Carlyle, and Stephen. It never was—at any rate under Jeffrey's sway—a mere party organ. It judged men and things from the standpoint of the public good according to its lights, and the hatred it aroused was due as much to the sting of its sarcasm against all things mean and base as to its consistent opposition to Toryism in all its forms. The measure of that hatred may, perhaps, be justly estimated by reference to a little work on the Periodical Press of Great Britain and Ireland, published in 1824:—"Success rendered its writers callous to consequences. Their antagonists shrunk back from them. Unopposed, they imagined themselves invincible. They saw that they held the reins of criticism despotically, and their pasquinades increased in number as well as bitterness. The Tory sufferers winced under their application in dogged silence. They endured the torture,

and only thanked God it was not worse. Frequently, indeed, they offered to conciliate; but they never had the prowess to retaliate. *A dinner and a brief often averted what their pens should have paid.*"

As early as 1807, Scott, then a poet at the summit of his fame, though not yet a suspected novelist, began to look at the *Edinburgh Review*, to which he himself in the past years had made many contributions, through glasses of the same tint as those worn by the writer we have just quoted. That tint was the party-colour of Torydom. The first grave offence to Scott was the ardent advocacy of Catholic Emancipation for which the *Review* was so distinguished; but it is impossible to acquit him of personal *pique* at the Editor's very candid criticism upon the romance of *Flodden*. "I owe Jeffrey a flap with a fox-tail," he writes, "on account of his review of '*Marmion*.'"^{*} But the politics, which became more and more pronounced, gave the Tory poet abundant ground for his secession, and seven months after the appearance of the critique, Constable, the publisher, with an "indignant dash" of the pen had to write "STOP!!!" after his name on the list even of the subscribers.[†]

Lockhart has shown the active part which Scott took in promoting the establishment of the great rival of the *Edinburgh Review*. The *Quarterly Review* has now for seventy years kept up the game, and has never failed to return the ball which the *Edinburgh* has served. No less a man than Canning himself helped in the plot, and Scotch and English Reviewers were soon prepared to criticise books and men on principles of Church and State. Scott, Southey, Young, Frere, and Ellis were among the earliest contributors, and so was one unworthy of that brilliant company, in spite of Charles Knight's kind words,[‡] John Wilson

^{*} Lockh. ii. 218.

[†] Lockh. ii. 202.

[‡] *Passages of a Working Life*, i. 274.

Croker. A second detonation never startles quite so much as a first; but the first issue of the *Quarterly* was not less brilliant than that of the Northern serial seven years before. In Gifford an Editor was found of singular ability, if not of a species beloved by writers of books. "He had a heart full of kindness for all living creatures except authors," says his prolific contributor, Robert Southey; "*them* he regarded as a fishmonger regards eels, and as Isaac Walton did slugs, worms, and frogs."* It is not surprising, then, that "he could count his enemies by thousands, and reckon his friends on his fingers."

It is creditable to Scott and still more to Jeffrey that the part the former felt called upon to play did not entirely destroy the old friendship of the two school-fellows. The poet suggested to the Editor a less trenchant political tone, and seems to have understood him to make promise of modification; but Jeffrey, recalling long years afterwards the conversations that passed between them, is able distinctly to remember telling his critic that the *Edinburgh* had but two legs to stand on, literature and politics, and "its right leg is politics."† Scott even writes of "the disgusting and deleterious doctrine with which the most popular of our Reviews disgraces its pages."‡ The emphatic assertion of Jeffrey, therefore, that there were but four men whose opposition he dreaded, and that Scott was one, was not likely to check the resolve of the great Minstrel; and his hint to Gifford on hearing that he was willing to edit the new venture, reveals almost a malignant hostility:—"The Whigs suffer most from cool, sarcastic reasoning and occasional ridicule." By any work of equal literary talent, which "should speak a political language more familiar to the British ear than that of subjugation to France," he is

* Southey's Life. Quoted by Allibone.

† Lockh. ii. 157; Jeffrey's Contributions to the E.R. i. xvii.

‡ Lockh. ii. 209.

persuaded that the circulation of the great Liberal organ might be reduced at least one half.*

The "little man, dumped up together,"† who first sat in the editorial chair of the *London Quarterly*, as the Scotchmen called it, at once obtained its recognition as the champion of "Church, Tory, and War principles." Jeffrey was not much discomfited by number one, which took upon itself not only the defence of the coasts against Buonaparte, but the defence of the faith against its supposed Voltairean assailants at Edinburgh. Probably Sydney Smith suffered as much as any of the Northern Reviewers; for the second number (May, 1809) contained many biting sarcasms in its notice of the remarkable sermons which he had published, and rather indiscreetly prefaced. It was not soothing to him who had blamed the Methodists so severely for dereliction from orthodoxy, to be calmly told that he appeared "to belong to the Socinian school;" and the concluding paragraphs, in which the Reviewer affects to discredit Smith's asserted connection with the *Edinburgh*, must surely have had some sting. "Would he deem it sufficient," asks his critic, "to sacrifice to decency and religion in sermons which he avows, and give himself a licence to aid the dissemination of malice and infidelity in anonymous criticism? It is not to be supposed. . . . He would not have produced one of his best and most experimental sermons expressly '*On the Errors of Youth*.'"

It is the rise of these two great Quarterlies, creative, as they were, of a new literature and a new criticism, that must always take the leading place in the Story of Nineteenth Century Reviewing. Their continuation offers innumerable points of interest, indeed; but at their origin their main characteristics were permanently fixed. The manner in which they so long kept up the extraordinary standard of literary and political ability which belonged to them at the

* Lockh. ii. 210, 211.

† Scott's Diary, Jan. 17, 1827.

outset is very inadequately explained by that high scale of payment which rendered theirs, in a more literal sense than those of the old *London and Gentleman's*, the golden age of magazines. Poets, historians, statesmen delighted to enrich their pages; and, like the theistic thinkers described by Mr. Gladstone, Jeffrey and Gifford, Napier and Lockhart, if they were not rulers, ruled those who were. When Jeffrey became Dean of Faculty of Advocates in 1829, Macvey Napier, already distinguished for his editorial work on the new edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, and for his lectures as Professor of Conveyancing, was persuaded to assume the command of the *Edinburgh*. He had neither the genius nor the decision of his illustrious predecessor, but his correspondence shows that it was not without skill that he kept his staff together. It fell to him to deal with Brougham in the days of his utmost arrogance, and Macaulay, M'Cullough, Bulwer, were none of them without their grievances.* The *Quarterly* was steered by Gifford with

* The recently-published Correspondence of Macvey Napier reveals the fact that Macaulay, in his vexation at the rejection of his own article on the French Revolution (1830) in favour of that of Brougham, was nearer the mark than he himself can seriously have supposed in his conjectures concerning the pressure brought to bear by that notable Reviewer. From Macaulay's Life (i. 196, *seq.*), we had already learnt that, on August 19, he wrote to Napier:—"I have no notion on what ground Brougham thinks that I am going to review his speech" [on Colonial Slavery], and then proceeded to condemn the "vile taste" of, "puffing and flattering each other in the Review;" also, that he offered, in the same letter, to write an article on "The Politics of France since the Restoration." On Sept. 16 he wrote from Paris another letter (also given in his Life) in great annoyance at his article being put aside in favour of one by Brougham, and protesting that the language of the latter amounted to this:—"I must write about this French Revolution, and I will write about it. If you have told Macaulay about it, you may tell him to let it alone. If he has written an article, he may throw it behind the grate. . . . If he must be reviewing, there is my speech about the West Indies. Set him to write a puff on that." Probably every reader of this delightful biography has set all this down as the exaggeration of a slighted man. Yet it now actually appears that, on July 23, Brougham had written to Napier promising to send him his Colonial speech, and adding, "T. Macaulay is to prepare a leading article on it and the subject for next Number, which I hope will be first." (Napier's Correspondence, p. 80.) Further, on Sept. 8, Brougham did write:—"I must beg and, indeed, make a point of giving you

consummate skill till he withdrew from the command two years before his death, and five before the resignation of his Northern rival. Southey was perhaps the most important contributor under his rule; although he disliked its strong party complexion, and resented the mutilation of his contributions, the author of "*Thalaba*" could not but rejoice that Jeffrey, its contemptuous critic, himself should taste the fire of criticism. Gentle Elia winced under a *Quarterly* critique which he ascribed to the Laureate, his beloved friend. "I hate his 'Review,'" he cried, "and his being a Reviewer."* But he winced still more under the cruel mauling of his own favourable critique of the "*Excursion*" by the unscrupulous hand of Gifford. Mr. Coleridge, afterwards Sir John, took the reins from Gifford's relaxing grasp. His hold was feeble; and in 1826, the brilliant Blackwoodian, John Gibson Lockhart, "the Scorpion" of the famous "*Chaldee Manuscript*," was installed in Albemarle Street, with the goodly salary of fifteen hundred pounds a year, and pay for his own contributions besides. At that time about ten thousand copies of the *Review* were printed every quarter, but Lockhart found the stock of manuscripts in hand by no means to his mind,† and immediately laid many Northern cronies under contribution. Eager were the whispers and sundry the rumours as to the policy the new sovereign would inaugurate. But those in whose quivering frames the cruel *Review* had fleshed its maiden

my thoughts on the Revolution, and, therefore, pray send off your countermand to Macaulay. . . . I can trust no one but myself with it, either in or out of Parliament. . . . I have already begun my article, and it is of great importance that it should stand at the head" (p. 88). Nevertheless, the generally cordial relations of the writers for the *Edinburgh* with one another and with their editor by no means justify the caustic estimate made in the last number of their old Scotch rival edited by the late genial golf-player of St. Andrew's.

* "Barry Cornwall's" Charles Lamb, 177. "That accursed *Quarterly*"—Lamb to Southey. *Life of Southey*, v. 152.

† "Christopher North:" a Memoir of John Wilson, ii. 105, where Lockhart writes that the whole stock is not worth five shillings.

sword, Shelley and Keats, were dead. None with a human heart could now slash and hack at Lamb. Public taste was undergoing civilisation; and Lockhart was at least too shrewd, if not too kind, to perpetuate modes of warfare of which men were weary. Even "the scorpion who delighteth to sting the faces of men" may tire of the sport. A milder reign accordingly began, broken but now and then by stabs in the old style. In their respective situations Napier and Lockhart, notable editors as they were, served well to fill the period leading from the vivacious pugnacity of the epoch of the Napoleonic war to the more ponderous decorum of the latest generation.

The heavy artillery of the *Quarterly* had not long been levelled against the *Edinburgh*, when an assailant of lighter arms sprang up nearer home. Some thirty rounds had been fired in the cannonade when, in 1817, *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* appeared with glittering rapier on the field. Here Wilson poured out the gorgeous wealth of his genius; here Lockhart wrought his "splendid sins" and sowed his literary wild oats.

The *Edinburgh Monthly Magazine*, published by the new firm of Blackwood, appeared in April, 1817. It was a mild miscellany. The coincidence that its editorial projectors, Messrs. Cleghorn and Pringle, were both lame was not unsymbolical, though they wielded no hammer of Hephæstus. Great, then, was the surprise of the Northern capital when it read the seventh number, issued in October. The superscription now was for the first time *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*.* The change of title answered to a change of nature—the halt was suddenly an athlete. The invective against Coleridge, the ferocious onslaught on Leigh Hunt and the Cockney School of Poetry, above all, the daring "Chaldee Manuscript,"

* The promoters of the original *Blackwood* had amalgamated their venture with the old *Scots' Magazine*.

holding up all literary Edinburgh to ridicule and scorn under thinnest veil of disguise, were the manifest work, not of cheap splutterers, but of giants of the pen. The Whigs found themselves swept by a tempest of ridicule and vituperation compared with which any storms that they had raised were gentle breezes. This outburst of satiric genius was covered with impenetrable mystery. Who were these new masters of the reviewer's battle-axe and stiletto? There were "Dicaledon," "Wm. Scoresby, jun.," "H. M.," "T. B.," "J. R.," "Dandie Dinmont," and the terrible "Z.," among the first contributors; but none could fix the identity of any one of these. The mystification grew darker and darker as number followed number. All that was clear was that the days were over in which it could be sung in Edinburgh,

"Tories, tongue-tied, dare not speak."*

Tories dared not only speak, but inveigh, asperse, and libel. The courts of law were soon at work, and the "nimble, active-looking man of middle age," with the "sanguineous" complexion and the "intelligent, keen, and sagacious countenance," who founded the great house of Blackwood, was mulcted in damages for the exuberant frolic of his indiscreet and anonymous contributors.

From the host of writers who created the early *Blackwood*, including Hogg and De Quincey, Brewster and Scott, the Hamiltons, and many others, two stand out conspicuous for the stamp of genius they have left upon that caustic serial. John Gibson Lockhart, whom we have already encountered at a later crisis of his career, and John Wilson were the real *Blackwood*; though the common assumption that the magazine was ever actually edited outside the family of the publisher is once more refuted in the latest issue by the writer of a tribute to the last of that race removed by the hand of death. The permanent importance of the early

* *Blackwood*, October, 1817, p. 89, "Curious Old Song."

history of the publication in the annals of periodical literature lies in the brilliant but unscrupulous warfare which these two men introduced on the literary arena. It was not enough anonymously to mar honest reputations; the names of men totally innocent alike of will and power to make such communications were forged in signature to all kinds of random banter in prose and verse. Hogg suffered thus repeatedly, and bore it with a smile. The illiterate "Odontist," Dr. Scott, met like treatment, and accepted with every satisfaction his unearned and ludicrous renown. Other men resented bitterly the audacity of such unhand-some jests. But the flame of genius burnt too clearly, though often fed with garbage, to be denied the admiration of the world, and *Blackwood* and "the Edinburgh lads" sprang into a literary fame which the serial has never wholly lost, while it has long since made amplest atonement for the hot fervour of its youth. After a trenchant attack upon *Blackwood's* tone and substance, "nevertheless," says the *London Magazine*, in 1820, "its faults, gross as they are, bear the character of whims and flights rather than of radical vices."

The *Edinburgh Review* might well be deemed sufficiently engaged with two such adversaries as the *Quarterly* and *Blackwood*. These, however, had both made their attack in front; they fought for what they supposed to be "order," against the "progress" for which their elder contemporary did battle. But a new foe was presently to break upon the flank of the great Review. In 1823, Jeremy Bentham had gathered round him a little band of philosophic retainers, whom he had filled with chivalric ambition to champion the Utilitarian creed. The great philosopher viewed with little satisfaction the division of philosophical and political discussion between the Tory and the Whig Reviewers, and fifteen years after the appearance of the *Quarterly* he brought into existence, at his own expense, the *Westminster*

Review. The editorship, declined by James Mill, was accepted by John Bowring, already distinguished, though but thirty-one, as a traveller, a linguist, and a Radical. With him was presently associated, for the literary department, Henry Southern, in whose hands the *Retrospective Review* passed part of its career, and the unfortunate *London Magazine* expired.

John Stuart Mill has passed a severe judgment on the editorial qualifications of Bowring. Yet, issuing from a group of writers too small to be called a school, the *Review* under him won an audience and exercised an influence so large as to reflect high credit on his industry and talent. The first paper was the work of W. J. Fox, the "Norwich Weaver Boy."* It is a brilliant and earnest critique on current criticism, a plea for kindness to authors that the sacred flame may not be quenched. Bowring himself, the man whom Hood declared

able

To tell you what's o'clock in all
The dial-ects of Babel,

discussed in this same first number, the Politics and Literature of Russia. Bingham snubbed Thomas Moore like any Edinburgh Reviewer, and wrote four other articles as well. And James Mill blew the changes on the trumpet of defiance through sixty pages, elaborately analysing and denouncing the "aristocratical" proclivities, not of the Tory *Quarterly* only, but of the Liberal *Edinburgh* much more. This article won renown; but to our mind the calmer argument of Fox in the introduction, and the marvellously keen attack by Mill's precocious son, but eighteen years of age, in the April number, are both superior in power to the more ambitious assault by the historian of British India. The warfare of the two Reviews, in the co-existence of which the *Quarterly* gleefully discovered division in the

* Bowring's Autobiographical Recollections, p. 73.

enemy's ranks, reached its highest pitch of interest when the daring genius of young Macaulay was pitted, as he supposed, against the octogenarian philosopher who sustained the more Radical publication, in reality against the practised reasoning of James Mill.

The early contributors to the *Westminster* comprised, besides those named already, the two Austins, Grote, Roebuck, Perronet Thompson, Thompson's brother-in-law, Charles Barker, Edgar Taylor, Henry Roscoe, Southwood Smith, Fonblanque, William Ellis, Eyton Tooke, and others. But the younger Mill was the most prolific writer for its pages, taking credit for twenty-one articles in the first eighteen numbers,—a rate of contribution not comparable, indeed, with Jeffrey's seventy-five and Brougham's eighty articles in the first five years of the *Edinburgh*, but far outstripping anything which can be ventured in a magazine adopting that wholesome rule of signatures suggested seventy years ago by Cumberland, and pronounced by Sir Walter Scott an "extraordinary proposal" which "must prove fatal to the undertaking."*

But, in 1828, Stuart Mill, with his father, ceased to write for the Review, which the *London Magazine*, a year later, called, "the clever champion of things as they are not, in Church, State, and elsewhere." We have but one side of the dispute which severed the Mills from Bowering, and cannot, therefore, pronounce upon its merits.† It was not till six years later that the son, backed by Sir William Molesworth, established the *London Review* "to take the place which the *Westminster Review* had been intended to fill."‡ The competition between the two organs of "philosophic Radicalism" was brief. Molesworth bought the older periodical from General Thompson, and the two were thenceforth merged in one, bearing the double title;

* Lockh., ii. 230.

† J. S. Mill's Autobiography, p. 130.

‡ Autobiography, p. 199.

and, owing partly to the intellectual divergences between the father and his son, for the first time in periodical literature the individualisation of articles by subscribed initial or other device was adopted systematically. James Mill soon died; and notwithstanding the telling effect which he attributes to his applause of Lord Durham's Canadian policy and his welcome of Carlyle's "French Revolution," John Stuart himself has virtually pronounced his own editorship a failure. In 1840, he made over the whole property to Mr. Hickson, and he, who at eighteen had charged the *Edinburgh* with the most "gross hypocrisy," at twice that age, more wise and temperate, found in it the happiest vehicle for his most important thoughts. Mr. Hickson, with self-abnegating zeal, carried on the *Review* for some ten years. At the expiration of that time the circulation had sunk to one thousand copies; and Mr. Hickson not unwillingly conveyed the *Review* to Mr. John Chapman. Mr. Chapman hoped for the continued support of Mr. Lombe, a well-known Norfolk landowner. Mæcenas, however, not "sprung from ancestral kings," was extremely Radical, and to Mr. Chapman's professions of inability to find able writers of that type, he replied that there were plenty of clever young barristers with nothing to do. The rejoinder of the editor that articles, to have weight, must come of sincere conviction is said to have angered Mr. Lombe, who withdrew from the negotiation; but the first number under Mr. Chapman's auspices won back the patron's interest, and it was only his sudden death that prevented his rendering the *Review* the cordial pecuniary support of which it stood so much in need.

The battles of the gods, from the foundation of the *Edinburgh* downwards, have now been in barest outline recorded. Each of these renowned periodicals has wielded formative power in the moulding of British sentiment and thought. Each filled a place important, useful, and even

(save in the case of *Blackwood*) necessary in the evolution of literature and politics. But mortal men also had their frays; and it would become us, were space and the reader's patience at our command, to relate the warfare which the *New Monthly Magazine* waged against that *Monthly Magazine* of which we have already told. Like the little star that rises before the sun, the *New Monthly* shone with Blackwoodian light before the rise of "Maga." As the Leopard and the Scorpion smote Brougham and Jeffrey, the *New Monthly*, appearing in 1814, smote the *Monthly*. "The political poison so artfully introduced into every department of that work," it declared in preface to its opening volume, "and mixed up with a due proportion of ribaldry and irreligion, was calculated to produce a mischievous impression upon the minds of the unthinking and inexperienced at home, and to misrepresent and degrade the character of the country abroad." This miscellany ran a not undistinguished career. In various guises it was edited successively by the poet Campbell (who afterwards set up the short-lived *Metropolitan*); by S. C. Hall (not, as often alleged, by Bulwer*); by Theodore Hook; by Thomas Hood; by Harrison Ainsworth. In 1824, there was an immense number of monthlies in England, metropolitan and provincial; in Scotland many; in Ireland not one. In 1826, wreck was made of several. The *Annual Review*, the *British Review*, which owes an equivocal immortality to Byron's jest,† the *Literary Panorama* (united to the *New Monthly* in 1819), the famous *Pamphleteer* (not a regular periodical), the *Retrospective Review* (which looked back on the literature of the past), these all had their stories

* e.g. By Mr. Longfellow, who, in the *North American Review* (April, 1837), writes that, from 1831 to 1833, "Bulwer, the novelist, slept in the editorial chair." So also Allibone. Cf. S. C. Hall's "Book of Memories," vii., where he claims to have edited the *New Monthly* from 1830 to 1836.

† For fear some prudish readers should grow skittish,
I've bribed my grandmother's review—the British.

DON JUAN.

of success or failure. More deeply interesting was the *London Magazine*, which revived a name once famed, and won its own fame—bright, though brief—by giving home, not to Elia alone of the witty and the wise, but to Carlyle, to Hazlitt, to De Quincey with his marvellous “Confessions;” to “stalwart” Allan Cunningham, to Keats, Montgomery, and Landor, to Julius Hare and Hartley Coleridge, to “Barry Cornwall” and to Cary. Yet a vein of tragedy runs through the memory of the second *London* in the stern fate of John Scott, its editor, and a vein of horror in its association with the name of the “light-hearted,” flashy essayist and convict, Thomas Griffiths Wainwright. More fascinating still, perhaps, is the short tale of *Knight's Quarterly Magazine*, written mainly by that dazzling group of Cantabs—lads every one—Praed, Macaulay, Moultrie, Derwent and Henry Nelson Coleridge, Sidney Walker, Malden, with other young collegians; and presently, allied with them, the graver Davenport Hill. Said the Introduction:—

“Some of us have no occupation. Some of us have no money.
Some of us are desperately in love. Some of us are desperately in debt.

Many of us are very clever, and wish to convince the public of the fact.

Several of us have never written a line.

Several of us have written a great many, and wish to write more.

For all these reasons, we intend to write a Book.” *

All which was true, yet did not avail to save the book, after a short life and a merry, from extinction.

Of Reviews or Magazines beginning later than the *Westminster*, *Fraser* and *Tait* tempt us most to linger. *Fraser's* story, begun in revelry, touched with tragedy, continued in gravity, has been so well and so authoritatively told quite

* Passages of a Working Life, i. 297. Cf. Memoir of M. Davenport Hill, p. 67.

recently that we shall not stay upon it.* Its early tale of writers was brilliant indeed, yet its lasting fame must rest on the fact that it was of it that Carlyle wrote in reference to "Sartor Resartus," how the latter "had at last to clip itself in pieces, and be content to struggle out, bit by bit, in some courageous Magazine that offered." The dashing career of *Tait's Edinburgh Magazine*, with which, in 1834, was incorporated *Johnston's*, made for it a place and name even in the crowded literature which the early days of Reform achieved. Its vigorous publisher and editor declared it to have three times the circulation of the *Edinburgh* or *Blackwood*. Few who read it can have forgotten its vehement advocacy of Liberal ideas and policy. It is not without filial pride that we reflect that the "Question of Questions" and other stirring appeals came from the active pen of George Armstrong, once incumbent of Bangor, County Down, afterwards colleague and successor of Dr. Lant Carpenter, at Bristol. To *Tait's* the prolific De Quincey sent much of what Mr. Leslie Stephen is pleased to call his "respectable padding."

The *Foreign Quarterly Review* of 1827, associated with the names of Walter Scott, Carlyle, and Southey, and edited by Gillies and Fraser, had its own editorial disputes; it can, however, but be named and commended for its attempt to make British readers care for and comprehend Continental literature. Of the host of monthly and the few quarterly publications sprung up in the last quarter of a century, we dare not write. "Boz," with his *Bentley's Miscellany*, and Ainsworth, with his own *Magazine*, led the way for *Macmillan* and the *Cornhill*, begun respectively in 1859 and 1860. Who could pass by unquoted Thackeray's prospectus to the latter, with its record that a title proposed, but rejected, was "The Thames on Fire," and the intimation, "At the social board we shall suppose ladies and children

* *Fraser's Magazine*, July, 1879. Cf. *Daily News*, Nov. 28, 1879.

always present; we shall not set rival politicians by the ears; we shall listen to every guest who has an apt word to say; and, I hope, induce clergymen of various denominations to say grace in their turn"? The almost fabulous circulation of the *Cornhill* in its youthful days testifies how nicely the kindly satirist understood the taste of a new and more refined generation.

We do not propose to discuss the rise and progress of the most influential Monthlies of the present day further than is essential to our immediate purpose. The *Fortnightly Review*, published for its first year and a half at the intervals indicated by its title, was started by the late George Henry Lewes in the summer of 1865, with the quite new purpose of distinctly encouraging the expression of mutually opposed opinions in religion, philosophy, and sociology. That novel principle of comprehension was, however, unquestionably adopted under the conviction that this impartial hospitality to hostile systems must tend to the increase of the philosophy held by the promoters and claiming the name of Positive. To take no part is possible to no man of parts; and while, both under Mr. Lewes and his accomplished successor, the *Review* has been conducted with thorough loyalty to its original principle, its net result has naturally been to strengthen Agnostic opinion and weaken Christian or theistic belief. The *Contemporary Review* was founded a few months later, based on the same broad principle; only, its centre of gravity has been nearer to traditional Christian orthodoxy, and the general set of its influence has been towards a more Conservative religious position. The third of "the impartial," taking its name from this age of intellectual ferment in which we live, betrays, indeed, no preference in school or sect. Its talented editor entertains a brilliant company, and if a man's talk is good, and he is one whom guests will be glad to meet, think as he will, be he Bishop or Bohemian, he is

welcome at that glittering board. Of the service which these three real "eclectics" have done to the sacred cause of free thought and expression there can be no question: yet we hold that no one of them has perfectly reflected the intellectual and religious groupings of men in our generation.

The periodicals thus far enumerated belong to the broad path of literature. It was inevitable and useful that other Magazines should arise avowedly devoted to the promotion of an interest or a principle. In the religious sphere this has been markedly the case. To count up the organs of the sects would, indeed, be wearisome. The *Evangelical Magazine* has already found mention in connection with its great castigator in the *Edinburgh*; the *Gospel Magazine* was begun in 1766; the *Protestant Dissenters' Magazine*, in 1794. Three years after the establishment of the *Edinburgh*, the *Eclectic Review* appeared. Conducted at times with ability, particularly under the editorship of Josiah Conder, in whose time Robert Hall "irradiated its pages,"* and James Montgomery, Adam Clarke, and John Foster were contributors, it was the organ of the Orthodoxy of the Independents, and maintained from the first its strictly evangelical tone. The preface to its fourth series, begun in 1837, relates how it was originally founded "by a number of gentlemen who were solicitous to rescue the literature of our country from the dogmatism of superficial critics and the irreligious influence of a semi-infidel party"—all which was meant for Jeffrey and his band. The *British Quarterly Review* may fairly claim to be "matre pulchra filia pulchrior." Francis Newman has left in old volumes of the *Eclectic* some memorials of his own evangelical days.

A religious Review belonging to a very different party is associated with the fame of Francis Newman's illustrious

* Gilfillan's *Literary Portraits*, i. 4.

brother. The chance of the *British Critic* retaining a name in literature rests in the fact that, from July, 1838, to July, 1841, John Henry Newman occupied its editorial chair. These years fell in the very crisis of his mental story. Already the *British Magazine* had given shelter to his own sweet hymns, along with those of Keble, of Isaac Williams, of Hurrell Froude, of Bowden, and of Wilberforce. Already the "Tracts for the Times" had called forth the admiration or the alarm of Churchmen throughout the country. The *British Critic* had, since 1793, borne the name of Rivington upon its title-page, guarantee sufficient of its policy, which was always "Anglican," and of its tone, which was always dignified. But it was at the beginning of those three years that Newman made it the vehicle of his enthusiastic advocacy of the "Via Media" between Protestantism and Romanism. Beneath that road that seemed so safe and fair, a mine was sprung. The period of the great Tractarian's fiery mental struggle had begun. In the last number which he edited, the *Critic* avers: "If our own communion were to own itself Protestant, . . . then, doubtless, for a season, Catholic minds among us would be unable to see their way." In 1841, Newman ceased to edit. In 1843, the *Critic* ceased to appear. In 1845, Newman submitted to the Roman Church.*

Of the *Dublin Review*, commenced in 1836, and other Roman Catholic organs, we do not propose to speak; nor of the *North British Review*, at first the able representative of Free Kirk principles, and but recently deceased. It is more to our purpose to turn to a procession of periodicals originating in a quarter very different from either of these.

As far back as 1769, Priestley projected the *Theological Repository*, with its Horatian motto, "Si quid novisti rectius istis, candidus imperti," and through its columns he inured a section of the reading world to the idea of the free discus-

* Apologia, Edition of 1875, pp. 60, 75, 94, 104, 112, 113, 114, &c.

sion of religious opinion in a periodical publication. The *Monthly Repository* (1806), as edited by Robert Aspland, maintained this feature, but turned its chief energies to the battles against Nonconformist and especially Unitarian Disabilities. Many of those battles were already won when W. J. Fox assumed editorial responsibilities, and under his guidance the lines of the *Repository* were widened to embrace, with theological liberality and a broad Biblical criticism, topics of general literature and politics, in both of which departments the younger Mill was a contributor. Thus the way was prepared for the brief editorship of the author of "Orion," and the genial but certainly "boyish" management of Leigh Hunt. Hunt, on assuming command in July, 1837, thus "addresses the reader": "The *Monthly Repository* was for a long time in the hands of a most respectable and liberal sect, but still a sect; and it was with great difficulty it partly extricated itself from the consequences. Mr. Fox boldly broke the chain, and may be said to have tried the numerous friends who remained with his editorship in truly golden fires. Mr. Horne, his successor, never having been connected with any sect, was enabled still further to throw open the speculative character of the magazine; and he brought to it new zeal for his own departments of literature, which thus extended it in fresh quarters." He adds that the magazine will now aim at merging all Christian sects "into one great unsectarian brotherhood of placid differers in opinion and exalters of the spirit above the letter." It will be "very unsectarian, very miscellaneous . . . and an ardent reformer, without thinking it necessary to mistake brick-bats for arguments, or a scuffling with other people's legs for 'social advancement.'" Hunt was very sanguine of the success of this editorial venture. The *Repository*, however, had lost its *raison d'être*, and it was soon swamped in the great sea of periodical literature. It was in this magazine in its and her Unitarian days that

Harriet Martineau first tried her wings;* her successful flights and the kind editorial encouragement so filled her mind and busied her tongue that Sydney Smith was heard to say of her, "She is always talking of a Mr. Fox whom nobody knows, and of a *Monthly Repository* which nobody reads."

Nearly synchronous with the disappearance of this publication was the rise of the modest but able and devout *Christian Teacher*, which was merged, in 1845, into the more ambitious *Prospective Review*. Though known to be edited by four eminent Unitarian Ministers, Messrs. John James Tayler, James Martineau, J. H. Thom, and Charles Wicksteed, the *Prospective*, by its literary merit, its high scholarship, and, above all, its broad and bold, yet reverent treatment of all religious questions, won the respectful attention of men of thought and letters far outside any denominational circles. Lord King, Lord Houghton, Blanco White, Walter Bagehot, and William Caldwell Roscoe, were among the collaborators, and the last of these ultimately shared editorial responsibility. The *Prospective* died in 1855, after some overtures from both sides for amalgamation with the *Westminster*, and gave place to the *National Review*, understood to reflect the minds of the two first-named among the editors of its predecessor, and to be intended, not merely to occupy the place by it vacated, but to counteract the pronouncedly negative tendencies which had given dissatisfaction even to some writers on the *Westminster*. The student of English theology needs not to be reminded that in the *National* first appeared the remarkable essays of Mr. R. H. Hutton, who indeed sat in editorial chair.

Thus was carried on, from the early days of George III. to times within the memory of young men now, the succession of Reviews devoted to the free discussion of theology

* Autobiography, Period ii., sections ii. iii.

in its philosophical, critical, and historical aspects. The *Theological Review*, which for the last sixteen years has trodden the same thorny but fruitful path started from a stately Unitarian standpoint. But the Unitarians have throughout their history been distinguished by the breadth of their intellectual sympathies, and the co-operation of competent scholars and thinkers from every Church wherein liberalism is possible gave to the *Theological* a position less and less identified with any group of Churches and more and more representative of the best and most liberal culture among English theologians.*

Augescunt aliæ gentes, aliæ minuuntur,
Inque brevi spatio mutantur sæcla animantium
Et quasi cursores vitæ lampada tradunt.

Two-fold is the tradition of the *λαμπαδηφορία*, the race with the flaming torch. Did runner after runner, weary with the course, hand on to his comrade the burning light that he with fresh zest and unspent limb should bear it on through the darkness of the night? Or did many athletes press swift feet upon the ground, each bearing aloft his link of flame, and he win the wreath and plaudits of the Hellenes, who first, *with light still burning*, touched the goal? Commentators find traces of each method of contest, and even of both combined. We, too, would run our race. In short space the generations of the living change, and, like runners on the course, age hands down to age the lamp of life. We, too, would grasp the torch fed with the oil of the

* It is strange that the literary historian has never been attracted by the subject of the foregoing rapid and meagre sketch. Yet this most imperfect account is the first general *conspectus*, so far as we are aware, of British Review literature. Continental and American Reviews we have not touched, nor the important weekly organs of criticism. Mr. Poole, in the Introduction to his useful Index to Periodicals, in 1853, half promised an historical work on the leading Reviews and Magazines; but the Chicago Librarian has been too busy to accomplish his design.

ages that are gone, and so mingle the light of the wisdom of the dead with the dawning glow of the coming day. Or, we will take it otherwise: and we will race with the fleetest down the course, eager as any to move swiftly on the free path of progress. We will linger behind the steps not even of the most advanced. Yet, though we meet the keen breeze of the modern spirit, that air, bracing to us who bear the torch, shall not quench the flame of faith, but fan it to a ruddier blaze. We would press to the goal with the first, yet carry with us undimmed the steadfast light whose wick is plaited of faith and hope and love.

We have no quarrel with any of the great literary organs. The bitterness of controversy is passed away; nor have we controversy with any Review that sustains the literary repute of our time. Only, while some are, with perfect propriety, devoted to the interests of school or sect, and others, with truest liberality, hold impartial balance between "Orthodox" Catholic or Protestant on the one hand, and Positive Philosopher or Atheistically-inclined Agnostic on the other, we note that a group of schools, in love with liberty, pledged to progress, reverent in religious aspiration and affirmation, address the public through none of these; and we note a deepening and outspreading impression (as we think, in consequence) upon the public mind, that, where Faith is, Reason has no footing, and, where Reason rules, Faith cannot dwell,—that Religion and Science are offered to the world alternatively, and the world must make its choice between. Believing that impression false, pernicious, and removable, we make it our purpose to do what in us lies towards its removal.

To this end the philosopher shall discuss in our pages, with boldest and freest words, the fundamental problems that tax the human mind; the physicist shall show how fearlessly men who still pray to God may plunge into the recesses of Nature's holy secrets; the historian shall tell

how, in times and lands remote, the generations have thought and felt concerning Man, his whence, his whither, his bonds to the Eternal; the scholar shall entice the reader into the practice of that criticism which, to many who have not understood its spirit or its aim, appears "malicious,"* but to us seems beneficently "Reconstructive" of the story of how ancient tribes wondrously groped their way towards the clear-shining light of God; the citizens of foreign lands shall tell us through what hopes and fears they still fight their way towards liberties in Church or home for us won long ago; the student of lives that have been gathered away from earth in centuries gone by or in these days of ours shall write their record for the monument of those who lived them; the man in whose heart religion is a living power shall invite others to kneel with him within the shrine.

THE EDITOR.

* The *Expositor*, No. I. p. 1.

THE FORCE BEHIND NATURE.

SOME thirty years ago, I enjoyed opportunities of discussing with John Stuart Mill (whose younger brother had been for twelve months an inmate of my house) many questions of Philosophy in which we both felt the deepest interest. Among these was the Doctrine of Causation set forth in his recently-published "System of Logic:"—"We may define the cause of a phenomenon to be the antecedent, or the concurrence of antecedents, on which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent." I pointed out to my friend that when this assemblage of conditions is analysed, it is uniformly found resolvable into two categories, which may be distinguished as the *dynamical* and the *material*; the former supplying the *force* or *power* to which the change must be attributed, whilst the latter affords the *conditions* under which that power is exerted. Thus, I urged, when a man falls from a ladder *because* (as is commonly said) of the breaking of the rung on which his foot was resting, the real or *dynamical* cause of his fall is the force of Gravity, or attraction of the Earth, which pulls him to the ground when his foot is no longer supported; the loss of support being only the *material condition* or *collocation*, which allowed the force previously acting as *pressure* on the rung, to produce the downward *motion* of the man who stood upon it.

To this Mr. Mill's reply was, that the distinction is one of Metaphysics, not of Logic. I ventured, however, to press

on him that to whichever department of philosophy this point is to be referred, it is one of fundamental importance; that, assuming experience as the basis of our knowledge, we recognise the downward tendency of every body heavier than air, by our sense of muscular tension in lifting it from the ground, or in resisting its descent towards the earth; and that our cognition of *force* through this form of sensation, being thus quite as immediate and direct as our cognition of *motion* through the visual sense, ought to be equally taken account of.

The promulgation, about the same time, of the doctrine of the "Correlation of the Physical Forces" by Professor (now Sir William) Grove, and the researches of Mr. Joule on the "Mechanical Equivalent of Heat," seemed to me to bring this view of *dynamical* causation into yet greater importance; by showing that what is true of that form of Force which produces or resists mechanical (or what is now distinguished as *molar*) Motion, may be legitimately extended to those other forms which are manifested in the *molecular* changes that express themselves in Chemical action, or impress us with the sensations of Heat, Light, &c. Partaking of the general ignorance at that time prevalent in this country of the doctrine of "Conservation of Energy," already promulgated in Germany by Mayer and Helmholtz, I myself endeavoured to carry Professor Grove's principle into the domain of Biology; by showing that what Physiologists had been accustomed to call Vital Force, may be regarded as having the same "correlation" with the various forms of Physical Force as they have with each other.* And in the introduction to the fourth edition of my "Human Physiology" (published in 1853), I thus explicitly defined my position:—

"When this assemblage of antecedents is analysed, it is uni-

* "On the Mutual Relations of the Vital and Physical Forces," in *Philos. Transact.* 1850.

formly found that they may be resolved into two categories, which may be distinguished as the *dynamical* and the *material*, the former supplying the *force* or *power* to which the change must be attributed, whilst the latter afford the *conditions* under which that power is exerted. Thus in a steam-engine we see the dynamical agency of heat made to produce mechanical power by the mode in which it is applied: first, to impart a mutual repulsion to the particles of water; and then, by means of that mutual repulsion, to give motion to the various solid parts of which the machine is composed. And thus, if asked what is the cause of the movement of the steam-engine, we distinguish in our reply between the *dynamical* condition supplied by the heat, and the *material* condition (or assemblage of conditions) afforded by the 'collocation' of the boiler, cylinder, piston, valves, &c. . . . In like manner, if we inquire into the cause of the germination of a seed—which has been brought to the surface of the earth, after remaining dormant through having been buried deep beneath the soil for (it may be) thousands of years—we are told that the phenomenon depends upon warmth, moisture, and oxygen; but out of these we single warmth as the *dynamical* condition, whilst the oxygen and the water, with the organised structure of the seed itself, and the organic compounds which are stored up in its substance, constitute the *material*."

The subsequent general recognition by the scientific world of the "correlation" between the Forces of Nature (under whatever form expressed) has thus given a breadth of foundation to the dynamical doctrine of Causation which it previously lacked; and the doctrine having been afterwards formally developed by Professor Bain, was summarised by J. S. Mill in the later editions of his "Logic," almost in the very terms in which I had originally propounded it to him in conversation, and had publicly expressed it in the extract just cited:—"The chief
"practical conclusion drawn by Professor Bain, bearing
"on causation, is that we must distinguish in the assemblage of conditions which constitutes the cause of a
"phenomenon, two elements: one, the presence of a
"force; the other, the collocation or position of objects

"which is required in order that the force may undergo the particular transmutation which constitutes the phenomenon." * Mr. Mill himself still preferred, however, to express the principle in terms of Motion, rather than in terms of Force:—"If the effect, or any part of the effect, to be accounted for consists in putting matter in motion, then any of the objects present which has lost motion has contributed to the effect; and this is the true meaning of the proposition that the cause is that one of the antecedents which exerts active force." As this mode of expressing the facts is sanctioned by high authorities at the present time, it may be well for me to explain more fully the basis of my original contention, that our cognition of *force* is quite as immediate and direct as our cognition of *motion*; in fact (as I think I shall be able to prove), even more fundamental, inasmuch as our cognition of Matter itself is in great degree dependent upon it.

It has been recently well said that "all true Science involves both the knowledge of Nature and the knowledge of Man; it includes the study of Mind, as well as of Matter. A philosopher may pursue either, but he can have no complete knowledge of what he investigates, without borrowing from the other department of investigation." † Many of the Nature-philosophers who affirm that we have no knowledge of anything but the Matter and Motion which lie within the range of "experience," show themselves very imperfectly acquainted with what "experience" really means; unhesitatingly ranking as actual objective facts their own mental interpretations of the sensory impressions they receive from external objects. Many Metaphysicians, on the other hand, have reasoned as if our concern were with mental operations alone, and as if the abstractions in which

* "System of Logic," 8th Ed. Vol. 1, p. 406.

† "Natural Theology of the Doctrine of the Forces." By Professor Benjamin Martin, of the University of the City of New York.

they deal had an existence *per se*, without any relation to the phenomena of Nature. But among the ablest thinkers of the present time, there seems to be now a pretty general recognition of the necessity for the replacement of the abstract definitions of Metaphysics—so far, at least, as they relate to the external world—by Psychological expressions of the modes in which the Human *ego* is affected by its changes. Thus the ordinary metaphysical definition of “matter” is that which possesses “extension.” But for this definition to convey any definite idea to our minds, we must know what “extension” means; and this, we are told, is the “occupation of space.” Now, the conception of “space,” in the opinion of most Psychologists, is ordinarily derived from our interpretation of *visual* sensations; and yet these may be altogether deceptive. When we look at a window from a short distance, we cannot tell by the use of our eyes alone whether the space included by its frame is void, or is occupied by a perfectly transparent and colourless glass. A glass globe is held up in front of it, and we cannot tell by looking at it whether it is empty, or is filled with pure water or some other transparent colourless liquid. And we can take no cognisance by our vision of the atmosphere which surrounds us, unless its transparence is interfered with by mist or fog.—Clearly, then, our Visual sense cannot *per se* furnish us with a satisfactory definition of Matter.*

Now that we have got rid of the fiction of “imponderables,” we might fall back on a definition of Matter—in use before that fiction was invented—as that which

* According to Professor Bain, the conception of Space is essentially based on the sense of muscular tension which, according to him, we experience in the ordinary movements of our eyes. But I am satisfied that this is physiologically erroneous. These movements are ordinarily guided, as Professor Alison long ago contended, and as Professor Helmholtz and I myself have since experimentally proved, by the visual, not by the muscular sense; and it is only when we put the muscles to an unusual strain—as when our visual axes converge on an object brought nearer and nearer to the eyes, or when we entirely exclude light from the retina, that we experience any sense of tension in their muscles.

possesses "Ponderosity" or Weight. But what is Weight? The downward tendency, it may be replied, in virtue of which all unsupported bodies fall to the Earth. But what is this "tendency"? We might see any number of bodies falling to the ground, and might frame a correct law of their Motion, without having the remotest conception of their possessing that downward *pressure*, which we at once recognise when we take a lump of lead or iron into our hands; and it is obviously on our cognition of this pressure, that our idea of Weight or Ponderosity is based. Now the instrumentality through which we take cognisance of it seems to me to be threefold. In the *first* place, we have the sense of simple pressure on the tactile surface; as when, the hand passively resting on a table, a weight is laid upon it. *Secondly*, we recognise it by the sense of *tension* which we experience when a weight is attached to a pendent limb, and which we refer to the muscles and ligaments which are thus put on the stretch; or when, the hand resting on the top of a cylinder of glass placed over an air-pump, the air is exhausted from beneath, so as to make us *feel* the downward "pressure of the atmosphere." In these two cases, the mind is the passive recipient of the sensory impressions. But, *thirdly*, when we determinately lift a weight or hold it suspended by our hands, we experience, in addition to the sense of pressure and the sense of tension, a *sense of effort*, which we recognise as an *immediate* revelation of consciousness, not referrible to any physical impression, but of the same kind as that which we experience in a purely mental act, such as the fixation of the attention. And a little consideration will, I think, make it clear that it is on this "sense of effort" in resisting downward pressure, that our cognition of Weight is essentially based.

For, in the *first* place, the *continuance* of a moderate pressure on the Cutaneous surface, like other sensory impres-

sions that become habitual, soon ceases to affect us sensorially; for we cognosce rather the *changes* in the states of our Sense-organs, than the states themselves. Or, again, we may suffer under a temporary or permanent paralysis of the cutaneous sense, that may prevent our feeling the contact of the body we are lifting or supporting; and yet, recognising its downward pressure in other ways, we can put our muscles into action to antagonise it. But, *secondly*, this paralysis may extend to the Muscular sense, so that the feeling of muscular tension is wanting, as well as that of contact-pressure; and yet none the less can a weight be lifted or sustained by a conscious effort, provided that the deficiency of the guiding sensations ordinarily derived from the muscle itself is supplied by the sight. A woman whose arm is sensorially but not motorially paralysed, can hold up her child as long as she looks at it; and a man affected with the like paralysis of his legs, can stand and walk while looking at his feet. But, *thirdly*, since the *mental sense of effort* is experienced in every determinate exercise of our muscular power, and is, as all experience teaches, a necessary condition of that exercise; since, again, it is proportioned to the exertion we put forth, and continues as long as that exertion is sustained—it is in this, and not in the cutaneous or muscular impressions, which are (so to speak) accidental, that (as it seems to me) we find the real basis of our cognition of the “ponderosity” of Matter.

But “ponderosity” cannot be considered an essential property of Matter, being merely the “accident” of the Earth’s attraction for bodies lying within its range. This attraction varies with the distance of a body from the centre of the earth; and a body occupying the common centre of gravity of the Earth and Sun would be equally drawn towards both, and would consequently have no “weight.” We must, therefore, seek a satisfactory definition of Matter elsewhere; and we find the clue to it in the consideration

that the sense of effort we experience in antagonising the downward pressure of a body, is but a particular case of our more general cognition of *resistance*. When we project our hand against a hard and fixed solid body, our consciousness of its resistance to our pressure is exactly that which we experience when we try to raise a weight that we have not strength to lift; whilst if that solid be either yielding in its parts or movable as a whole, we measure its resistance, as in lifting a weight, by our sense of the effort necessary to overcome it. When we move our hand through a liquid, we are conscious of a resistance to its motion, which is greater or less according to the "viscosity" of the liquid. And when we move our open hand through air at rest, we are still conscious of a resistance, our sense of it being augmented by an extension of the surface moved, as in the act of fanning; whilst if the air is in motion, we feel its pressure on the sail of a boat by the "pull" of the sheet we hold in our hand, or on the sails of a windmill by the rotation it imparts, the *force* of which we can estimate by the *effort* we must put forth to resist it. Attenuate any kind of air or gas as we may, its resistance can still be made apparent by the like communication of its own motion to solid bodies. Thus, in Mr. Crookes's wonderful Radiometer, a set of vanes poised on a pivot within a globe of glass exhausted to a *millionth* of its ordinary gaseous contents, is whirled round by the movement excited in the molecules of that residual millionth, either by the Heat of the radiant beam falling on the surface of the globe, or by the passage of an Electric current across its interior; and the mechanical force required to impart that motion can be measured with precision, by bringing it into comparison with some other force (as that of gravity) of which we can take immediate cognisance. And thus, as Herbert Spencer remarks, by the decomposition of our knowledge of any form of matter into simpler

and simpler components, we must come at last to the simplest, to the ultimate material, to the substratum; and this we find in the *impression of resistance* we receive through what we may call our "force-sense." *

Such being the teachings alike of general and of scientific experience, I cannot but feel surprised that any persons claiming the title of Philosophers should affirm that we *know* nothing except Matter and Motion, and that Force is a creation of our own imagination. One might suppose such persons to be either destitute of the "force-sense," or to have based their philosophical system upon the movements of the heavenly bodies which they can only *see*, instead of upon those mundane phenomena in the cognition of which they can bring their *hands* to the assistance of their eyes. How essential this assistance is to the formation of correct conceptions of the solid forms and relative positions of the objects around us, is known to every one who has studied the Physiology of the Senses. Should we not think it absurd on the part of any one who possesses in the use of his hands the means of detecting the error of his visual perceptions, if he were to base a superstructure of reasoning—still more to found a whole system of philosophy—upon the latter alone? Yet such appears to me to be the position of those who deny our direct cognition of Force.

Let us suppose (if possible) a man who had enjoyed the full use of his eyes, but whose limbs had been completely paralysed from infancy, looking on at a game of billiards. He would see a succession of motions connected by regular sequence—the motion of the arm of the player, the stroke of the cue, the roll of the ball, its contact with another ball, the movement of the second ball, the change of direction or the entire stop of the first, the rebound of

* Herbert Spencer considers the cognition of resistance to be essentially derived from the sense of Muscular tension. I have already expressed my reason for now dissenting from this view, which I myself formerly held.

balls from the cushion in altered directions, and so on. And he might frame a statement in "terms of motion" of all that passes before his eyes, thinking this all he can know.—But suppose the limbs of such a man to be suddenly endowed with the ordinary powers of sensation and movement; let him take the cue into his hands and himself strike the ball; let him hold his hand on the table so that the rolling ball shall strike it and make him feel its impact; let him hold the second ball and feel the shock imparted to it by the stroke of the first. Can any one deny that he would thus acquire a dynamical conception linking together the whole succession of phenomena, which he was previously quite incapable of forming; that this dynamical conception is quite as directly based upon the experience derived through his "force-sense," as his kinetic expression was upon that derived through his visual sense; and that this cognition of the Force producing the motions is, therefore, fully as much entitled to be introduced into a logical doctrine of causation, as the visual cognition of the Motions themselves? If it be replied that we have no proof that the movement of the ball we strike is produced by the force which we consciously exert in striking it, I simply reply that we have as much proof of it as we have of anything which rests upon universal experience, and which we can verify experimentally as often as we choose to try—quite as much as we have of the existence of anything whatever that is external to ourselves.

Let us take, again, the simple case of Magnetic Attraction. A man who knows nothing of Magnetism sees a piece of iron, brought within a certain distance of what looks like a horse-shoe bar of the same metal, suddenly jump towards its approximated ends; and might, as before, correctly express the fact in "terms of motion." But let him take the piece of iron in his hands, so as to feel the "pull" upon it when brought sufficiently near the magnet,

and he then becomes conscious, through his force-sense, of a *power* of which he was before utterly ignorant.

Thus, as it seems to me, an analysis of those *psychical* experiences, on which all our cognitions of the *physical* universe around us are really based, irresistibly lands us in the conclusion that, as Herbert Spencer expresses it, "All the sensations through which the external world is known to us, are explicable by us only as resulting from certain forms of Force;" the direct derivation of our conception of Force from our own experience of muscular tension (or as I should myself say, from our own sense of effort) being "a fact which no metaphysical quibbling can set aside." In the words of the able American writer I have already quoted, "The conception of Force is one of those universal ideas which belong of necessity to the intellectual furniture of every human mind." By no one has the principle for which I am contending, been more clearly and more authoritatively expressed than by Sir John Herschel, a philosopher who united to his wonderful grasp of Nature-phenomena a profound insight into the action of the Mind of Man in the interpretation of them:—

"Whatever attempts have been made by metaphysical writers to reason away the connection of cause and effect, and fritter it down into the unsatisfactory relation of habitual [unconditional] sequence, it is certain that the conception of some more real and intimate connection is quite as strongly impressed upon the human mind as that of the existence of an external world, the vindication of whose reality has, strange to say, been regarded as an achievement of no common merit in the annals of this branch of philosophy. It is our own immediate consciousness of *effort*, when we exert Force to put Matter in motion or to oppose and neutralise Force, which gives us this internal conviction of *power* and *causation*, so far as it relates to the material world."—*Treatise on "Astronomy" in Lardner's "Cyclopædia,"* p. 232.

Man's position as the "Interpreter of Nature" may be not inaptly likened (as it seems to me) to that of an intelligent

observer of the working of a cotton-factory, with whose mechanical arrangements he is entirely unacquainted, and of whose moving power he knows nothing whatever. He is taken into a vast apartment,* in which he is at first utterly bewildered by the number and variety of the movements going on around him ; but, by directing his attention to the several machines, *seriatim*, he is able to arrive at a *classification* of them, according to the *kind of work* which each does. Thus he finds one set *carding* the cotton-wool supplied to it, so that its confused tangle gives place to a parallel laying of the fibres. He would see another taking up the bundles of carded wool, and *drawing* them out (after repeated doublings to secure uniformity) into a long soft cord. This cord he would then trace into the *roving* machine, which, by a continuation of the drawing process, further reduces its thickness, at the same time giving it a slight twist to increase its tenacity, so that it admits of being then wound upon bobbins. Thence he would trace the cord into the *spinning* machine, which at the same time stretches and twists the cord, producing from it a yarn whose fineness might vary considerably in different machines. Finally, he would see the spun yarn carried, some as weft and some as woof, into the *power-loom*, from which it emerges as woven cloth—the final resultant of the whole series of operations.

Concentrating now his attention upon any one of these machines, he studies its wheels, levers, and other moving parts, and tries to comprehend their several actions and the bearing of these upon each other. By long and scrutinising observation he masters the whole series of sequences, and traces the distribution of motion from a single large axis, through the hundreds (it may be) of

* In one of the flax-spinning mills belonging to the Marshalls of Leeds, the whole of the work is done on one floor, covering (I believe) two acres of ground, instead of in the usual building of several stories.

separate pieces of the machine directly or indirectly connected with it; and he might thus frame a description of the working of the machine, which might be perfectly correct so far as it goes, and which yet would be defective in one most essential particular—the statement of the *force* or *power* by which it is moved. For, so far as mere visual observation could teach him, the machine might be self-moving; and he might thus attribute to each kind an *inherent power* of carding, roving, drawing, spinning, or weaving, as the case might be.

Carrying his observations further, and noticing that one or another of these machines comes to a standstill, but resumes its motion after an interval, he may include this occasional suspension also in his general expression; but, perplexed by the want of any regularity in its intervals, he will seek some further explanation. Continuing his patient watch, he will see that the stoppage of the machine follows the pulling of a handle by the man in attendance upon it, and that when the handle is pulled the other way, the machine goes on again; and thus he will be led to introduce a certain position of this handle as one of the antecedent conditions of the machine's action. Still pursuing his inquiries, he finds out that the axes of the several machines are all in mechanical relation with one great longitudinal shaft, being connected with it either by continuous bands passing round pulleys, or by trains of wheelwork: and at last he discovers the important fact, that the movement of the handle which stops the machine breaks the continuity of that relation, shifting a strap from a "fast" to a "loose" pulley, or throwing the wheelwork "out of gear;" while the converse movement, which restores that continuity, is followed by the renewed action of the machine, which goes on until the continuity is again broken. Thus he will be led to regard its maintenance as essential to the working of the machine; but nothing that he has yet learned explains

to him *why* it is essential. He has only got at the *material collocation* which his educated vision enables him to recognise; and for anything he knows to the contrary, the change in that collocation may be *in itself* adequate to determine the result.

But let him lay hold of the band which stretches between the main shaft and the axis of one machine, or attempt to stay with his hand the rotation of the train of wheels which connects it with another,—he then at once becomes conscious, through his “force-sense,” of the *power* which the band or the wheelwork is the instrument of conveying; and as he finds that the “pull” upon his hand is just the same whether the machine is in motion or not, provided that the band or wheel remains in mechanical connection with the main shaft, he comes to the conviction that the *source* of the power is in the shaft, and that, so far from any one of the machines having an inherent power of movement, its motion entirely depends upon the Force supplied to it from the shaft. And when, under the guidance of this conception, he again examines the *working* of the several kinds of machine, he finds that while the *power* is the same for all, the diversity in their respective products is traceable to the diversity in their construction—that is, to the *material collocations* through which the one moving Force exerts itself in action.

But having thus acquired the notion of *moving power*, and having satisfied himself of the derivation of the Force that gives motion to each of the entire aggregate of machines, from one main shaft, our inquirer finds himself again posed. Has this shaft itself an inherent power of motion; or does it derive that power from any ulterior source? He sees the shaft apparently terminate in the two end-walls of the building; and, finding no evidence of its connection with anything else, he may feel himself drawn towards the conclusion that it moves *of itself*—

that is, by the "potency" of its own material constitution. But before adopting this *rationale*, he sees all the machines stop at once, and finds that the shaft also has ceased to revolve. Here is a new and startling phenomenon. After pondering on it for an hour, and carefully looking out for an explanation, he sees the shaft and its connected machines resume their motion, and yet is certain that no agency visible to him has had any concern in that renewal. By continued watching, he finds this suspension and renewal to be periodical, so that he can frame a law that shall express them in terms of *time*. Thus he might give a complete *phenomenal* account of the action of the shaft, which should be perfectly consistent with the assumption of its "inherent potency," and which might be sufficiently satisfactory to his mind to justify him in believing that there is no more to be learned about it. But not wishing to leave anything uninvestigated, he goes round to *the other side of the wall*. There he finds that one end of the shaft comes through it, and is in mechanical connection with either a Steam-engine or a Water-wheel; and by watching what occurs when its motion is checked and renewed, he sees that the Engineer shuts-off, or turns-on, either the steam generated in the boiler of the steam-engine, or the descending water whose motion drives the wheel.

I shall not weary the patience of such readers as may have followed me thus far, by tracing out in like detail the further steps of the inquiry; but shall land them in the final conclusion now accepted by every man of science—that the power exerted in both these cases is drawn from Solar Radiation: the fall of the Water which gives motion to the Water-wheel, being merely the return of that which has been pumped up as vapour by the sun's heat; whilst the combustion of Coal from which steam-power is derived, reproduces, as active force or "energy," the sunshine

that exerted itself during the Carboniferous period in dissociating carbonic acid and water into the hydrocarbons of coal and the oxygen of the atmosphere, whose recombination gives forth Heat and Light. And if we look still further back for the source of the Sun's radiant energy, we should find it, perhaps, in the progressive consolidation of the primeval "fire-mist"—Nebular Matter.

But whence Nebular Matter? And whence the Force which draws its particles together, and which manifests itself as Light and Heat during their consolidation? Here we come to a wall, to the other side of which we seem at present to have no access.

But *is* there no other side? Does not the whole course of the preceding inquiry show the unsatisfaction (if I may revive an obsolete word) of resting in any inherent "potency" of Matter as the *ultima ratio* of the existing Kosmos? If we think the man foolish who supposes the main shaft of a cotton mill to turn *of itself*, merely because he sees it apparently end in a wall which conceals from him the source of its motive power, are we not really chargeable with the like folly if we attribute self-motion to the ultimate molecules of Matter, merely because the Power that moves them is hid from our sight? The mere Physicist may see no possible way further. But there is a Philosophy which has fully as true and as broad a basis in Man's Psychical experience, as can be claimed for the fabric of Physical science; and in the admirable words of the great Master I have already quoted (Sir John Herschell, in his "Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects," p. 460), I shall sum up an argument which this paper is intended rather to illustrate and enforce by an appeal to the familiar facts of consciousness, than to present in strict logical form:—

"In the *mental sense of effort*, clear to the apprehension of every one who has ever performed a voluntary act, which is present at

the instant when the determination to do a thing is carried out into the act of doing it, we have a consciousness of immediate and personal causation which cannot be disputed or ignored. And when we see the same kind of act performed by another, we never hesitate in assuming for him that consciousness which we recognise in ourselves; and in this case we can verify our conclusion by oral communication." "In the only case in which we are admitted into any personal knowledge of the origin of Force, we find it connected (possibly by intermediate links untraceable by our faculties, yet indisputably *connected*) with volition, and by inevitable consequence, with *motive*, with *intellect*, and with all those attributes of Mind in which personality consists."

As a Physiologist, I most fully recognise the fact that the Physical Force exerted by the body of Man is not generated *de novo* by his Will, but is derived from the oxidation of the constituents of his food. But holding it as equally certain, because the fact is capable of verification by every one as often as he chooses to make the experiment, that, in the performance of every volitional movement, that Physical Force is put in action, directed, and controlled, by the individual personality or *Ego*, I deem it just as absurd and illogical to affirm that there is no place for a God in Nature, originating, directing, and controlling its forces by His will, as it would be to assert that there is no place in Man's body for his conscious Mind.

WILLIAM B. CARPENTER.

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS.

AMONG the throng of young students who, in the middle of the thirteenth century came from all parts of Europe to Cologne to hear the wisdom of the renowned doctor, Albertus Magnus, was a certain "brother Thomas of Aquino," a Neapolitan of noble birth; his father, nephew of the great Emperor Frederic Barbarossa, in whose army his two brothers were generals. While a mere boy he had fled from home, and secretly joined the order of Friar Preachers, distinguished in those its early years as much for poverty and zeal as it has ever since been for learning and orthodoxy. Both force and more discreditable means had been tried, before his relatives gave up the hope of reclaiming him to what they thought the worthier life of a noble and a soldier. Now, at all events, he was far enough away to be safe from molestation. But neither youthful trials, such as he had gone through, nor even his high rank in the world, availed to attract esteem or attention in a society in which poverty was had in honour, and the merits and distinctions of past life were counted for nothing beside present proof of piety and learning. So it was that this young friar, being thick-set, square, and somewhat heavy looking, a silent listener and reserved student, withal so taciturn that it did not appear that either learning or teaching profited him, got among his fellows the nickname of Dumb Ox—a name which even the master seems to have recognised as appropriate and smilingly adopted till the occasion that Thomas

was forced to show what was in him. A difficult question had been put to him, to which he was to prepare an answer on the morrow; he did so, but in so unusual a manner for a learner, with so much clearness and confidence, that Albert said, "Brother Thomas, you speak in the way of one who is settling the matter rather than answering a question." "Master," he replied, "I don't see how I can answer otherwise." "Answer then, now," said the master; and he brought against his solution four arguments so difficult that he believed he had altogether "shut him up" (se eum crederet conclusisse). These Thomas met most fully, upon which Albert gave utterance to that prophecy, than which none was ever more literally fulfilled, "Dumb Ox we call him, but he shall yet bellow so that the whole world shall hear him."

It is six hundred years since, in the very prime of manhood, the silence of death overtook him, and one might well have thought that amid the tumult of more modern teachers his own "bellow," however once sonorous, had long since faded in the distance and been forgotten. Yet it is but yesterday* that one, whose voice, ridiculed or revered, is never unheeded, issued an "encyclical letter to all the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops of the Catholic world," in which he recalls the past glories of St. Thomas—how "almost all founders of religious orders desired their followers to study and adhere to his doctrine;" how, in the ancient Universities of Europe, at Paris, Salamanca, Louvain, Bologna, Naples, and many other places, "in those homes of human wisdom, Thomas reigned as a prince in his own kingdom;" how "the Roman Pontiffs extolled his wisdom with the loudest praises and the amplest testimonies";—and this letter concludes with a practical exhortation, which, addressed as it is to a thousand subject bishops, deserves the attention even of those who have

* The Pope's letter referred to is dated 4th August, 1879.

least sympathy with it. "While we proclaim," writes the Pope, "that every wise saying, every useful discovery, by whomsoever it may be wrought, should be received with a willing and grateful mind, we exhort you all, Venerable Brethren, most earnestly, to restore the golden wisdom of St. Thomas, and to propagate it as widely as possible for the defence of the Catholic faith, the good of society, and the advancement of all the sciences. The wisdom of St. Thomas, we say, for if there is anything in the scholastic doctors of over-subtle inquiry, or ill-considered statement, if anything inconsistent with ascertained doctrines of a later age, or, lastly, in any way not admissible, it is by no means our intention to propose that to our age for imitation. But let teachers endeavour to instil the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas into the minds of their disciples, and to place in a clear light his solidity and excellence in comparison with others." Grave words these, and well worthy of the attention even of Protestants, and especially of free-thinking Protestants, who should of all men be most desirous to understand aright the history and position, and estimate fairly the strength and weakness of the ancient dogmatic Church, the only worthy antagonist of liberal religion. Let it not be thought, then, that these few pages devoted in the *Modern Review* to the consideration of the place among teachers occupied by Aquinas, and a short account of his great work are either misplaced or trifling. The treatment is necessarily slight, but the subject is a right worthy one.

The position occupied by Thomas Aquinas is an extraordinary one, and in more than one respect, I think, unique. It may be safely said that, with the exception perhaps of Aristotle, no teacher has ever lived who, without any claim to inspiration or infallibility being made by him or for him, has obtained so wide, enduring, and absolute an authority. The authority of Augustine has, indeed, always ranked

very high; but he was too much of a rhetorician, too apt to forget all but the cause which he was attacking or defending, and so to make strong assertions which elsewhere, or in another connection, he would wittingly or unwittingly contradict or modify,—in a word, too full of zeal and passion—to be wholly relied upon as a guide. And even in regard of Aristotle, “philosophus,” *the* philosopher, as they called him, there was just this drawback—one would have thought to Catholic theologians an overwhelming one, but it was not so—that he was a heathen. His reasoning might not be questioned, but his conclusions might, nevertheless, be erroneous; indeed, sometimes must be altogether set aside as contrary to faith. No uninspired man could approach him in intellectual power and encyclopædic knowledge, yet the merest Catholic child could instruct and correct him by the higher light of the Church’s teaching. So it was that the authority of Augustine was doubtful, and he might be corrected if not by a greater teacher, at least out of his own works; that of Aristotle was limited to the sphere of natural knowledge and unaided reason; St. Thomas alone obtained an authority without drawback; for he was a philosopher both by education and temperament, arguing against reasons rather than with the reasoners (foes of flesh and blood), and never, therefore, betrayed into hasty or exaggerated statements; he was, moreover, a devout and faithful Catholic, having even in this respect the advantage over Augustine of living in an age in which the doctrine of the Church had been more fully determined and developed. His writings, therefore, from the first, especially his latest and maturest work, the “*Summa Totius Theologiæ*,” did his own Dominican order accept as their authority both in theology and in philosophy; and never during the six hundred years which have passed since his death has their devotion and fidelity to him been forgotten. No other—certainly no contrary teaching—is

permitted in their schools, insomuch that an oath to abide by his doctrine is imposed upon all their students assuming the degree of lector in theology. Indeed, of late years, their adherence has become closer and more loving. His text is learnt by all their theological students, and expounded by their professors as that of Holy Writ itself; and if more recent decisions of the Church have seemed to conflict with his teaching, every nerve has been strained to prove that he did in reality anticipate and provide for such definitions. Nor has his reputation been confined to his own religious order; theologians, lay, secular, and religious, have ever done deference to him as the "Angel of the Schools"—"Theologorum facile princeps"—while Popes have vied with one another in their encomiums on his doctrine, so that it is argued by Dominicans, and not without reason, that to attribute error to St. Thomas is to accuse the Church itself. It must be borne in mind, too, that, despite the jealousy and rivalry, first of Franciscans and then of Jesuits, the Dominicans have ever been recognised as the theologians of the Church, and as such have, from their very beginning, held the offices of Master of the Apostolic Palace, or Pope's theologian, and of Inquisitors of heretical pravity. To be recognised, therefore, by them is, in a sense, to have the recognition of the whole Church, and such St. Thomas has as the first and weightiest of teachers.

Was there ever another teacher who could boast of so numerous a school of theologians and philosophers devoted through six hundred years to the study and elucidation of his doctrine?

But not only is Aquinas known to the learned world as the great Doctor of the middle ages, whose works have outlived all but the religion of his time, and survived even into this nineteenth century; his has been, moreover, the singular fortune to be renowned all the world over, wherever the Church of Rome has set her foot—and where has

she not?—as a saint, an example of pure life, and a helper and intercessor for all who desire to live likewise. Especially notable is his reputation as *the* saint whose succour should be sought in all trials of chastity; and boys and girls, men and women, all the world over, gird themselves with the linen cord of St. Thomas, so as to ally themselves, as it were, with the great scholastic theologian against the assaults of the flesh. I cannot help dwelling upon this peculiar feature of his holy fame, for there is to me something singularly fascinating in this union of angelic purity and subtlest thought, in this one man being the patron of the tempted youth and of the learned theologian. Many have been deemed saints beside him, many, too, have had reputation for learning; but his unique glory is it to be accounted the subtlest, clearest, most authoritative expounder of the Church's mysteries, and at the same time to be venerated by high and low, rich and poor, for his humility, purity, devotion, and love.

How truly marvellous, too, was his power of intellectual work may be estimated by a mere look through the seventeen volumes folio which contain the writings of a life of forty-eight years. Perhaps the very lightest of them are the Biblical commentaries, and of these those on the Pauline Epistles are, *me judice*, equal or superior to any of earlier or later ages constructed on the old supposition of Bible infallibility. All his works are full of thought and reason and research, so that it is difficult to understand how he found the time for so much reading amid such constant writing, or how it came to pass that his power of reason was not overwhelmed, as has so often happened, by the weight of his learning.

But we need not dwell upon any but his last and greatest work, the mature fruit of all his labours and the crown of his fame, the "*Summa Totius Theologiæ*." Observe first the title. The theology of the middle ages may have little

claim upon our attention, and yet is it not true that every man who will give the world a *summa* of all that is worthily thought and known in his time in any one department of knowledge is a benefactor, not only to his generation, but to all who come after, whether his name be remembered with honour or slighted or forgotten? Is it not from such summings up that new starts are made, or is there any progress except by that knowledge of the past and its gains, which is thus rendered possible and comparatively easy? It may, indeed, be that to many, such works are as an intellectual paddock, and they are content to take the sum of what is known as the limit of what can be known; but to the world at large they are rather as firm stepping-stones, on which supporting themselves, the noblest and bravest spirits may reach forward to higher attainments.

Certainly such seems to be the lesson taught us by a comparison of the theological schools in which this great work is acknowledged as a *terminus a quo*, and those, whether amongst Protestants or Catholics, which, while bound with the same fetters of old rules of faith and old-world authorities, are yet without a great intellectual guide and interpreter of the past. With neither position can we sympathise, but the former is a high and commanding one, which we are forced to respect even while we oppose.

If this work be then at all what it professes to be, and does worthily sum up the gains of its day on the great subject of God and His relation to the created universe, it constitutes beyond doubt an epoch in the intellectual history of mankind. And yet there is probably no other great work which has met with so much contempt and misrepresentation. I cannot resist the temptation of giving here one specimen of the way in which English theologians have been in the habit of dealing with this greatest intellectual monument of the Middle Ages. The following passage is taken from a book of reference edited by three learned clergymen of the

Church of England* :—" It was reserved for Thomas Aquinas to be more precise concerning this mysterious subject (the Hierarchies and Orders of Angels). The 18th Article in the first part of his *Summa Theologica* addresses itself to this point. . . . But as we are by no means certain that we distinctly follow the thread of his argument, we prefer giving the main positions . . . in his own words† :—(1) It appears that all the angels are of one Hierarchy ; (2) that in a Hierarchy there are not different Orders ; (3) that in an Order there are not different angels ; (4) that men are never raised into the Orders of angels. The first syllogism of the concluding article may be presented as an average specimen of the reasoning (!) contained in all the others. It should be remembered that the great logician has already determined in the outset that there is but one hierarchy. Nevertheless, he proceeds, ' The human hierarchy is beneath the lowest hierarchy of angels, and that, in turn, beneath the higher hierarchies, but the angels are never transferred from a lower to a higher hierarchy ; therefore neither are men.' " Now all this, of course, is rubbish, and St. Thomas neither arrived at such positions, nor adduced such futile proofs of those at which he did arrive ; but from it all I draw three conclusions, of a kind too commonly to be drawn from the statements of theologians regarding the opinions of those with whom they have no theological sympathy :—

First : That St. Thomas was but a clever trifler. What, then, is to be thought of the multitudes who have followed him as leader and spent their lives in the study of his works ?

* *Encyclopædia Metropolitana* : " Hierarchy."

† The mistake here, excusable in another, but unpardonable in one who gratuitously undertakes the subject, arises from mistaking the objection for the argument. Each article in the *Summa* (and there are some thousands) is divided into four parts. First come the objections, stated as briefly and forcibly as may be ; then (2) the authorities quoted in a few words in support of (3) the conclusion, which is defended by argument ; and lastly, the answers to the objections, in the light thrown upon them by the main argument.

Secondly: That so utterly worthless are his conclusions and the arguments by which he supports them that it is but time thrown away to inquire carefully what really are either the one or the other.

Thirdly: That, nevertheless, it is perfectly honest and legitimate to assign to him absurd and inconsistent positions and to support them with a show of candour by extracts from his words selected at random and quoted incorrectly.

My subject is a theologic one, and yet to be forced thus to estimate theological criticisms makes one almost revolt against the very name of theology. It is against this too common assumption that every one that differs from us, especially in religious matters, is a fool at best, that true Liberals should be ever on their guard. But let us take a brief survey of this stupendous work, and consider its extent, its methods, and its order, giving a brief analysis of the whole, and a more particular one of some interesting sections.

Theology is the science which treats of God, but of God necessarily as He is known to us, and, therefore, in particular of God as He is related to the universe and to the rational creature, He being thereof the Beginning, the Preserver, and the End. Hence, too, of things created considered as proceeding from, depending on, and returning to Him, and more particularly of the highest creature, *i.e.*, the rational, its adaptation to its own end, its way thither and hindrances and helps on the road, its final rest in or separation from God, according as it attains or misses the end of its being. Truly might St. Thomas say, *Theologus sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto*. For not, indeed, so much God as man is the proper object of theology, man regarded as constituted and ordained by God for God, supernaturally helped and equipped, and preternaturally hindered, sharing the natures of spirit and beast, and his history interwoven with that of angel and demon and of God himself—man, in a brief life on earth, gaining the

end for which he was created, the intellectual perfection of the beatific vision, or for ever missing it and necessarily for ever miserable. The subject is one fit for a Dante among theologians, and Dante repeatedly pays homage to him who treated it so worthily.

No such review of the universe is possible now or henceforth. With increasing knowledge man has grown too small, and from his corner, no longer the centre of the world, he can get no such outlook into space or time as he imagined of old; and yet the imagination was a sublime one, and we may surely admire its beauty without incurring the charge of superstition or bastardy to the age.

Such, then, is the ground this work covers. The *hic et nunc*, the individual and the accidental, have no part in it; but all that interests man as man or that might be known or conjectured of God, is there discussed.

And now, as to the character and method of the work, it might reasonably be supposed that a writer distinguished at once for his learning, his modesty, and his submissiveness to all recognised authority, would lean much on the words of the Bible and the Church, on Aristotle and the Fathers. No doubt Aquinas did so; but it does not so appear in his theology. An authority, indeed, he invariably adduces for each conclusion, but the authority is as invariably explained and supported by philosophical arguments. With him is reason most truly what the scholastics were fond of calling it, "the handmaid of faith;" not a slave forced to another's work, but a servant loving, faithful, eager, watching the mistress's will and deed, and counting herself honoured to execute and support it. It is the intense conviction of his faith which delivers him from any unworthy quibble or evasion. "Since faith," he writes, "rests on infallible truth, it is impossible that the contrary to it can be truly demonstrated." So he never hesitates to state clearly the argu-

ments against the Church's teaching, and deals with them with that confidence and honesty with which truth-loving men meet a clever but obvious sophism. Take, for example, the article, "*Utrum sit ponere plures personas in divinis*"—Whether there can be more persons than one in God? He begins with four arguments against such plurality: the first, taken from the received definition of person—*rationalis naturæ individua substantia*; the second, that a plurality of relation does not imply a plurality of persons in men, nor therefore in God; the third, that to make more than one person in God is to introduce number into the essentially one; the fourth, that number implies parts.

And in the same manner are all the teachings of the Church discussed. The conclusions are, indeed, settled before all reason, but the absolute certainty respecting them gives a freedom of its own kind to the reason—a freedom to exercise itself in all its fire-play of subtle argument without fear of consequences, against which faith gives ample insurance.

It remains to give some idea of the contents of the work and the beautiful arrangement of it; for the whole is like a great tree, each furthest and smallest twig of which is connected through widening branches and stems with the trunk. Yet it can hardly be expected that any can duly appreciate this order, so much admired of old, if they have not some knowledge of the chaos of matter which previous works of the kind contained. It required learning and much judgment to bring together in one *Summa*, without repetition or omission, all the true gold and silver of the accumulation of preceding centuries, and still more to discern and reject the dross and rubbish. But to put into all this collection a living idea which should order each part to each other, and present, too, the order clearly to every student's understanding, required, indeed, a singular genius specially fitted for the task. Yet, as in many like cases, it

is the very merit of perfect simplicity which is apt to detract from the praise due to the author. What is easy to understand and easy to imitate seems easy too to originate.

We will begin by describing briefly the whole tree and its great branches, and then follow out a branch here and there to its topmost twigs.

The subject of the work—the trunk to which every part of it is vitally related—is God. So the holy Doctor lays it down to begin with, “In sacred learning all things are considered as under the one heading—God; the subject being either God Himself, or other things so far as they are related to God as their beginning and their end.” Hence, we have three great divisions. The first treats of God Himself in Unity and Trinity, and as the Fount of Being to all creatures spiritual, material, or, like man, both flesh and spirit in one. The second and largest portion of the work treats of “the movement of the rational creature towards God” (*in Deum*), and therein of the last end of man—his attaining the perfection of his individual being in indissoluble union with the Deity, primarily by the intellect seeing and knowing God, and consequently by the will and all his powers—and at large concerning the acts by which this beatitude may be arrived at or frustrated; concerning their “*principia*”—i.e., originating and determining causes—whether within the man, his natural powers and acquired habits—or from without, the guidance of laws or help of Divine grace. The third part treats of Christ as the way to God—seeing that only by God Himself can God be reached—of the mysteries of his incarnation and life, of the seven sacraments as the means of union with the God-Christ; and this part would have concluded, had not the author's untimely death broken off the work, with the consideration of the end of all things, and man's last state of final and indefectible beatitude in union

with God, or irremediable aversion from God in will and mind, and consequent eternal misery.

And now let us return to the first part, and its two great divisions: Of God considered in Himself, and of God as the First Cause. Of the Divine Being, and of the Divine Persons: these are the subjects treated of under the first division. We will confine ourselves to the former, which deals with (1) the existence of God, (2) the essence or nature of God, and (3) the divine action.

The existence of God is proved by the five arguments which Kant has not succeeded, I think, in wholly setting aside, and which appeal to all, even the uninstructed, now and then with convincing force. He is the Unchangeable, the Cause of all change; the Uncaused, Cause of all causes and effects; the One Necessary Being, who alone cannot not be; the Supreme in Being, Goodness, and all Perfection, under whom are all the countless grades of being, higher or lower, according as in greater or less degree they partake of His Fulness. And, lastly, He is the One Universal Intelligence, by which all things, intelligent and material, are ordered to their due and allotted end. So, from these observed facts respecting things known to us, namely, that all are (1) subject to change, (2) effects of some prior cause, (3) such that they may be conceived of as never having come into being, contingent, (4) graduated into more or less, none being entirely perfect, (5) fitted into one another and disposed each to its own end; it is argued to the Unseen, and, save by reason or revelation, Unknown, who is—Lord and Governor, Perfect, Uncaused, Eternal.

We then come to the questions concerning the essence of God: "What God is, or rather, since we cannot know of God what He is, or how, what God is not, and what modes of being are not His." Accordingly, there are removed from the conception of God all composition, and imperfection,

and limit, and change, and multiplicity; and it is determined that He must be absolutely Simple—His nature and operation and attributes all Himself, not separable, as in creatures; Perfect; Infinite in Himself, and therefore existing everywhere and in all things by essence, presence, and power; Unchangeable, and therefore Eternal—*i.e.*, not subject to time, but above it; and, lastly, One, because Being itself—“*Ens ergo unum.*”

I would specially notice the article in the question on the Eternity of God, entitled, “Whether Eternity is Something Different from Time,” for the conclusion must affect our whole view of the reasonableness of the scholastic system of the universe, and evidently has powerfully influenced the greatest of living Roman Catholic converts (Cardinal Newman) in reconciling him to some of the difficult doctrines of the Church.* St. Thomas thus, then, answers the question: “It is clear that time and eternity are not the same; but the reason of the distinction some have sought is this: that eternity has neither beginning nor end, and time has both. But this is but an accidental difference, for time may be imagined, and has been so, as without beginning or end, and yet there would be a difference—this, namely, as Boethius says, that eternity is ‘*tota simul*,’ all together, which time is not; and for this reason, that eternity is the measure of that which abides, but time is the measure of change and movement. And so, *even if time should last for ever, it would not be eternity*, for it would be divisible into parts, such as days and years; but in eternity no parts can be taken, or beginnings or endings of periods found, because, as before said, it is ‘*tota simul*.’”

I shall not enlarge on this point, but it seems to me one of the most momentous conclusions by St. Thomas published, though it need scarcely be said that the idea is by

* See “Dream of Gerontius.”

no means peculiar to him, but is familiar to St. Augustine and all Catholic theologians of his school. I could never discover that Jesuits or orthodox Protestants had properly understood or accepted it.

Now let us turn to the question, "Of God as First Cause," thus divided:—1. Of the production of creatures, or creation. 2. Of the distinction of creatures; first, into good and evil, evil being the absence of that good which should be in anything; and, secondly, into spiritual and corporeal. 3. Of the divine government by which all things are maintained in being and ordered to their proper end.

Let us take the questions concerning creatures as distinguished into spiritual and corporeal; between the two being man, who shares both natures. This last subject divides itself into three: Of the body of man, which, however, as appertaining to physics, is not discussed; of the soul of man, its nature, powers, and operation; of the first man, his creation, original condition, and fall therefrom.

The questions concerning corporeal creatures discuss at length the work of the six days of creation; days which may be interpreted literally, or—and to this opinion of Augustine, St. Thomas evidently inclines, though, for the weight of authority opposed to him, he will not decide—as successions of spiritual light manifesting to the angelic intellects the instantaneously perfected work of God, too immense for even spiritual intelligences at once to comprehend.

Fourteen questions here, and four under the consideration of the divine government, are occupied in the discussion of spiritual creatures or angels; and, despite the supercilious contempt with which it has been treated by many who have never read a line of it with attention, I cannot but regard the treatise as one of the grandest creations of the philosophic intellect. From the Bible and

the Fathers St. Thomas took scattered hints, by him of course deemed more or less revelations, and from these he built up a complete doctrine of spiritual beings.

First, of Angels in general, their spiritual substance and relation to body, time, and place; their intellect and their will; their history, so to speak—*i.e.*, creation, perfection, fall, and consequences.

Secondly, of Angels in their relation (1) to one another, by which is determined their division into Hierarchies and Orders; (2) to the material creation; and (3) to men, to whom they bear the mind of God as messengers, and whom they protect, or, as bad angels, tempt and attack.

Perhaps I cannot do better than give the conclusions concerning the Hierarchies and Orders of Angels, as I have already quoted a parody upon them. Be it remembered first, that in a previous article Aquinas has determined that no two angels can be of the same species, on the ground that individuals of the same nature or species cannot be distinguished except by the material distinction of the bodies they subsist in.* So there are many individuals who have one human nature, because human nature connotes a body in which, and by which, it is completed.

There are three hierarchies distinguished by this, that the highest intelligences know all things in the Divine Nature, the cause and pattern of all; the secondary intelligences see things in their higher and general causes; the lower see but the things themselves, as we men do. In each hierarchy are three orders, distinguished according to different acts and offices, as in each ordered state we find the higher, lower, and middle classes. But this division of orders is, after all, but a rude and ignorant one. If we knew perfectly the offices and differences of angels, we should see that each has his own office and peculiar order, as has each star of heaven, yea, much more so these spiritual lights.

* See a like argument in "In Memoriam" XLV.

And this division, which has its foundation in their nature, is confirmed and accentuated in their supernatural state of elevation to "be partakers of the divine nature" (2 Peter i. 4). "For grace"—it is a common-place with St. Thomas—"does not destroy but perfects nature." Lastly, men are raised to the various hierarchies of angels, not, indeed, to partake of their nature, for then they would cease to be men, but by gifts of grace to be equalled with the angels in the participation of the divine vision. And here I would notice the objection mistaken for a conclusion, and inaccurately quoted in the extract above. The hierarchy of men is contained beneath the lowest hierarchy of angels, as is the lowest of angels beneath the middle, and the middle beneath the first; but the angels of the lowest hierarchy are never transferred to the higher ones; therefore, neither are men transferred to the orders of angels. Or, briefly, if angels cannot be raised from one order to another of their own kind, *a fortiori* can not men be raised to orders of a kind not their own.

The answer to this is that to angels grace and glory were allotted in proportion to their natural endowment, in consequence of their instantaneous trial; but to men grace and glory are not so allotted. Angels, therefore, both by grace and nature, are limited to their own orders. But men receiving grace out of all proportion to their inferior nature, are so made capable of rising above it, to equality with a superior nature. Is the answer very subtle? The objection, at all events, is within a child's grasp.

This is, indeed, but a poor account to render of so great a work—an abridgment of a summary. It is tempting to go on to tell at greater length of the solutions St. Thomas proposes of problems which modern science scarce approaches, and which six centuries of angry discussion and intensest study have only left as he left them,—of human liberty and divine law, of God's supremacy and the success

of evil, of the foundations of morality, and much else; but of this there were no end.

But to what purpose this obtruding on men overwhelmed with the tasks of to-day, this work of a day long gone by? The creed it supports we have rejected, the philosophy it relies on has been disproved and well-nigh forgotten; its method is obsolete and superseded; its science left to antiquarians—a preserve on which few will care or dare to trespass.

True, and yet is it no mere curiosity of literature. For all great work has in it something of the nature of eternity; it is “not of an age, but of all time.” The age which begets it passes away, the circumstances which form and colour it change and are half forgotten; the keen interest which its bearing on questions of the day arouses dies with the day and its questions, but work which treats worthily of man and his thoughts, not merely of the men and thoughts of its day, which regards man in his permanent relations to earth and time and eternity and God, cannot, or, at least, should not, be suffered to die. And such is this *summa* of theology, clothed in old-fashioned garments and strictly conformed to the rules of mediæval faith, but, withal, the genuine product of too large a heart and brain to be representative of a Church or a century and not rather, as it truly is, of human thought and reverence and desire towards the Unseen.

Of its importance simply as a successful *summa*, I have already spoken. It must ever hold its place in the history of thought as collecting and arranging all the gains of the past, and so clearing the ground and bringing together the materials for workers and thinkers to come after.

But even looked at in the worst light, as a great authority which overawed men, so that for centuries the ablest and subtlest thinkers dared not go beyond its bounds, but confined their life-work to the elucidation and defence of its

every proposition, oblivious of the universe which they read second-hand in their master's explanations of it, were this labour and criticism and analysis and research all thrown away? Has not the *Summa* rather been in the education of the race somewhat like what Euclid has been in that of the individual? Most of us have forgotten proposition, proof, and corollary, but few will regret the time spent on them as wasted; most will be conscious that the benefit derived therefrom, and now insensibly enjoyed, is in direct proportion to the earnestness and minuteness of their work. In like manner have the European brain and brain-power gained by the thoroughness and subtlety of scholastic research; so that this work, whether considered by itself and weighed by its own merits, or regarded as a landmark in the history of European thought, or even as the field in which the great intellects of several generations were trained and exercised is, from each point of view, well worthy of respect and attention.

"This glory," writes the Pope in the letter before quoted, "seems reserved for Thomas Aquinas, that he should extort from the adversaries themselves of the Catholic name homage, praise, and admiration." True, if only other words than *reserved* and *extort* had been used. The true liberal Christian pays willing homage to all the God-anointed princes of humanity—the prophets of every age and faith. Gautama Buddha, Confucius, Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, Martin Luther, George Fox, all and a hundred other, "adversaries" though their followers may count us, are names venerable to us. Not by one path or one guide does God lead men, but "at sundry times, in divers manners, in the prophets, and in the Son." But it is another question how far the Pope's faith in the doctrine of St. Thomas as the most opportune at this time for recalling to the Catholic faith "those who prefer reason to be their only master and guide" can be justified. It seems to me,

indeed, that it ought to be so as respects a very different class of "heretics"—those who hold to one or other form of orthodox Protestantism. The honest study of so candid and powerful a defence of the older faith could scarcely fail to influence, if not convert, them. But those who accept as their divine guides reason and conscience must approach such a study with *a priori* objections which no scholastic argument will affect. That the first man, for having yielded to his wife's entreaty and eaten an apple, contrary to God's command, brought down God's wrath on himself and the whole human race sprung from him; that a certain being who was born in Judæa 1800 years ago was God Himself, and that he died to remove this, his own curse; that, nevertheless, the great majority of men are doomed to everlasting torment, foreseen of God when He brought their souls into being; that a certain book, the Bible, is, from beginning to end, inspired of God and infallible—these, and like propositions which underlie Catholic and Protestant theology alike, are, once doubted, not to be received again for any scholastic argument. Indeed, we must ever bear in mind (if we would do full justice to St. Thomas) certain facts of his environment, which, while they need in no wise diminish our admiration of him, must materially detract from his influence over us or our age. Intellectually, he lived in another universe than ours. The earth he dwelt on was the great world's centre, round which sun, planets, and stars revolved. Its history was known from the day of creation—a few thousand years before his time—to the day of doom—certain to be not many centuries delayed. The religion he believed and defended was that of the whole civilised earth; Manicheans, Jews, Turks, and heathens—such was the enumeration of non-Catholics. The experiences of six hundred years of religious life and thought, the long story of the past of man and of the earth, the insignificance of our

planet in a universe of suns, ideas which are the possession of every schoolboy of our time, were to him utterly and necessarily unknown. Shall we go back, then, to learn of him who, with all his surpassing genius, might learn so much of us? It is impossible—even as it is impossible that the Church of Rome can again, as in his day, subdue to herself the learning, piety, and liberty of mankind.

It may be useful to append an *Analysis of the Summa Theologica* :—

Of Theology. Its Nature and Objects.

FIRST PART.—INTRODUCTORY.—OF GOD.—I. *In Himself.* II. *As Cause of all things.*

I.—1. Of God in the Unity of His Being.

(a) His Existence proved.

(b) His Nature. One, Undivided, Infinite, Eternal.

(c) His Action, (a) Within—His Knowledge, Will, Providence, Pre-
(β) Without—His Power. [destination.]

2. Of God in the Trinity of Persons.

II.—1. Of the bringing of Things into being.

2. Of the different kinds of things.

(a) Of Good and Evil.

(b) Of things (a) Spiritual. Angels, their nature, creation, fall.

(β) Material. The work of the Six Days of Creation.

(γ) Spiritual and Material in One. Of Man—his
Body, his Soul, his Creation.

3. Of the Government of all things by God.

(a) Of the Preservation of things in being.

(b) Of their Change (a) By the action of God.

(β) By their action on one another.

SECOND PART.—OF THE MOVEMENT OF THE RATIONAL CREATURE
GODWARD.

I. OF THE END OF MAN in the attainment of the Beatific Vision.

II. OF ACTS, by which man reaches or is frustrated of his End.

1. Of Human Acts in general.

A. Of the Acts themselves.

(a) Of Acts peculiar to man—Voluntary Acts.

(b) Of Acts common to man and beast—Passions.

B. Of the Causes of Human Acts.

(a) From within (a) Capacities or Powers of Action.

(β) Habits.

(b) From without (a) Guidance of Laws.

(β) Guidance of Grace.

2. Of Human Acts in Special.

A. Of such as are common to every state of life.

(a) Of the Three Theological Virtues, and Vices opposed to them :
Faith, Hope, Charity.(b) Of the Four Cardinal Virtues, and Vices opposed to them :
Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance.

B. Of such as are peculiar to certain states of life.

(a) Of Special Gifts and Graces.

(b) Of the Active and Contemplative life.

(c) Of Sundry Positions and Duties.

THIRD PART.—OF JESUS CHRIST, and the Way to God opened up through him.

I. OF JESUS CHRIST, God and Man.

1. Of the Incarnation.

2. Of the Consequences of the Incarnation.

3. Of the Life of Christ.

II. OF THE SACRAMENTS instituted by and dependent on Jesus Christ.
Of the Sacraments in general. Then

1. Of Baptism, or Spiritual Birth.

2. Of Confirmation, or Spiritual Manhood.

3. Of the Eucharist, or Spiritual Food.

4, 5. Of Penitence and Extreme Unction, or Spiritual Medicine.

6. Of Orders, for the Spiritual Government of Men.

7. Of Matrimony, for the Spiritual Life of the Family.

III. OF THE RESURRECTION, which we obtain through Christ, and the end of all things.

The author's untimely death cut short the work, when the important moral questions connected with "the Sacrament of Penitence" were but just entered upon. The total number of "Questions" is 512, and of "Articles," over 2,500.

CHARLES HARGROVE.

IN THE NAME OF CHRIST.

THE worship of Jesus should not be confounded with prayer in the name of Christ ; for, as a matter of fact, many who, rightly or wrongly, regard the former as idolatry, still conform to the traditional practice of approaching God in the name of Christ. In their adherence to this practice, they are influenced partly, no doubt, by the *moral* authority of the New Testament,—a very different thing from any positive law. And, in particular, they have great sympathy with the feeling that dictated the passage in the Epistle to the Philippians where it is said, “ God hath highly exalted him (Jesus), and given him a name which is above every name.” According to the opinion of the best scholars in the criticism of the New Testament, the words which follow should read, “ That *in* the name of Jesus every knee should bow.” The words, therefore, do not raise the question of the direct worship of Jesus ; they simply suggest that all Christian prayer should be offered to God the Father “ in the *name* of Jesus Christ.” I am aware that, even translated so, many theological doctrines may seem to be involved in the words, which are matters very difficult to understand, and would lead us far away from the simple object I have in view. I propose, therefore, to resist any temptation to such discussion, and to speak simply of the traditional practice, existing everywhere in the Christian Church, of offering prayer to God in the name of Jesus Christ. The reason why I think it well worth while to

devote a few paragraphs to the consideration of this one point is, that it seems to raise, in typical form, a question more or less discussed between those who desire to keep the old paths of religious progress, and those, on the other hand, who wish to start afresh, taking, so far as possible, lines of definite knowledge alone, apart altogether from most of the symbols and the associations precipitated in by-gone days by human emotion. The latter party sometimes criticise the former, amongst whom I confess myself one, for adhering, so far as possible, to ancient forms of devotion. They say, "Your ideas are often rational, and we can follow these with much sympathy; but your devotions appear to us to have no basis in reason. You are in the habit of making very large concessions to the requirements of progressive knowledge; but when you bow your heads in worship, you seem to ignore them altogether." Such criticisms may, indeed, be plausible, but I cannot say that I think them justified or entirely accurate. It ought to be remembered that in all departments of life it is simply impossible to take definite knowledge exclusively for our guide. It is a good thing to have knowledge; and, in the last result, all experience that will bear examination, all experience productive of lasting fruit, will be found to be based upon facts that may ultimately be grasped, or at least apprehended, by human knowledge. But such facts are by no means always within the ken of those who instinctively pursue a healthful practice. How many customs, for instance, among savage tribes, conducive to social security and often also to health, are adopted and carried out in entire ignorance of their reason! Nay, to go lower in the scale of creation, how certainly are the instincts of various tribes of animals based upon real facts concerning the conditions under which they have to live. But how utterly unconscious are these creatures of the nature of such facts! So, in every stage of human progress, it will be found that

there is a very large part of human conduct—and that by no means the least important—which cannot be theoretically based upon proved and definite knowledge, but which has grown up, we know not how, through the working of the innumerable influences involved in the conditions of life under which the human race must live.

Now, true rationality will take into consideration all such facts as these concerning human experience, and the organisation of society, and the conduct of life. True rationality will observe, not merely the progress of disintegration amongst religious traditions, but also the persistency of *feeling* amidst that disintegration. It may be perfectly true that there is a tendency at the present day to substitute bare, historic facts for miraculous legend, and that this substitution very considerably alters our view of sacred history. But there is also another truth that ought not to be lost sight of. It is well known how, in a saturated solution of certain chemical substances, a projecting point will form the base on which a beautiful crystalline structure rapidly develops itself out of the material around. Now, human history, human experience, is, as it were, saturated with many mystical, indefinite, but most powerful feelings concerning the Eternal and the Infinite; and these feelings cannot possibly be left out of consideration in framing our ideas of the conduct of life. And these bare, historic facts, which are apparently all that are left us after the searching processes of modern criticism, become so many points projecting into this saturated medium of human experience—projecting points that crystallise around them, in transcendently beautiful forms, those invisible and indefinite elements of imagination and emotion that always inspire the highest human life.

This is a most important subject, and, therefore, I would dwell upon it for a moment, in order to apply the better to the subject in hand the principle involved. I may illustrate

it by the fallacy of a criticism often passed upon the English nation. It is often said that Englishmen are, in their political institutions, distinguished from others, especially the French and the Germans, by the utterly illogical character of their proceedings. They do not care to set up a theory and build their institutions in accordance with it. It is of no concern to them if one part of their constitution, logically considered, is wholly out of harmony with another: it is sufficient for them that it works well. Now here, again, we have a criticism that is plausible, but inaccurate—and inaccurate for very much the same reasons as those, on account of which I maintain that the criticisms on ourselves are inaccurate and insufficiently grounded. It is not true, if the matter be fully considered, that English political institutions are illogical. The real truth is that the English nation is in the habit of taking into consideration a great many other facts besides merely abstract principles,—other facts, of which surrounding nations are far too oblivious. For instance, it is the English habit to bear in mind that the working of a constitution must needs be dependent upon the amount of mental and moral preparation existing amongst its citizens. It is the English habit, again, to bear carefully in mind the unconquerable power of custom and the innumerable obstacles offered to rapid progress by ignorant prejudices. It is the English habit, once more, to bear in mind how the progress of social evolution is necessarily extremely slow. Now surely it is not logical, but utterly illogical, in the largest sense of these terms, to leave out of consideration all such elements as these, and to proceed merely upon cut-and-dried notions of abstract theory. The practical mechanician, in dealing with real levers, pulleys, and weights, often arrives at very different results from those obtained by the youthful theorist doing his sums upon his slate. But the reason is not that the practical mechanician

is less true to mechanical principles than the student, but that he has to apply his calculations to a number of facts left out of consideration altogether by the youthful theorist. He has to bear in mind the friction of materials, the elasticity and the want of rigidity in his pulleys, his cords, and his levers; and the fact that he does so shows him to be not less scientific, but far more scientific, than the young tyro who is merely beginning the study of the subject. So, I boldly contend, from my point of view, that, in retaining certain forms of devotion, frequently rejected, we should be not less logical, but more logical, than those who, in the endeavour to reform religion, would cast to the winds all such forms sanctified by experience. We are not less rational, but more rational, because we insist upon borrowing largely from the experience of the past. We refuse to exclude from view the religious affections that have played so large a part in human history; and all experience goes to show that it is very difficult to separate these religious affections from sacred symbols, around which they have gathered themselves.

These are the general principles on which I persist for myself in offering prayer, according to the traditional forms, in the name of Jesus Christ. But in order to see how these general principles apply, it will be necessary here that I should state as clearly as I can what I mean by prayer in the name of Christ. I do not mean asking that God would grant us certain boons *for the sake* of Christ; though even had the words that meaning, to me they would be far from superstitious or irrational. They would be still instinct with an emotion which has in human nature very genuine reasons. For, whatever view we may take of the difficulties inherent in a study of the Gospel history, all who have any interest in this subject—and, indeed, most who wish to retain religion at all amongst mankind—would agree, that the Gospel stories arise out of a beautiful life of devotion to

the glory of God and the good of men—a life that was quenched in death because the Saviour would not yield to the evil in the world, or make compromises with its claims. Now, when we consider at what a cost to himself Jesus of Nazareth inaugurated a work of which the like has never been seen in human history elsewhere ; and when we compare the pure simplicity of his spirit, the high aims that he set before him, not for himself but for mankind, with the perverted bigotries that are insisted upon in his name, and with the base and cruel hypocrisies that are practised under the pretence of Christianity, an irrepressible wail of wounded faith and hope rises from the heart. Oh, the pity of it!—that such a transcendent sacrifice should have been made, and these be the poor results,—that blood so sacred should have flowed, and the ground on which it fell produce thorns and briers and poisonous fruits like these! “For Christ’s sake,” we cry to Omnipotence, “make an end of this!” And is there not a meaning in the words? Not as though we supposed that the Almighty Father of mankind needed the intercession of any, however great and good, to draw down His love and pity to His children, but that the fact of Christ’s great sacrifice for mankind and his pure, beautiful devotion give to us ourselves a deeper interest in the progress of mankind, and seem to present to us an additional reason for striving against all falsehood and wrong, and for seeking to establish that kingdom of righteousness which Jesus strove to found upon earth.

There is, however, no need to pursue this subject, because the practice with which I am concerned does not at all involve any appeal to omnipotent mercy ; the phrase, “for the sake of Christ,” does not signify that this sacred name is to open to us the door of the divine audience-chamber, and be an introduction, without which we could not gain the ear of God. What it means is simply this,

that, by experience, I for my part and tens of thousands of others, in this age as well as in others gone by, feel nearest to God when we can approach God in the spirit of Christ; and the *name* of Christ represents here to us the *spirit* of Christ. When we pray in the name of Christ, we mean that we strive to approach the Heavenly Father, just as he did, who was pre-eminently called the "Son of God." We strive to realise that consciousness of God within us, that contemplation of God in all His works without, which were transcendently characteristic of the bearing and the teaching of Jesus Christ.

Let me dwell here upon this significance of the "spirit of Christ;" for I cannot think that any who would feel with me in regard to this would have much difficulty about prayer in the name of Christ. What is it that strikes the sympathetic soul in contemplating the memoirs of Jesus, as they are fragmentarily recorded in the Gospels? We are struck, amongst many other things, by the marvellous combination we behold there of strength and humility. The strength of Jesus is not shown by any boastfulness, or any kingly pretensions. It is shown by a quiet, calm assumption of a work immeasurable in its vastness, to be accomplished through the means he set in operation. He faced the powers of evil apparently triumphant over all the world; and he showed a certain confidence that, afterwards, through the work he had begun, the powers of evil would be utterly overthrown, and the kingdom of God established upon earth. True, he looked that this work should be gradually accomplished. "The kingdom of God cometh not with observation," he said, "neither shall they say, 'Lo here,' nor 'Lo there,' for the kingdom of God is within you." It was to be brought about by a moral progress amongst mankind. "The kingdom of God," he said, "is like to a grain of mustard seed, which when it is sown is the smallest among all seeds, but when it is

grown it becomes a tree, so that the birds in the air take refuge in its branches." "The kingdom of God is as though a man should sow corn in his field, and should sleep and rise night and day; and the seed groweth up he knoweth not how." All these parables and sayings bear upon their face the stamp of authenticity, and they show that Jesus looked not for a sudden and violent revolution, but for a gradual and constant progress. Now, in the steadfast faith that was confident of the continuity of this progress and of its final triumph over all obstacles, there was manifested a spiritual strength such as we see in no other whose name is recorded in history.*

But combined with this strength, there was a *humility* which was equally distinctive of his character. I sympathise very much with those critics of the Gospels who believe that the disciples did not in all respects fully understand the real greatness of their Lord; and I think we must bear this in mind in studying the writings of those disciples, otherwise we shall miss the significance of many hints which are left for our instruction. It is said, for instance, again and again, that Jesus shunned the multitudes that waited upon him to applaud and glorify him. He is reported to have warned those whom he had healed or blessed not to tell any man, but to go straight to the priests of God, that they might give thanks for their recovery. Now, we have in such words as these a hint of a humble, retiring character, which could not bear publicity except so far as publicity was a plain duty in order to the accomplishment of his work. Again, in the absence of pretence concerning his own moral perfections, we have a token of the same characteristic: "Why callest thou me good?" he said to one who asked his instructions, calling him "good master," "there is none good but

* The only parallel I know is Gautama Buddha. But, if I understand rightly, he did not look for a regenerated society.

One." How comes it to pass that there should exist such a marvellous combination of strength and humility? The reason is that the strength was inspiration, and the humility was resignation to the will of the Father. His strength was inspiration. "I can do nothing of myself," he said. The works that he accomplished, he declared, were the works of the Father. The words that he spoke were not of himself, but, as the spirit of the Father enabled him, so he gave utterance to the instructions he communicated to mankind. We must think of the consciousness of the Lord Jesus as everywhere pervaded by the presence of the Eternal. For him the Father was not far away in a mystic home above the skies, but dwelt ever in his heart and soul. Realising the unity of his will with the Father, he could say with profoundest truth, "I and my Father are one;" and as his consciousness was everywhere pervaded by the spirit of the Eternal, it was his joy to resign himself wholly to the will of God, to do or to be or to endure anything which this will might require for the salvation of mankind.

Inspiration, resignation,—these constitute the constant attitude of prayer. True, we are told of special times and seasons when Jesus ascended the lonely summits of the hills that he might hold converse with the Father; but as we find so few records of any articulate words of prayer that were spoken by the Lord to the Father, it strikes me sometimes that those long nights of aspiration towards the Eternal were nights of divine silence, a silence full of God; and in that fulness was the prayer of Christ. So it was that he presented the transcendent emblem of that law of life offered to us by the Apostle Paul when he says, "Pray without ceasing;" for the full consciousness, the whole activity of Jesus was one continuous prayer to the Eternal. Again, let those who would know the spirit of Christ turn to the Sermon on the Mount; let them mark

the high morality described in the fifth chapter of the Gospel of St. Matthew—a morality so high, that worldlings say it is wholly unattainable, but a morality of which it would be very difficult indeed to deny the claims in any point, duly considering our relations to the Eternal. That morality is lofty, exacting, authoritative, even austere; but when we come to the sixth chapter, how unobtrusive it is in all its outward acts. Severe, austere, as it is,—in the society of men it is always to present an attitude of unobtrusive humility and kindliness. No deed of charity is to be done to gain the praise of men. No act of piety is to be exhibited so as to win their applause. Then, after showing how humility is to be the last adornment of a pure, divine morality, most naturally the Lord leads his disciples to the subject of prayer. They are not to pray to be heard or to be seen of men; but when they pray they are to address the Most High as their Father, and to speak to Him as His children, conscious of their needs, and assured of His care for them. Here we have the spirit of Christ's spotless morality, austere in its standard, yet unobtrusive, yielding, sympathetic in its practice as regards men, and both, because its eyes of aspiration are ever fixed on high, whence alone flows the moral strength needed to keep to such a standard in this world of imperfections. They who would know the spirit of Christ must mark his own conduct in times of trial and disappointment. In the eleventh chapter of St. Matthew we read, according to my understanding of the passage, how the spirit of the Lord was bowed down in depression because of the non-success of his work amongst the Jews. The Pharisees and the Scribes, who might have been expected to understand him, scorned his instructions, and looked upon him as a self-willed and self-conceited revolutionist. It was only the poor, the simple, the uneducated, and the uninfluential who waited upon his

teachings, and seemed to win any inspiration from them. Yet he would not, on that account, despair; for, full of God, he readily yielded to the motions of the Divine Spirit. "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth," he said, "because Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in Thy sight." And he was confident, nay, triumphantly confident—for it is said by another of the evangelists that he "rejoiced in spirit"—that through these apparently unlikely means, the work of God would yet triumph in the world. Here again is manifested the spirit of Christ's dauntless faith, and humble, heartfelt, overflowing gratitude to God.

Once more, follow him to that most dread scene of all, where the flesh showed its weakness under the intolerable burden laid upon the pure and loving spirit of the Lord. He was brought to that black barrier beyond which seemed no hope; he was led not merely to the depth of humiliation, as it appeared in the eyes of the world, but to a darkness from which seemed to be shut out all prospect of further action on the minds and hearts of men; and we are told that, "being in an agony, he prayed the more earnestly." It is said—and experience of utmost human anguish has shown that there was nothing miraculous in this—that "he sweat, as it were, great drops of blood falling down to the ground." Now, they who have ever been brought face to face with the apparent certainty of an intolerable woe, often have felt that they would flee anywhere, seek any relief, even though it might be in hypocrisy, in dishonesty, in wrong, so only that this one unbearable cup might be taken away from them. So, we may well suppose, did he who was tempted in all points like as we are, realise the weakness of the flesh; but being still even in that darkness, full of God, he sought once more the only true refuge, which was in entire surrender to the will of God. "Holy Father, if this cup may not pass

from me except I drink it, Thy will be done." And he arose from the dust, collected, calm, magnificent in his consciousness of utter surrender to the divine will. So he went to his death, and made that death the means of conquest over all the powers of darkness.

Now, in such a contemplation we realise the very spirit of Christ; and though I do not say, of course, that the spirit of Christ would be absent because the name of Christ is not used, yet I do contend most earnestly that if we find the mention of the name of Christ remind us of his teaching, and renew in us his spirit, so far from being a relic of superstition, it is most truly rational on our part to use that name, sacred by ten thousand holy associations, in all our devotions at the footstool of grace.

Never man spake of the Father as did Jesus Christ; and though he teaches no theosophic theory concerning the Eternal, he does give to us an attitude towards the unknown and unknowable Infinite, which practically supplies all our need in the distresses of life. It is the *attitude* towards the Eternal that is wanted. We do not know how to express the nature of God, but we do know that we are in His hands. We do not know how to fathom the counsels of God, but we do know that in subjection to His will, as it is revealed to us either in nature or in experience, is our only law of life. We do not know by what mystic channels the exhaustless resources of everlasting life pass into the budding flowers, or into the growing grasses, or into the ripening fruits, or into the developing child, or into the prophetic soul; but we do know, by experience, that to breathe such inspirations, and to act according to their impulses, is the noblest life man can enjoy. Now, Jesus gave us this attitude towards the Father, and just in proportion as we realise his spirit, do we adopt that attitude towards the Father, which is the only true religion.

When, therefore, we pray in the name of Christ, we mean

that we pray in the spirit, or strive to pray in the spirit of Christ. When we pray in the spirit of Christ, we mean that we strive to realise the strength of inspiration and the humility of sanctified resignation,—that we aspire towards a morality, pure and austere, but, at the same time, tender and charitable towards all human weakness. When we pray in the spirit of Christ, we mean that amidst all the disappointments of life we strive to realise a joyful faith and a loving gratitude, together with such a full consciousness of God, and such an instant obedience to the impulses of His spirit, that though we had to face ruin and death, we should still be able to say with courage, “Even so, Father, for so it seemeth good in Thy sight.” It is difficult for me to conceive what objection can be made to such a use of the name of Christ. It may indeed be said to me, “You do not know the facts of his life with sufficient accuracy to construct a satisfactory biography, or to draw a portrait distinct in detail.” I am well aware of it. But we feel the impulse of his spirit, nevertheless, lasting throughout the ages. Inspiration is not always articulately explicable, nor always traceable to the precise acts or forms of words from which it flows. I call to mind from early life a grand, and, to my memory, venerable figure, from whose lips I drank in the inspiration of what little of higher life there may be in me, but I can scarcely recall the words that were uttered. I know little or nothing of the story of the man's life compared with what I know of many friends around me. Nevertheless, the inspiration endures; and what one smaller man can be to a group of students in any one generation, the great Christ, the Son of God, may be, has been, to all humanity coming after him. We do not know, as we should like to know, the story of his childhood and his manhood, the exact report of the very syllables that he used. Nevertheless, out of that cloud-land, bright with many a divine vision, there issues forth a strong impulse that has urged

mankind on in the path of moral progress and is felt breathing on our souls to the present day.

But it may be said, "People misunderstand you when you use the name of Christ in your prayers, and suppose you to be praying through Christ as a necessary Mediator between God and man." If people misunderstand me, I cannot help it. All that I can do is to explain myself to the best of my power. I welcome truth from all sources, from all critical inquirers, from all natural discoveries; I am compelled to surrender to the innumerable converging lines of evidence which show that the miraculous stories of the past are constructed more out of vivid and glowing imaginations than out of real historical events. Yet, nothing whatever disturbs that idea of a divine life which Christ has given to the world; a life in the consciousness of God, a life lovingly one with mankind. And in the contemplation of that life, ideal or historic, whichever men choose to call it, I rejoice in obeying the apostolic exhortation, "Whatsoever ye do, in word or in deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus; giving thanks unto God and the Father by him."

J. ALLANSON PICTON.

*THE HOMES OF THE STANLEYS AND THE
TAITS.**

IT does not need the grace and charm with which the Dean of Westminster invests every theme which he touches, nor the high esteem in which the Archbishop of Canterbury is held outside, as well as within, the National Church, to recommend the volumes which have suggested the title of this paper, or to justify their publication. Readers who are repelled by ordinary religious memoirs are drawn to these by the revelation of the divine power of spiritual religion which they exhibit. No truer evidence of what Christianity is in its deepest root can be found anywhere than in the records of such lives as these. Like the lives themselves, such records are witnesses to its living and permanent influence.

Something of this feeling has inspired the publication of these biographies. Speaking of the too brief fragments of journals and letters left by his mother, Catherine Stanley, the Dean of Westminster remarks:—"They will not be deemed less instructive because, like her husband's activity, her own spiritual insight belonged to that larger sphere of religion which is above and beyond the passing controversies of the day. In this age of transition, it may be useful to

* *Memoirs of Edward and Catherine Stanley.* Edited by their son, Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D.D., Dean of Westminster. (Murray, 1879.)

Catherine and Crauford Tait, wife and son of Archibald Campbell, Archbishop of Canterbury: *a Memoir.* Edited by the Rev. W. Benham, B.D., Vicar of Margate. (Macmillan, 1879.)

find expression given to thoughts of which we may be sure that, as they preceded our present conflict of opinions, so they will long survive it, and which may possibly convey guidance and consolation to those who know how to value the faculty of seeing things as they really are, without the distorting medium of personal prejudice or party passion."

In language striking from its simplicity, Miss Tait gave her judgment in favour of publishing the memoir of her mother:—"If it be thought that the history of my mother's life is likely to do good by helping and encouraging anybody in good living, then let the thing be done, but any other motive ought not to be heard of." To considerations such as these the Archbishop yielded, for, as Mr. Benham writes in his modest preface to the work which he has so carefully edited—"These memorials comprise a record of deep piety; of an unstinted wealth of effectual sympathy; of untiring labour, along with an exulting love of home and husband and children."

The two books have, as might have been expected, many divergences; yet there is beneath these an essential similarity in their tone and spirit. The four lives—of Edward and Catherine Stanley, of Catherine and Crauford Tait—reveal that unworldliness which consists in devotion to the highest ends of living. In no one of them is there a trace of that thankless contempt for God's earthly gifts which has too often passed in Evangelical circles for spirituality, but in all alike, blended with sympathy with all bright and pure things in this world, there is a tone of thought and feeling which rises habitually above the level of that so-called "society," in the atmosphere of which idealism of any kind, religious or other, finds it difficult to thrive or even to live. In the Archbishop's notice of Mrs. Tait, at a time when she helped him by her sympathy and by her activity in the work of his diocese, we read:—"She never laid herself out in any way for what is commonly called London society, but

her position necessarily brought her into connection with many of its brightest ornaments. I know nothing in her life more truly Christian than the way in which she moved as befitted a bishop's wife in such society. When she first came to London she was still young, and had it not been for the deep lessons of her previous life, she might have been tempted to plunge into the society that opened before her. . . . She neither sought society nor avoided it; she enjoyed it when it came in her way quietly and calmly, and consistently with all the claims of important duty which were ever present to her mind."

We see less of Mrs. Stanley's outward life than of Mrs. Tait's, but the coincidence in this spirit of unworldliness, in its best sense, as equally removed from absorption in externals and from contempt of them, is as conspicuous in the thoughts which we find in the letters and journals of Mrs. Stanley as in the memorials of Mrs. Tait. "The absence of some pursuit beyond the mere living in society narrows the heart as much as the mind. Where the natural sense of beauty and excellence is destroyed, where neither is felt or admitted but through the medium of circumstances, connections, or some prejudices of this nature, how the character is debased and lessened, how the selfish principle expands! The moral and intellectual nature are, and must be, connected." "'Crucify the flesh with the affections and lusts' may extend over a wide range of duty. It almost comes to making out whatever is disagreeable to be right, which yet is an odious, discouraging, legal view of the case. An odd transposition of duty and pleasure thus takes place. I leave off reading Chalmers' sermons on a principle of duty to assist at a dancing lesson. Self-indulgence would have preferred the first." "Form your idea of Christ, not from the *detail* of His conduct, but from the virtues which He personifies; *establish* these, and Christ is within you." It is rare even

yet to find in current types of religious teaching a tone of thought and feeling like this, leavening life with its influence while leaving unspoiled every genuine human interest.

This, too, is the charm of the memoir of the late Bishop of Norwich. Edward Stanley was born in 1779, and thus his early life belonged to the period before the Oxford movement of 1834 had arisen, and when the Evangelical movement had touched the highest point of its influence and was already verging towards its decline, passing from its first passionate fervour into that servitude to words and formulas which has been the bane of the later Evangelical school, and prevents many good men who have been brought under its influence from recognising even their own ideas when presented in other language.

The Dean of Westminster's concise memoir hardly permits us to judge to what extent this stream of spiritual tendency had affected his father's earlier years. It is quite possible that the breath of new life to both Church and Nonconformity—which the Evangelical revival unquestionably was—may have had its share in the formation of his mind and character; but if so, happily for himself and for us, its influence was that of a spiritual power, not of a form of thought. It is interesting to note in his case the parallel with F. W. Robertson, whose passion for the military profession, for which he was destined in his youth, "gave a colour to his whole after life." Edward Stanley's passion was for the sea, and his love of nature, as well as his fondness for natural history, helped to impart to his mind that sense of reality which saved him from mere questions of words and names. "The exhibition of divine power and goodness in the natural world seemed to him so much more direct and simple than amidst the perplexities and confusion of the moral world, that he always regarded it as one of the purest sources of intellectual and religious instruction, and always studied and encouraged it as a

natural part of a clergyman's duty, and as conducive, when it could be followed up, to the welfare of his flock also. 'The perversions of men,' he used to say, 'would have made an infidel of me, but for the counteracting impressions of Divine Providence in the works of nature,'"—a curious contrast, we may remark by the way, with J. S. Mill's indictment of nature,* and with much modern thought on the subject, but suggesting that childlike faith to which science in its ultimate issue will bring back the human mind.

"Of the Scriptures," says Dr. Stanley, "he was at all times a careful student. But the contrast of the elaborate systems of later divinity with the simplicity and freedom of the Bible was a topic to which he constantly recurred; and though giving a practical assent to the creed and worship of the Church of England, he never could endure minute controversies relating to the details of its doctrines and ceremonies. It was not till a later period of his life that the full effects of this tendency, whether produced by temperament or education, were clearly manifested; but it deserves remark thus early as having conduced to foster and determine in great measure his taste for physical science."

The life of such a man affords a lesson which the religious world of most times, our own included, greatly needs to learn—the possibility of combining with earnestness, devoutness, and strong personal convictions in the matter of religion, manly simplicity, freedom from party bias, tolerance, and charity. It was more difficult, perhaps, then than now to exercise such qualities, when all earnestness was stigmatised as Methodism, and all largeness of mind branded as infidelity.

We get glimpses in this memoir of a state of things in the English Church comparatively rare now, which severely tested Edward Stanley's strength of character, both as

* Three Essays on Religion, pp. 28—32. Conf. Lucret. *De Rerum Nat.*, Lib. V. v. 195 *et seq.*

Vicar of Alderley and as Bishop of Norwich. "The state of a country cure . . . was not an easy post for one who had formed a high ideal of pastoral exertion." At Alderley "the clerk used to go to the churchyard stile to see whether there were any more coming to church, for there were seldom enough to make a congregation." "The rector used to boast that he had never set foot in a sick person's cottage." Of the neighbouring clergy—"all who could afford it, hunted; few, if any, rose above the ordinary routine of the stated services of the Church." The condition of the diocese of Norwich, to which Edward Stanley was appointed in 1837, is thus sketched by the Dean:—"Non-residence, pluralities, one instead of two services once a week. . . . carelessness in admission to holy orders, imperfect administration of the rites of baptism and burial, such were some of the more obvious anomalies which had made the diocese of Norwich a by-word for laxity among the sees of the Church of England."

With a light but firm hand the Dean of Westminster sketches in this notice of his father, a pastoral career, the secret of the success of which was so largely due to the strong individuality of the man. The details of his management of his parish and of his government of his diocese must be read, to be fully appreciated, in the book itself. His frank and genial bearing towards the poor, his cordial sympathy with their joys and sorrows, his interest in education, in science, and in literature, his courage physical and moral, his liberal attitude towards ecclesiastical and political reform, his capability of recognising the good in those from whom he differed most, his conscientious exercise of his patronage, his respect for those of his clergy who frankly avowed convictions differing from his own, his unwearied efforts for the welfare of his parish and his diocese—all these

things we find illustrated in life and word in the memoir itself. "I hear a great deal," he once said, "about zeal for the welfare of the *Church*. I wish I could hear more of anxiety for the welfare of *Christianity*." These are words which express the spirit of his life. For him Christianity meant living after the pattern of Christ.

Dr. Stanley has admirably summed up the lesson of such a life :—"If the simpler religion exemplified in the pastoral career here described was less brilliant in its results than some of the subsequent revivals or imitations of mediæval practices, yet it was also without their darker features of strife and suspicion. There have been cases even in the judgment of those not unfavourable to such experiments, where 'a parish which had been before as the garden of Eden has been transformed into a howling wilderness.' It is instructive to notice that, independently of these recent aids, there existed a sound form of moral and religious life, not the less admirable because it sprang from a zeal tempered by common sense, and because it aimed, not so much at the interest of a party, or even of a Church, as at the good of the whole community."

As we turn from the volume of Dean Stanley (upon whom, even while we write, we learn, with deep regret and sincere sympathy, that a fresh bereavement has fallen) to the memorials of Catherine and Crauford Tait, we seem to pass into the very sanctuary of sorrow. Perhaps no part of the book has been read with a keener interest than Mrs. Tait's narrative of the loss of her children at Carlisle, and the account of the more recent death of the Archbishop's son, Mr. Crauford Tait, and of that of Mrs. Tait herself. We leave this narrative to tell its own tale. Silence is the only tribute that can be paid in the presence of such griefs as these. But the deeper interest of these memorials lies, we think, not in the sorrow so much as in the life. Even this pathetic picture pales before the history of a life-long

devotion to the service of the highest good. We have already quoted a passage from the Archbishop's notice of his wife's superiority to the fascinations of society, and we doubt if wealth and station have ever shown more of the power of faith in heart and life. Incidentally the Archbishop refers more than once to the "ample means" and to the outward circumstances which necessarily freed his wife from those harassing cares which so seriously hamper in many cases the higher work of life. Yet a woman of another order would have made much more of wealth and station such as hers for purely personal gratification—for show, for glitter, for refined self-indulgence—even while fulfilling in the bare letter the office of a chief pastor's wife. Decent regard for religious conventions can very well go hand-in-hand with a spirit and temper of mind as really worldly, in the worst sense of this much-abused term, as those of the woman who "liveth in pleasure, and is dead while she liveth." And this victory over the temptations which belonged to her place in the world impresses us all the more forcibly, because Mrs. Tait never wore the dress of any religious exclusiveness, but frankly delighted in home, in children, in literature, in cultivated society, in all that adorns and beautifies life.

The two sets of influences to which Dr. Stanley refers in his preface—the Evangelical and the Oxford movement—had each its share in the formation of the character of Mrs. Tait. Her early training was in the Evangelical school. The associations of her home in the parsonage of Elmdon seem to have been exclusively Evangelical. We learn, in fact, that "the first distinct awakenings of her spiritual life" came from a relative "who finally joined the Plymouth Brethren." It was a happy circumstance that her spiritual development should have been so greatly modified, before her opinions were fixed or her habits of thought fully formed, by the introduction of a "totally

strange element into the family," the teaching of the Oxford school, and the indirect influence of John Henry Newman. There are many examples of men, and still more of women, who have passed at one bound from the extreme type of the one school to the extreme type of the other; many examples, too, of these two forms of religious tendency neutralising each other, and leaving the soul stranded on total unbelief, or, at least, on utter indifference to all religion. It was not so with Mrs. Tait. She touched both extremes, but rested in neither, still less subsided into some conventional form which covers with a decent drapery the absence of all religious earnestness. She has her earlier dream of becoming a missionary to the Catholics in the West of Ireland. Then she is drawn towards asceticism, and thinks that there is nothing like the teaching of the Oxford school. But the conflict between the two opposing types left at last a soul naturally Christian (to use Tertullian's phrase)—the bright, pure, loving nature of the woman—free to yield itself to the inspirations of the Life of the Lord, which both schools alike have too often warped; and while she never lost that spiritual earnestness which is the best characteristic of Puritanism, "all through her life a marked love for the ceremonial of the English Church . . . continued as the outward form in which her deep inward piety embodied itself."

We do not gather from these memorials that Catherine Tait ever quite freed herself from her early Evangelical or early Oxford bias, or rose into those upper zones of thought in which the temporary and local forms of both schools are seen in their true significance, and only the eternal elements of both remain. For that, her life was too busy. But it is certain that she was saved by her own good sense, by her real piety, and by her husband's influence from the errors and extravagances which have, in different directions,

marked the two forms of religion which seem to divide the National Church between them. She was capable of understanding and sympathising with many from whom, as from Broad Churchmen, she dissented. "One day Crauford, when a boy, said to her, 'Mother, I don't think you and father think always alike.' Both parents laughed. 'Have you found that out, my boy?' said she." "She could apprehend the truth and beauty of another's mind, while seeing the same truths herself from a different point of view." "She had no faculty for detecting heresy," she said; and she "could read with the deepest interest the books and enjoy the conversation of men from whom she differed, and admire their great qualities, and help them in good works without in any way pledging herself to follow their guidance."

A life such as this is the best proof of how much deeper lie the springs of religious emotion and action than the forms of faith for which men contend so bitterly, and, except for evil, so fruitlessly. It was a life Christlike, because it was a life of unwearied energy in the cause of humanity. The story unfolded in these pages is the story of a home-life, womanly and true; but also of an outer life crowded with active exertions, full of sympathy for the poor and the suffering, which still found time for reading and meditation, and which no external activity could withdraw from fellowship with the Father of Spirits. The theological and ecclesiastical distinctions which separate rival creeds and schools fade into insignificance as we close the book in which we have followed through another human life the enduring influence of Jesus of Nazareth.

Our space will allow of only a few words of tribute to the memory of Crauford Tait. It is not surprising that, brought up in such a home, he should have been what he was, and displayed a promise of which his early death forbade the fulfilment. His father's simple narrative of his worth and

goodness will not bear condensation. We will not say with Wordsworth—

“ The good die young,
“ While those whose hearts are dry as summer dust
“ Burn to the socket ;”

but we think that none can read this memorial of a young man, so early called away, without a sense of pain that one whose modesty hid real powers should have fallen on the field while his work was scarcely yet begun.

CHARLES SHAKSPEARE.

FERVENT ATHEISM.*

THE admission of Miss Bevington's exposition and defence of practical Atheism into *The Nineteenth Century* may be fairly taken to indicate that the Editor has reason to believe that a considerable portion of his numerous readers are not likely to find anything very distasteful to them in this clever young lady's strenuous endeavour to divest human life of all the sanctions and trusts of religion. This is only one among many indications that the profession of Atheism does not now shock the sentiment of society as it once did. Nor is it difficult to account for this change. It is, no doubt, in part due to the fact that, owing to recent scientific discoveries, and still more to the daring theories and speculations which these discoveries have occasioned, a large and increasing number of thoughtful people are being carried into that vague condition of theological opinion called Agnosticism—a condition in which the mind oscillates between the two opposite poles of belief; at one time touching the confines of Atheism, at another time approaching equally near to definite Theistic convictions. Conversation with a genuine

* "Lectures and Essays." By the late William Kingdon Clifford, F.R.S. Edited by Leslie Stephen and Frederick Pollock. With an "Introduction" by F. Pollock. 2 vols. Macmillan and Co.: London, 1879.

"Modern Atheism and Mr. Mallock." By Miss L. S. Bevington. *The Nineteenth Century*, October and December, 1879. C. Kegan Paul and Co.

"The Personal Aspect of Responsibility." By Miss L. S. Bevington. *Mind*, April, 1879. Williams and Norgate.

Agnostic soon reveals that he does not like the Atheist; that, in fact, he has a much more decided objection to Atheism than he has to Theism. But, at the same time, it is evident that the Agnostic unintentionally helps the Atheist to a social recognition, which the latter could hardly otherwise obtain. Some shades of Agnosticism are, as I have said, not far removed from Atheism. So near, indeed, are the two, that the intellect of the majority of good people fails to distinguish clearly between them; and hence it comes to pass that since Agnosticism, as being the creed of so many eminent and popular *savans* and philosophers, is, of course, perfectly respectable, Atheism—its next-door neighbour on the negative side—gets the full benefit of this close association, and can now confidently show its face at the fashionable *conversazione* and in the high-class Review without fear of being frowned upon as a disreputable intruder.

But it is not only on account of its close proximity to the negative developments of Agnosticism that Atheism has obtained kindlier treatment. A much more just and substantial consideration has contributed to this result. I allude, of course, to the more general recognition of the truth that it is quite possible for intellectual scepticism concerning fundamental religious ideas to co-exist with much moral worth and benevolent enthusiasm. Most Christians and Theists would probably still endorse Lord Bacon's assertion that "the denial of a God tends to destroy man's nobility, and to deprive human nature of the means to exalt itself above human frailty;" but they are now quite aware that this mischievous tendency of a false intellectual system may, in the case of the Atheist himself, be largely, if not wholly, counteracted by his voluntary adherence to an ideal of virtuous conduct. They see that there can be no genuine and complete negation of God's presence and authority so long as the spirit reverently aspires to realise its ideal of moral excellence. Each man's ideal of moral

excellence is, in the view of the Christian Theist, a glimpse of the living presence of the Eternal—a more or less imperfect vision of the character of God. Whoever, then, is diligently fashioning his life in accordance with his highest idea of moral excellence, and is rejecting in obedience to the claims of that ideal the importunities of personal appetite and selfish ambition, that man is recognised as doing the will of the Father within him, and as spiritually drawing nigh to God, even while intellectually doubting or denying His existence. For Atheists of this stamp the devout Theist must feel at once admiration and regret—admiration for them in that they reverence their Conscience as their King, regret in that they are not reinforced and comforted by the assurance that this same Conscience is a living testimony to their present and perpetual relation to that Indwelling Spirit, of whose perfect justice and eternal love human justice and human love are imperfect presentations and embodiments.

There are, doubtless, many in the present day who are Atheists in the above sense. The philosophy of Evolution has loosened their intellectual hold on God, but has as yet failed to lower their moral ideal, or to diminish in any appreciable degree their warm love for humanity. Can, however, this condition of what we may call fervent and philanthropic Atheism be a permanent one? It is the object of Miss Bevington's paper to show that it both can be and will be permanent; that, indeed, it is destined to become the universal condition of mankind. Love for man will, she thinks, burn with even greater brightness and intenser heat when the thought of God and the love of God have been totally extinguished in the mind and heart. I will presently examine the more important of the reasons which she alleges on behalf of this doctrine, and will endeavour to justify my belief that such Atheism as we have been considering generally succeeds in passing into some more or

less adequate recognition of religious truth; and that if it fails in so doing, it can hardly long retain its high moral ideal, inasmuch as it will lose at length the emotional power and fervour which is needful for great and sustained moral efforts.

It must, however, be remarked at the outset, that it would be a serious mistake to suppose that the great majority of those whose theological convictions have been affected by recent scientific discoveries and speculations, entertain that confident sense of the beauty and sufficiency of Atheism which characterises the utterances of Mr. Bradlaugh and Miss Bevington. Most of those who feel the old intellectual foundation of their faith in God and Immortality giving way beneath them, are by no means in a mood to proclaim this circumstance through the press and from the platform, much less to boast that their religious loss is amply compensated by the light and comfort which their new views afford. Those who have once richly enjoyed the spiritual experience involved in the assurance that they are not alone, for the Father is with them, may, in exercising the right and duty of free inquiry, be forced to doubt the validity of this assurance; but the doubt is generally regarded as an unwelcome visitor, whose presence in the soul chills and freezes the precious springs of spiritual trust and hope. Mr. Mallock truly describes the condition of the mass of earnest unbelievers in God and Immortality, when he says, "their only impulse is to struggle and endure in silence." That Miss Bevington recovers from the loss of religious belief so readily, is probably due to the shallowness of her spiritual experience. Her review articles display much power of clear thinking, and to judge from her verses, she is by no means a contemptible poet; but one becomes conscious of a marked defect in her mental constitution when she is contemplated side by side with natures of the

spiritual or saintly type, such as Madame Guyon, Fénélon, George Fox, or Channing. As the fervent experiences of these eminently spiritual persons rise considerably above the average religious sentiments of mankind, so, on the other hand, does Miss Bevington's capacity for religious emotion appear to sink far below the ordinary level. It is probably on this account that she is content to call herself an Atheist rather than an Agnostic; for Agnosticism, as represented by such teachers as Professor Tyndall, implies the recognition and the cherishing of religious emotions, that is, of emotions which are kindled by meditating on that invisible power of which matter and mind are the manifestations. Professor Tyndall says, "What Dr. Martineau *knows*, I *feel*;" but Miss Bevington seems desirous to repudiate all emotion as well as knowledge in reference to aught else than man and the phenomenal universe.

A cursory perusal of the late Professor Clifford's philosophical and ethical Essays would probably leave the impression that his Atheism was quite as thorough as Miss Bevington's. Certainly, Atheism in his writings often presents a more openly offensive and unjust attitude towards Christianity than is seen in that lady's more temperate and cautiously worded articles. I am inclined to think, however, that Clifford's writings exhibit more traces of a capacity for religious thought and feeling of religiosity as it is sometimes called, than are apparent in the pages of the lady Atheist. The essential difference between them is seen when we compare their sentiments towards that Theistic faith, which their scientific and philosophical views had compelled them to resign. Miss Bevington's words are:—

"Our 'unbelievers' know what they lose in losing religion. They lose their moral sofas, their spiritual 'cakes and ale'; but the solid ground remains for spiritual exercise, and the bread and meat of success and survival will continue to reward that exercise wherever faithfully performed."

I do not think that any one who had really experienced the power and the peace which religious faith imparts, could ever refer to the loss of it as the loss of "moral sofas" and "spiritual cakes and ale." These words betray a poverty of spiritual experience, which alone would utterly disqualify any one for the task of estimating aright the ethical worth of religion. In reference to the same subject Professor Clifford writes:—

"Now, whether or not it be reasonable and satisfying to the conscience, it cannot be doubted that Theistic belief is a comfort and solace to those who hold it, and that the loss of it is a very painful loss. It cannot be doubted, at least by many of us in this generation, who either profess it now, or received it in our childhood, and have parted from it since with such searching trouble as only cradle-faiths can cause. We have seen the spring sun shine out of an empty heaven to light up a soulless earth; we have felt with utter loneliness that the Great Companion is dead. Our children, it may be hoped, will know that sorrow only by the reflex light of a wondering compassion. But to say that Theistic faith is a comfort and a solace, and to say that it is the crown or coping of morality, these are different things."

The two writers agree in resigning Theism, and in declaring that Morality will not be affected by this loss; but in how different a spirit do they bid farewell to the faith they have once professed! In the one case it is the parting with a mere acquaintance whom we have only superficially known, and the loss of whose dainty hospitality creates a transient regret; in the other case it is the severance from a dear friend with whose life our own life has become intertwined, and in losing whom we seem to lose the better part of ourselves.

It is true that Clifford at times assaults in a rude and unjust way, not only sacerdotal Christianity, but even the essential principles of all spiritual faith. One cannot deny, I think, that this mathematical genius and brilliant speculator upon all things human and divine, was defective in

that feeling of reverence which is at once a source and product of religious faith. Affectionate he must have been to a high degree, and he seems to have powerfully drawn to himself the hearts of those who came under his personal influence; but to the sentiment of awe it would appear that he was almost a stranger. It may, indeed, be true that much in his tone and language that looks like irreverence is really due to disappointed reverence; that it was because ideas and doctrines which he had once revered had failed, as he thought, to keep their promise to his mind and heart, that he turned savagely upon them, and vehemently abused and denounced them. It was probably under the influence of some such reaction as this that he wrote from Malaga to Lady Pollock:—

“I don't understand why one is expected to be polite and reticent about the distinction between the Hebrew piety and Roman universalism attributed to Jesus and Paul, and the ecclesiastical system, which is only powerful over men's lives in Spain, the middle and south of Italy, and Greece—countries where the population consists chiefly of habitual thieves and liars, who are willing opportunely to become assassins for a small sum. I suppose it frightens people to be told that historical Christianity as a social system invariably makes men wicked when it has full swing. Then I think the sooner they are well frightened the better.”

In this same unwholesome mood of reckless defiance to a doctrine which he had once held dear, he talks of the belief in Providence as an “immoral doctrine,” and insists that if man has free-will, morality is impossible.

Yet while thus vigorously contending for doctrines that utterly remove the foundations of all Theistic belief, Clifford can still declare, and no doubt with truth, that “he reveres with all his heart the teachings of James Martineau.” It is clear that we must not take too literally all the smart sayings of Clifford as though in their unqualified form they fairly and fully represented his deep and deliberate con-

victions. He who delighted, when at Cambridge, to startle his admirers by the boldness and novelty of his gymnastic feats, and felt more proud of being mentioned in *Bell's Life* as a distinguished athlete than of attaining the second place in the list of wranglers, may well be expected to have yielded at times to the temptation to say brilliant and audacious things, in which exaggeration and clever caricature won a transient triumph at the expense of exact and complete truth and justice. One of his friends, who rivalled him in athletic skill and daring, writes:—

"His nerve at dangerous heights was extraordinary. I am appalled now to think that he climbed up and sat on the cross-bars of the weathercock on a church tower; and when, by way of doing something worse, I went up and hung by my toes to the bars, he did the same."

His characteristics as a gymnast were also his characteristics as a critic and theorist in philosophy, morals, and theology. In reference to this point the *Spectator* remarks:—

"As he seems to have been entirely free from anything like giddiness in his gymnastic feats, so he seems to have been equally free from anything like awe in the equally marvellous gymnastic feats of his mind, treating the infinity and eternity in which his fellow-creatures believed with the same sort of contemptuous familiarity with which he treated the ecclesiastical height he had once reached, only to balance himself by his toes on the weather-vane."

But though Clifford was lacking in the sentiment of reverence, his was a nature that loved deeply and yearned for responsive sympathy and love. In the Theistic faith there was much that satisfied this deep need of his soul; hence the pathetic way in which he refers to his parting with this faith. But could he do without *some* faith and worship? It appears that Miss Bevington can: I doubt much if Clifford could. It is, I take it, a universal fact,

that in every soul that is capable of passing out of personal interest and surrendering itself wholly to some self-forgetful aspiration, the cry for a religious faith, for an object of religious trust and adoration, becomes irrepressible. We see this exemplified in the worship of Humanity by the Comtists; we see it, too, in a very marked form in the case of the highly-gifted man whom we are now considering, and whose early death all of us must heartily deplore. Having given up the Father-God of Theism and Christianity, Clifford is soon found personifying, trusting, and virtually worshipping what he calls the Father-Man, or the results of the accumulated experiences of the forefathers of our race, which, as Mr. H. Spencer teaches, present themselves in our souls as intellectual intuitions and moral impulses. We may well believe that in the passage I am about to quote, Clifford is worshipping a very inadequate God, which his own imagination has created; but that his words are all aglow with fervid sentiments of love, trust, and adoration, cannot be questioned; nor can we fail to see, I think, in this spontaneous creation of a form of faith and worship by one whose intellectual life was wholly saturated with the idea of Evolution, a practical refutation of Miss Bevington's doctrine that the human race can and will manage to dispense with religious ideas and emotions. Clifford's lecture on "The Ethics of Religion" concludes with this eloquent utterance:—

"Far be it from me to undervalue the help and strength which many of the bravest of our brethren have drawn from the thought of an unseen helper of men. He who, wearied or stricken in the fight with the powers of darkness, asks himself, 'Is it all for nothing? shall we indeed be overthrown?'—he does find something which may justify that thought. In such a moment of utter sincerity, when a man has bared his own soul before the immensities and the eternities, a Presence, in which his own poor personality is shrivelled into nothingness, arises within him, and says as plainly as words can say, 'I am with thee,

and I am greater than thou.' Many names of gods, of many shapes, have men given to this Presence, seeking by names and pictures to know more clearly and to remember more continually the guide and helper of man. No such comradeship with the Great Companion shall have anything but reverence from me, who have known the divine gentleness of Denison Maurice, the strong and healthy practical instinct of Charles Kingsley, and who now revere with all my heart the teaching of James Martineau. They seem to me, one and all, to be reaching forward with loving anticipation to a clearer vision which is yet to come—*tendentesque manus ripæ ulterioris amore*. For, after all, such a helper of men, outside of humanity, the truth will not allow us to see. The dim shadowy outlines of the superhuman deity fade slowly away from before us; and as the mist of his presence floats aside, we perceive with greater and greater clearness the shape of a yet grander and nobler figure—of Him who made all gods and shall unmake them. From the dim dawn of history, and from the inmost depth of every soul, the face of our father Man looks out upon us with the fire of eternal youth in His eyes, and says, 'Before Jehovah was, I am!'

In what respect, then, does "our father Man" differ from the Theist's God, the Father? To both alike it seems we can apply the words, "the Father within us," and also the words, "My Father is greater than I." The God of the Theist is the indwelling guide and helper, and so we are told in the above passage is "our father Man." At the first superficial glance, we might suppose that the religious ideas of Clifford and of the Theists are virtually interchangeable, and that the difference between them is, for the most part, in name only. A moment's reflection, however, dissipates this pleasant illusion. The "Father within us" of the Christian Theist is a *living* God holding personal relations with the human spirit; but the object of Clifford's adoration is either a lifeless abstraction or, at most, a self-evolving Force acting unconsciously and from the blind necessity of its nature. The unity and *quasi*-personality which Clifford for the nonce appears to ascribe to it, and which are needed in

order to justify his language about it, appear to have no reality objective to the worshipper's own mind; and it is evident that the soul of man cannot long impose upon itself and find an adequate satisfaction for its religious needs in a being whose chief glory and grandeur are simply the reflection of the soul's own moral and spiritual light. If this mysterious "Presence" within the soul, which presides over Evolution, be really greater than man, as Clifford says it is, then of a surety it must be nothing less than personal; and if it be personal, or in some mode inconceivable by us higher than what we mean by personal, why may we not regard it as not merely the originator and controller of the physical force whose evolution constitutes Nature, and of the psychical force which passes up through the animal kingdom into the sentient and impassioned frame of man, but also as the giver and inspirer, the judge and the comforter, of that Spirit in man which giveth him understanding, which *raises him above nature* by enabling him in some degree to determine his own activity and to exercise a certain control over the physical and psychical energies which are evolving themselves around and within him? This, so at least it appears to me, is the only view of human nature and its relation to the Father within us, which will provide an intellectual basis for a satisfying religious belief; and I cannot but think that this conception of God as personal or super-personal, and of man as in his spiritual (as distinguished from his physical and psychical) nature a true offspring of the Eternal and Infinite One, and not merely a part of the process of phenomenal evolution, rests upon a solid foundation in the incontrovertible and otherwise inexplicable facts of man's moral and religious experience. On no other theory than this can a satisfactory account be given of our consciousness of personal causation, of persistent self-identity, of volitional freedom,

and of moral responsibility. And not only is this theory imperatively demanded by the fundamental and ineradicable intuitions of our reason and conscience, but it likewise harmonises with and explains those more variable and fluctuating, yet most real and precious, experiences of the soul, which we describe as the personal communion between the spirit of man and the Divine Presence within us.

It is much to be regretted that neither in the admirable biographical sketch by Mr. F. Pollock, which is prefixed to this edition of the Lectures and Essays, nor in the selection given from Clifford's letters, is there any adequate insight afforded us into the great change which took place in Clifford's theological views. We read that "when he took his degree, and for some time after, he was a High Churchman; but there was an intellectual and speculative activity about his belief which made it impossible that it should remain permanently at that stage. . . . Religious beliefs he regarded as outside the region of scientific proof, even where they can be made highly probable by reasoning; for, as he observes in a MS. fragment of this time, they are received and held, not as probable, but as certain." "When and how" (continues Mr. Pollock) "Clifford first came to a clear perception that this position of quasi-scientific Catholicism was untenable, I do not exactly know; but I know that the discovery cost him an intellectual and moral struggle, of which traces may be found here and there in his essays." It would be very interesting to learn more about that period of his mental history when he was in the Theistic stage; for that he did tarry sometime in Theism, the passages I have quoted from his writings appear to prove. One thing is quite clear—namely, that it was the study of the views of Mr. Darwin and Mr. Herbert Spencer which finally led him to abandon all definite theological belief, and to assume, with almost passionate enthusiasm, the attitude of an extreme Evolutionist.

This important doctrine of Evolution (so far, indeed, as it rests on actual scientific discoveries) presents, I believe, not the slightest incompatibility with liberal Theology; but Evolution, as it commends itself to such thinkers as Clifford and Miss Bevington, passes beyond the domain of science and becomes a merely speculative theory which very far oversteps the limits of possible verification, and aspires to give an exhaustive explanation of all the changes in both the physical and the spiritual world. This extreme form of the doctrine overlooks the ultimate distinction between what is real or causal, and what is phenomenal or caused. Spirit belongs to the former category, while Evolution has only to do with the latter. To apply it to the former is to violate the primary deliverance of our consciousness, and to undermine the foundations alike of philosophy, morals, and religion. To the recognition of this basal distinction between causal Spirit and caused Phenomena our *savans* will, I feel assured, one day return. At present many of them are too much intoxicated with this really grand idea of Evolution to see the necessary limits of its range and its utter inapplicability to the sphere of spiritual causality, whether it be the causality of God or of the human spirit, the offspring of God. It is the causal action of Spirit which explains Evolution, and therefore Evolution is utterly powerless to explain the nature and activity of its own cause. By extreme Evolutionists, who seek to overleap this impassable limitation of their theory, the Theistic doctrine, which I have endeavoured to expound, is naturally felt to be very objectionable, for it takes the action and relations of the spiritual element in human nature to some extent out of the actual and possible range of scientific explanation and prevision, and while leaving to Science the undisputed possession of the phenomenal universe, yet vindicates for Philosophy and Theology a real *locus standi*, and gives

them a most important function to perform in that grand curriculum of culture which is needful for the complete education of mankind. It is not difficult to understand the character of the fascination which impels many of our *savans* to seek to include the whole of human nature within the scope of necessary Evolution. Such an hypothesis captivates by its simplicity and by the summary way in which it makes a clean sweep of all philosophical difficulties and theological mysteries. It cannot, however, make good its vast pretensions. Stubborn facts of consciousness rise up in mighty protest against it. It may well be doubted whether theories fashioned in violation of consciousness are ever practically realised even in the case of their expounders themselves. I cannot persuade myself that Mr. J. S. Mill ever succeeded in thinking of his absent manuscripts, for instance, as mere possibilities of sensation, and really felt that what we call Nature has no existence at all beyond the subjective states of the observing mind. Still less can I imagine that Miss Bevington can exemplify in her own case the theory of moral responsibility which she has elaborated in the pages of *Mind*. She there assures us that as Free-will is an illusion, which Modern Thought (*i.e.*, the Evolution theory as held by her) has happily exploded, we must cease to apply the ideas of personal merit or demerit to human conduct. Are we, then, to suppose that, if that lady should see a friend of hers being shabbily or insultingly treated by some person who allowed his selfishness or passion to have its evil way, she would ascribe no personal demerit to the offender, and that the indignant remonstrance which she would utter would not be intended to express blame at all, but would be solely prompted either by the pain which the ugly act gave to her delicate æsthetic perception, or by the benevolent intention of furnishing the offender, and others like him, with an additional motive not to

act in the same way again? And when in one passage of her paper she refers to Mr. Mallock as "a conjurer," whose sleight-of-hand "tricks" her sharp eyes have detected; and in another passage speaks of his "glib and sinister insinuations," are not these expressions redolent with a sense of his personal demerit? If they are not, English words have changed their meaning under the régime of "Modern Thought." But, indeed, in that lady's neighbourhood words are undoubtedly used in a very peculiar way, for she tells us that if her watch goes wrong it is visited with her *disapproval*.* In most parts of England "disapproval" would be reserved for the incompetent watch-maker. The truth appears to be that Miss Bevington's and Professor Clifford's theories of our moral ideas and emotions rest upon a perverted psychology, an utterly false reading of the human mind and heart. The entirely distinct domains of æsthetics and morals are by them hopelessly confused together. They have evidently not begun by looking into their immediate consciousness to learn what verdict it gives on moral matters, but have first asked what does the theory of Evolution require our consciousness to be, and having discovered what the sentiments and ideas ought to be on the Evolution hypothesis, they have set to work to persuade themselves and other people to remodel their moral consciousness accordingly. But they will find that the well-worn maxim, *Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret*, still holds good, and the time-honoured words, "right" and "wrong," "merit" and "demerit," will continue to retain their ancient meaning when "Modern Thought" has come and gone.

Professor Clifford's account of the Universe is that it is made up of particles of "mind-stuff." As consciousness is certainly in existence now, and as it evidently cannot be evolved out of unconscious matter, Evolutionists are driven

* *Mind*, April, 1879, p. 247.

to make the unverifiable assumption that consciousness or feeling in some exceedingly faint and elementary state has co-existed with all matter. When the material elements cohere in an animal organism, the vague sentiences which pertain to the material particles cohere likewise and produce that definite consciousness which animals enjoy, and which attains its most vivid and highly differentiated form in man. Now, whether this explanation is competent to account for the consciousness of animals, and for that psychical portion of our consciousness and activity which we appear to inherit from the animal kingdom, must be left at present an open question. There seem to be immense difficulties in the way of such a theory; but I do not know that there is anything in it which is intrinsically absurd or which collides with any well-assured facts of our inner experience. But when it is maintained, as it is by Clifford, that this is likewise the constitution and mode of genesis of the spiritual element in our nature, of our true self (the *πνεῦμα* of Paul, and the *νοῦς* of Aristotle*), so that that which possesses a clear consciousness of its own unity and continuous self-identity, of its freedom of choice and its moral accountability, is merely an aggregate of separate atoms of "mind-stuff," which have been brought into temporary combination during the animal life, and which will be dissolved again at death; we may well ask what warranty there is for the truth of this bold assertion, seeing that it represents the formation of the soul by a process which is *prima facie* most improbable, and indeed, so far as I can see, quite inconceivable.

That Clifford was so dazzled by the Evolution Theory,

* "According to Aristotle, the human soul, uniting in itself all the faculties of the other orders of animate existence, is a Microcosm. The faculty by which it is distinguished from those orders is reason (*νοῦς*). The other parts of the soul are inseparable from the body, and are hence perishable; but the *νοῦς* exists before the body, into which it enters from without as something Divine and immortal."—Ueberweg's "History of Philosophy," Vol. I., p. 168.

that his sober judgment was at times in abeyance, is clear, I think, from his language with regard to volitional movement. Gratuitously assuming that the only thing which can influence Matter is the action upon it of surrounding Matter, he unhesitatingly proclaims, in open defiance of the evidence of consciousness, that "the statement that Will influences Matter is simply nonsense"—an affirmation which (as Dr. Carpenter justly remarks) "assumes that Professor Clifford knows all about Matter and its dynamical relations, and therefore has an unquestionable right to say that Man-kind at large are wrong in the conviction that the movements of their Bodies are in any way directed by their Minds."

That such a statement as that which I have just quoted from one of Professor Clifford's popular lectures is nothing more than the sheer dogmatism of a mind hopelessly committed to a foregone conclusion, is rendered the more probable by the significant circumstance that such a competent authority as Dr. Tyndall (himself also an eminent Evolutionist) admits that the ordinary belief that the Mind exerts an influence upon the Body, which belief Clifford had summarily disposed of as "nonsense," is probably the correct account of the matter. It is by such unwarranted assertions as the above, and by diverting the attention from the real source of truth, the careful study of consciousness, that the extreme Evolutionist gives a superficial plausibility to his doctrine that the spirit of man is a mere transient phase in the process of phenomenal evolution. If, however, Professor Clifford's and Miss Bevington's account of human nature be accepted as the true one, it is clear that all the ordinary notions about morality and responsibility must undergo a radical change; nor can it be doubted, I think, that the disappearance of the genuine sentiment of moral freedom and moral obligation would speedily be followed by the decadence and final extinction of all faith in God and Immortality.

I turn now to consider briefly, in the remaining portion of this paper, what are the effects upon human Happiness and Virtue, which the loss of this Theistic faith may reasonably be expected to produce. With regard to the first of these questions, there appears to be a tolerably unanimous confession by recent Atheistic thinkers that the immediate effect of the decay and death of religious belief would be a decided diminution of the sum of human happiness. Miss Bevington's language on this subject affords, it seems to me, evidence of the weakness of her own position—and evidence, too, the more cogent because it is indirect and unintentional. She allows that the poor, the sick, the unsuccessful,—in short, all who are in any way grievously disappointed and distressed,—may undoubtedly derive much positive relief and comfort from the thought of the constant presence and sympathy of a Heavenly Father, and from the hope of Immortality. Her words are:—"Their earthly life is made more bearable by a belief in unfailing love, which mysteriously permits the misery, and in unfailable power which will eventually remove it, and by the convinced hope of 'another chance' after death." One would think that the perception of this truth would naturally suggest the further thought that the comforting power of religious faith operates most effectually where it is most needed. So far, however, from seeing this, she proceeds to undervalue this potent agent in the work of lessening the misery of mankind by alleging that it is only wanted where there is imperfection. "Were there no sickness," she says, "and no earthly hopelessness and joylessness, there is nothing to show that there would be any need of celestial comfort." Even if it were the fact (which it is not) that the beneficent influence of religion is only needed and felt under these distressful circumstances, there would still be no ground for supposing that

occasions for the exercise of this beneficent function will ever be wanting on this earth. "Man is born to trouble as the sparks fly upward" is a saying which is not likely to become obsolete. Bodily and mental suffering, painful and early deaths, can never be wholly eliminated from humanity; and though it may be true that the social sympathies of mankind will by degrees grow stronger, and mitigate in some measure the inevitable physical and moral evil in the world, still there can be no question that such human affections, most precious though they are, will never supersede the further need of religious trusts and hopes. But even supposing that the Utopia of the Secularists were realised, there would be just as great, if not a greater, necessity for religion as a condition of happiness. Miss Bevington strangely fails to notice, that in proportion as these social sympathies increase in intensity and purity, and human hearts are linked more closely together by the sacred ties of affection, the longing after immortality becomes a more prominent and persistent factor in human consciousness. The love of man, as well as the love of God, suggests and postulates the eternity of personal relations. As the soul awakens to a clearer sense of its illimitable rational faculties and emotional capacities, it realises more and more that this life on earth affords no adequate conditions either for the complete fulfilment of what it feels to be its true vocation, or for the satisfaction of its purest and loftiest aspirations. Hence is it that a decline of religious faith in a highly-cultured and refined age sheds a still denser gloom over men's minds and hearts, and pessimism is the peculiar ailment of a time when high secular civilisation is divorced from religious convictions. Miss Bevington cannot be ignorant of the important lesson taught us by the experience of that admirable man, the late J. S. Mill; how that, when his emotional nature had expanded under the kindling influence of holy love, he retracted his doctrine that man

ought to confine his thoughts and aspirations to this life, and declared that it was both permissible and desirable to cherish the hope that God may be powerful enough to grant His children immortality. Mr. F. Pollock says of Clifford, that "as never man loved life more, so never man feared death less." One can well believe it. In an upright man, whatever be his philosophical or religious creed, the thought of death is not likely to awaken any fear. But surely Mr. Pollock would allow that Clifford's last days on earth, and many of his previous hours also, would have been very much cheered and comforted by the assurance that he was not about to look for the last time on wife and children dear; and by the hope, which Socrates cherished, that he might after death enjoy the privilege of converse and discussion with the noblest and wisest of mankind. One other of the many powerful influences of faith on happiness may be mentioned—namely, that whether it be true or not that virtuous endeavour would be as constant and persistent if dissociated from the sanctions and expectations of religion, it is certainly true that the yoke of the conscience grows lighter, and duty is done with greater alacrity and joyfulness when the mind is conscious of the approval and sympathy of Him whom Clifford calls the Great Companion, and when we further feel that the issues of moral character extend into eternity.

And this suggests my final topic—a topic which would require a volume for the adequate treatment of it, but which I must not here leave quite unnoticed; I mean the probable effects of Atheism on Morality. Miss Bevington, who does not entertain, it seems, the slightest doubt as to the ultimate triumph of extreme Evolutionist ideas all over the world, and the consequent entire extinction of faith in God and a Future Existence, argues that virtue will gain rather than lose by the restriction of men's thoughts and interests

to this world and to this life. She allows that the immediate effect of removing the restraints which certain philosophical and theological ideas have exerted over the conduct, may be a temporary decline of morality; and accordingly she warns her readers that "human virtue is on the eve of reaching a difficult and stormy crisis in its development." She confidently expects, however, that virtue will weather the storm without receiving any vital injury, and "firmly believes that after some possible tacking, moral opinion will eventually set sail in a direction so nearly parallel with Christianity, that the divergence towards a yet more social standard will, for generations to come, be scarcely perceptible." This conclusion Miss Bevington rests on the doctrine of heredity. The moral conduct of mankind is, she thinks, only temporarily affected by any change of theory respecting the psychological or philosophical foundation of morality; so that after some transient perturbation, people will not fail to obey the deeper tendencies which, owing to ancestral influences, have got a firm footing in their mental constitution. There is, no doubt, important truth in this doctrine of hereditary influences on character. It is a case of the mighty power of Habit, as exemplified in the organism of the race no less than in that of the individual. That the good habits of conduct which past generations have generally formed by obedience to conscience and under the inspiration of religion are generally transmitted and reappear in the psychical constitution of the present generation can hardly be disputed. The same holds good also of transmitted bad habits. Each personal self, or spirit, falls on coming into this present existence under these inherited psychical conditions; but the Theist believes that it receives from the indwelling Divine Spirit, insight into the relative worth of the impulses and attractions which prompt it to action, and that in the light of this self-knowledge, and in virtue of its personal freedom, it

is enabled to make such moral choices as shall gradually improve or deteriorate its character and place it in sympathy or out of sympathy with the Father within it. The spirit of man is not responsible for the original goodness or inferiority of its inherited psychical nature, but it is responsible for the changes which it produces in itself by its own free choice and activity.

But the psychical forces of inherited habit are too strong to allow of spiritual energy or spiritual inactivity making in a short time any radical change in the morality of the age. So far I agree with Miss Bevington. The real question at issue is, Will the gradual change in human character which she allows must take place be affected for good or for ill by the absence of a faith in God and Immortality? After carefully reading Miss Bevington's thoughtful Essays, I am only strengthened in the conviction that the abandonment of Theistic and the acceptance of Positivist views places the spirit of man under conditions very unfavourable to the persistent exercise of its personal energy on the side of virtue and humanity. I cannot now enter upon the question whether there are several moral intuitions, and therefore several virtues, or is, as Miss Bevington believes, only one virtue, namely, that of sacrificing the personal self to what Clifford calls the tribal or social self. For my present purpose I may allow that all the virtues may be resolved into benevolence or humanity. Will mankind, then, I ask, be as ready to sacrifice self-indulgence and greed for the sake of their fellow-creatures, when they firmly believe there is no God who approves of them and blesses them, no personal merit or demerit in their vice or their virtue,* and no future before themselves and other people save this short and precarious life? Morality, it is true, does not directly depend upon Religion. It is rather Religion that

* See Miss Bevington's article in *Mind*, April, 1879.

depends on Morality, or at least it is on the moral consciousness and on that Categorical Imperative which, as even Clifford candidly admits, unavoidably suggests an external personal authority,* that religions of the conscience (such as Judaism, Christianity, and Theism) find their deepest and most secure foundation. But while Theology to a large extent reposes on our moral intuitions, it is equally true that practical morality in turn finds in the experiences and hopes of religion a mighty source of energy on the side of rectitude and philanthropy. The fatal feature in this Positivism is that it takes all their natural life and meaning out of our moral sentiments and ideas, by seeking to import into them new meanings which do not correspond with the moral consciousness of mankind; for by this misrepresentation it insidiously undermines one of the chief supports of religious belief, and in so doing deprives morality itself not only of its inner sanction, but also of a stimulus and motive power, with which it can in no wise dispense.

Miss Bevington emphatically assures us that "a belief in right and wrong as such" is by no means impaired by the acceptance of the Atheistic view of human nature and human life; and I understand her to endorse the popular conception that the consciousness of doing "right" forms a very considerable part of the conception of happiness. "It is," she says, "this assumption that gives its ring of bitter melancholy even to the lurid glee of the Lesbian singers in their ever-conscious defiance of what the world calls virtue." Most true; but it seems to me self-evident that her tampering with the ideas of Right and Wrong,—her doctrine that wrong-doing is no indication of personal demerit in the conscious sinner, but only something strictly analogous to the offensive yelping of a troublesome dog which can be prevented in the future by giving the

* See the *Nineteenth Century*, April, 1877, p. 354.

animal a new and sufficient motive in the recalled smart of a blow,—is likely to be as effectual as any intellectual error can be in weakening this conviction of the necessary connection between virtue and happiness, by bewildering the moral judgment of all who are under its influence, and so paralysing instead of stimulating that clear, strong sense of duty on which all the true progress and well-being of society finally depend.

I have before pointed out that her Atheistic doctrine is incomparably inferior to religious faith in its power to deal with physical and mental suffering; I now maintain, in addition, that it is in like manner helpless and worthless—nay, absolutely mischievous, when brought face to face with human sinfulness. How, for instance, are these “Lesbian singers” whom she refers to above to be raised to a purer and higher life? Miss Bevington’s words testify that the divine element is not wholly extinguished in their souls. How, then, is it to be roused from its slumbers, and stimulated and aided to break away from its vile captivity, and win once more a reconciliation with the Eternal Father, the Great Companion, conscious estrangement from whom is the real cause of that haunting melancholy and unrest? Let some saintly spirit, such as a Baptist-Noel or a Channing, appeal to them, speaking to them out of the overflowing of his own faith and compassion, making them vividly conscious of God’s presence and God’s love and of the priceless worth and eternal destiny of that spiritual nature of theirs, which vanity and passion are now debasing, and may not such an appeal awaken the soul to a true sense of its real position and of its divine relations, and so enable it to experience in the spiritual emotions thus called forth such mighty reinforcement on the side of purity and virtue, that the will may have it in its power to win a noble victory, and true reformation of heart and life may begin?

But suppose that, instead of the men I have mentioned, Miss Bevington came with her "Modern thought" and new-fashioned Ethics, and told the erring ones that they were not to feel remorse and self-reproach for their past sinfulness, for competent persons were now assured that there was no personal demerit in the case; that she had come to provide them, if possible, with such additional motives as might perhaps turn the scale the other way the next time they were tempted to go wrong. To judge from her essays, these motives would be the assurance that society took a warm interest in their well-being, and really did not think they were to blame for what they had done, and also the thought of the superior happiness for themselves and others that would eventually follow from a virtuous course, if strenuously and laboriously sustained. She would assure them that there would come to them "in the long run" such sweet harmony with their surroundings, such satisfaction in being impelled to action by social affections and aspirations, that it would be clear to them that the balance of happiness is decidedly on the side of virtue. They must take care, however, not to suppose that there would be any personal merit in their persistence in a better way; for, just as their sin was the necessary result of the predominant bias of their nature at the time, so, too, would their reformation be, if, perchance, it came about. I do not think that many of those, whom I suppose her to be addressing, would derive the needful help and spiritual power from such exhortations as these. They would probably reply to her —

"We did feel, before you spoke to us, that we really deserved to be blamed by God and good people for our course of life, and that was the one thing which troubled us most of all; but as you have tried to show us that we have become what we are by the force of our strongest tendencies, and that therefore we really had no choice in the matter, we suppose that we need not feel uncomfortable or reproach ourselves on that score any longer.

And as to what you say about the advantage 'in the long run,' we are very doubtful as to whether ours will be a very long run; so we will e'en go on in the old way, eat and drink and be merry, for to-morrow we die, and we have your word for it that in that sleep of death no haunting dreams of by-gone wickedness will come to break our rest."

Surely virtue would find in Miss Bevington's so-called "science" a very questionable ally.

Finally: I do not doubt that this lady is correct in one doctrine which she takes great pains to establish—namely, that as Evolutionists study more and more carefully the immediate and remote consequences of actions, their code of practical ethics will come near to the ordinary Christian morality. The Christian Theist, indeed, anticipates *a priori* the truths which the Utilitarian moralist arrives at *a posteriori*; for believing that the Inspirer of the Conscience is Eternal Love, he feels a strong assurance that obedience to the law written on the heart will conduce to the highest and truest happiness of mankind. The sum of the whole matter is simply this—that however closely Atheistic and Christian morality may come to resemble each other in the outward form and letter, in their inner spirit and dynamic efficiency they are wide as the poles asunder. The former dismisses the ordinary conceptions of Sin and Remorse as "unscientific" fictions; the latter appeals from this science, falsely so called, to the ineffaceable truths of experience, and finds in our sense of personal accountability and of conscious revolt from the Divine Authority within the breast, facts of the most real and momentous significance. In thus eviscerating man's moral consciousness, Atheism saps also, as we have seen, the spiritual forces to which the progressive social elevation of mankind is mainly due. Not from Secular lecture-halls, but from the inmost heart of Christianity have proceeded that divine love and that sublime sense of duty which have inspired and strengthened the world's great philanthropists

—the Howards, the Wilberforces, and the Florence Nightingales—to enter upon and achieve their noble and abiding works. It is not, in short, from Atheism, but from Religious Faith that the Heart derives the trusts and hopes which in its darkest hours save it from despair, and the Will is reinforced by that mighty power of spiritual emotion and affection which makes it possible for it to resist successfully the gravitation of our nature to sensuality and selfishness, and to climb up bravely and hopefully towards the realisation of its God-inspired ideal.

CHARLES B. UPTON.

THE PRESENT SITUATION OF THE REFORMED CHURCH OF FRANCE.

IT would, perhaps, be difficult for foreign readers to arrive at any very exact comprehension of the questions which have been so passionately debated in the Reformed Churches of France during the last few years, without some previous understanding of their ecclesiastical organisation, and of the laws which govern them. In order to convey some idea of these, we must go a little way back into the past, and give a brief *résumé* of facts. To do this, and to lay these facts as clearly as possible before the readers of this *Review*, is our present object.

Up to the year 1852, the Reformed Churches of France were dependent solely upon the provisions of what is called "the Law of Germinal, Year X." (1802). After having, in 1801, signed the Concordat with the Catholic Church, the First Consul, just about to become Napoleon I., wished by this law of Germinal to settle the organisation of the Reformed Churches. He completed his Concordat, when, for Catholics and Protestants alike, he fixed the relations of their Churches with the State. These documents bear the impress of the clear, but singularly authoritative, or rather despotic, mind of the man who aimed at absolute mastery, and who would have constituted himself head of the Church as readily as he proclaimed himself General-in-Chief of his armies. The idea of an autonomous Church could not have entered the mind of

such an autocrat. Naturally, then, this Law of Germinal is not exactly perfect; but the Protestants had been so little accustomed to be treated as citizens at all that they accepted it with gratitude. It was only later, in conjunction with the progress of thought and the improvement of their social condition, that they perceived the defects of the organisation which had been given to them, and keenly felt the disadvantages which these involved. The restraints and disabilities were, however, far from being so serious as the Orthodox, in a spirit of partizanship and disparagement, have represented.

The organisation of the Protestant Churches of France, according to the Law of Germinal, is extremely simple. It comprises Consistories and Provincial Synods. There is one Consistory to every six thousand Protestants, and five Consistories together form an *Arrondissement Synodal*. These two bodies conduct all the business of the Church, but all their important decisions require the approval of the Government. No Confession of Faith, no article of discipline, can be promulgated without the approbation of the State, and the State alone can decree the deprivation of a pastor. These conditions naturally follow from the fact that the Church is the result of a Concordat. The union of Church and State obviously and necessarily involves State control; and no objection was raised on the part of the Churches to this State control for at least a quarter of a century. Peace reigned among the Churches, such differences of tendency as are inseparable from the very spirit of Protestantism were tolerated with fraternal charity, while all alike laboured for the diffusion of the Gospel. There were no ecclesiastical differences, because all were willing to emphasize grounds of communion rather than points of difference.

Everything went on well until the Revival (*Réveil*) appeared among us. This religious movement commenced

about 1830 ; at least, it was about this time that it began to excite attention, and to produce those consequences which have left so deep an impression upon our history. It was a movement of foreign origin and importation, and one on which it is difficult to pronounce judgment. Good there certainly was in the Revival, but, at the same time, there was a singular amount of harm. It did good in calling attention to religious subjects ; it stirred the minds which were falling into apathy as a result of a life too uniform and too placid ; it did good, inasmuch as it supplied, by its very exaggerations, the first stimulus to critical studies. But it was harmful by reason of its narrowness, its harsh interpretations, its daring theories, and its frequent exhibitions of a mean and petty spirit. From this time forth, the peace which the Churches and Consistories had hitherto enjoyed was broken, and doctrinal divergences, becoming ever more sharply defined, pointed to the final crisis. Some pastors who ardently espoused the cause of the Revival, and embraced its doctrines in some of their most exaggerated forms, went so far as to assert their right to act in total disregard of the will of the Church to which they belong. This is mere disorder and anarchy ; here the State should interfere, simply for the enforcement of the Law of Germinal, since a contract ought to be equally binding upon each of the contracting parties. Some time before the struggle had reached the degree of intensity which marked its later stages, a pastor, who was an earnest promoter of the Revival, said, " We will act, if need be, without the Consistories, and, if they drive us to it, against them ! " Yet, in spite of little outbreaks from time to time, a sufficiently good understanding between the two parties, or tendencies, of the Reformed Church of France was maintained in a general way under the Monarchy of July. There was unity enough to keep all French Protestants within the same borders—a unity which the *odium theo-*

logicum was not yet strong enough to break. When the Revolution of 1848 broke out, it became obvious that the Protestants, whether pastors or laity, were by no means so divided as certain statements, more striking than exact, might have led one to suppose. The proclamation of the Republic occasioned great anxiety, if not actual panic, among the Protestants. The new political ideas were, it is true, those of the vast majority of Protestants, but the question of the separation of Church and State was coming to the front, and in view of such a contingency there was need of concerted action.

A "General Synod" consequently met at Paris on the 10th of September, 1848. This synod, however was purely unofficial, since the Law of Germinal recognised only *provincial* Synods. Representatives of Churches attended in large numbers, and the most fraternal feeling prevailed. It was, however, impossible that the Assembly should separate without giving evidence of differences which were daily growing wider. On purely ecclesiastical questions there was perfect accord; but now, as always, the stone of stumbling was the dogmatic basis, the Confession of Faith which it was proposed to substitute for the ancient Confession of La Rochelle, already deservedly fallen into disuse. It was this, as we shall see, which brought about the sharper conflict of 1872; and so it will ever be, in the case of a Church allied with the State.

After the *coup d'état* of Napoleon III. a new modification was introduced into the organisation of the Reformed Church of France. A more serious defect in the Germinal Law than the want of a General Synod was the omission from the organisation of the Consistories of the representation of parishes. The unofficial Synod of 1848 therefore proposed the creation of a body which should represent the parish, and take cognizance of its affairs, under the control of the Consistory. The Law of Germinal had provided that

nomination to office as members of a Consistory should be restricted to those who paid the highest taxes. The Synod of 1848 demanded that members should be elected by the suffrages of Protestants above twenty-five years of age. This proposal was, in 1852, substantially adopted by the Legislature. The Law of the 26th March, 1852, which re-organises Protestant worships, Reformed and Lutheran, holds every Protestant of thirty years of age (instead of twenty-five) who has resided in the parish for at least two years, and who gives evidence of his qualification as a Protestant, to be an elector. This new Law, which is the complement of the Law of Germinal, establishes—(1) a Presbyteral Council at the head of each parish, entrusted with its administration, and subject to the authority of the Consistory; (2) a Consistory, constituted like that of the Law of Germinal; (3) Provincial Synods, like those of 1802; (4) a Central Council, in place of the General Synod, of which the Law of 1852 makes no more mention than the Law of 1802; this Central Council is the recognised mediator between the Consistories and the State. Such is the constitution under which the Reformed Churches of France have been living for the last twenty-eight years. We gladly recognise the fact that it was a great step in advance, and that the Churches have had reason to be well pleased with it. Undoubtedly it would have been more logical that the Reformed Church should have its General Synod in place of the Central Council. But the Napoleons were despots, and would have viewed with alarm the re-establishment of the old Synods, as the creation, in fact, of a constituent authority in religious matters, side by side with their own discretionary power as representing the body politic. It may be said that the Synods could promulgate nothing without the approval of the State, and that consequently their constituent power would have been a mere fiction. Yet if the State had refused sanction to its decisions, a certain amount of agitation would have been

sure to ensue ; and agitation for the sake of ideas was as distasteful to the last emperor as to the first. The simplest thing was to suppress General Synods altogether. As for the Provincial Synods, we may say at once that they never had more than a nominal existence, so that all matters which concern the Churches are, in fact, settled by Presbyterian Councils, Consistories, and the Central Council, with no lack of efficiency in business, and without detriment to the interests of parishes. The Orthodox still urge with much pertinacity the establishment of General Synods, moved in part by the consideration that they themselves have managed the grouping of the circumscriptions* and are sure of a majority, because they have swamped populous Liberal parishes with insignificant Orthodox parishes. And as all parishes, whatever their population, have the same number of delegates, the voices of Liberalism are quite drowned by those of Orthodoxy. The astuteness of this arrangement is more remarkable than its equity.

In the Synod of 1848 warm discussions arose upon the question of a Confession of Faith. Ever since 1850 the gulf which separates the two doctrinal tendencies within the Reformed Church of France has been growing gradually deeper. The Strasbourg *Revue de Théologie* threw a strong light upon the most intricate problems of theological learning. With a keen and pitiless logic it dissected system after system, leaving each in such a plight that it could never be put together again. Questions of history were sifted to the bottom. Before the flood of truth which burst forth on all sides, many illusions were swept away and many phantoms vanished. Hence a perpetually increasing irritation among the adherents of tradition ; they lamented, and complained that their God had been taken away, and they knew not where they had laid Him. Their faith, dependent upon

* i.e., Electoral districts, of which there are twenty in France, with another for Algeria.

externals, could not stand the test of criticism. From reviews and books, the scientific spirit passed into the pulpit. Some pastors, endowed with eloquence, warmth of conviction, and keenness of intellect, presented the results of contemporary criticism in admirable sermons. This was the last drop which made the cup run over. Up to this point Orthodoxy had confined itself to lamentations, outcries, and occasional threats. The Pastoral Conferences, which took place every year in Paris, furnished a common ground upon which the members of the different Churches, both Orthodox and Liberal, were in the habit of meeting. There was plenty of lively, and even violent, debate, but still the two parties continued to meet. Suddenly a scandalous event took place. The Consistory of Paris, a centre of Orthodox reaction, acting under the influence of a man who, with all his great abilities, did considerable harm to the Reformed Church of which he was a member, M. Guizot, suspended M. Athanase Coquerel *fils* from his office of suffragan to M. Martin Paschoud. The news of this action was received from one end of France to the other, and even in foreign countries, with a burst of indignation. It was evident that henceforth the struggle between Orthodox and Liberal was to be a war to the knife. Unfortunately for themselves, the Liberals had not taken such precautions as the Orthodox, who had silently ensured themselves positions of advantage in the different ecclesiastical bodies. In the later years of the Empire the Orthodox were especially persistent in urging the authorities to take vexatious measures against the Liberals, who, by reason of their notions of independence and freedom, were not in the best possible odour in high places. The leaders of Orthodoxy, having completed their work of secret organisation, were pressing in their demands for a General Synod, in which they were sure of obtaining a majority, if only that arrangement of circumscriptions which they had already sketched

were adopted. In spite of these endeavours, repeated not perhaps without some degree of humiliation in certain quarters, the Empire and its advisers turned a deaf ear to their entreaties. If the Imperial rule had continued, would the Orthodox have gained their point? Possibly; many of them have asserted as much. Their opinion is certainly based upon a sufficient acquaintance with the back-stairs of Government offices, and the head of the State, justly anticipating some despotic procedure as the result of a Synod with an Orthodox majority, might have seen in it something which would make for his own interests, and be in accord with Imperial policy.

The insane war of 1870 broke out; in shame and bloodshed the Empire fell. Throughout this terrible year the members of the Reformed Church forgot their quarrels, and thought only of their country. The same patriotic enthusiasm, the same devotion, the same sorrow pervaded Liberals and Orthodox; all hearts beat in unison. But when the danger was past, and peace concluded, the religious and ecclesiastical differences became more strongly marked than ever before. The Government of the Republic was pressed more hardly than its predecessor to yield consent to the holding of a General Synod. At last, after some hesitation, it is said, M. Thiers, then President of the Republic, signed the decree convoking the General Synod on the 29th November, 1871, and a Ministerial circular fixed its assembly for the 6th June, 1872. We can well believe that if M. Thiers could have read the future, and foreseen the trouble which he was preparing for the Government of the Republic, he would have given to those who demanded the Synod the same reply as was given a short time ago to certain requests of a like purport—"When you are all agreed in your requisition of a Synod, the Government will be prepared to grant it."

On the day appointed, the members of the Synod, pastors,

and laymen—108 in number—met in the Temple du Saint-Esprit, Paris. Whatever judgment we may be inclined to pass upon this Assembly, it is impossible to deny the vast importance, the high tone, and the religious earnestness which characterised the discussions in which it engaged. French Protestantism had sent its most illustrious representatives to take part in these solemn deliberations. Before the end of the sitting it became matter of remark that if Orthodoxy had the advantage in point of numbers, it showed itself singularly inferior to Liberalism in learning, in sense of responsibility, and in serious handling of subjects under discussion—an estimate fully confirmed by the official minutes of the Synod.

It is not our intention to give a *résumé* of the thirty sessions of the Synod. We may briefly say that everything centred in the discussion of the profession of faith which was brought forward at the opening of the third session. This was the salient point; for this ghost of a creed, which the Orthodox wished to proclaim as the official faith of the Reformed Church, would suffice, they thought, to drive from the Church the Liberals, who were known to be resolved against subscription to it. The two articles of this Confession of Faith are as follows:—

“The Church proclaims: The supreme authority of the Holy Scripture;

“And salvation by faith in Jesus Christ, only Son of God, who died for our offences and rose again for our justification.”

Regarded as an expression of religious feeling, this document betrays singular poverty. God, the Holy Spirit, &c., are conspicuously absent. It is, in fact, a weapon of war, and nothing else. This matter was debated through ten sessions. The most eloquent voices were raised in proof—first of the inutility, and next of the danger, of enacting this Confession of Faith, and in preaching peace and concord. It was all in vain; the Orthodox party had long been pre-

pared for this. Many of its speakers pressed for a complete severance of the two tendencies in the Reformed Church ; but they did not at that time go so far as to demand the *expulsion* of the Liberals. At last, at the thirteenth session of the Synod, on Thursday, 20th June, the Confession of Faith was adopted by 61 votes against 45, 106 voting. Two members were absent—one Liberal and one Orthodox. The only feature in the subsequent work of the Synod which calls for mention here is its adoption of a regulation by which the age of electors is lowered to 25, instead of 30, as fixed by the Law of Germinal and the *Décret-Loi* of 26th March, 1852. The Assembly dissolved on the 10th July, and the two parties, instead of being brought closer together, were more sharply divided than before. From this moment the breach became irreparable.

The adoption by vote of a Confession of Faith was something, but it was not all. Obviously, it was not merely for the platonic satisfaction of seeing it enrolled among the acts of the Synod that the Orthodox had drawn it up. They wanted to be able to make use of it ; hence their repeated declarations that they did not intend to *impose* it cannot be taken, as the sequel sufficiently proves, as exactly expressive of what was in their minds. But, in order to use it as they wished, there was one condition to be complied with. The terms of the Concordat provide, in the case of the Reformed as well as of the Catholic Church, that no Confession of Faith, no article of discipline, may be promulgated without the consent of the State. Before the Confession of Faith could assume an official existence, this consent had to be obtained, and the Council of State must pronounce a favourable opinion. During the presidency of M. Thiers all efforts in this direction proved fruitless ; but when the coalition of reactionary political parties overthrew M. Thiers, the men who came into power on the 24th March, 1873, listened with more attentive ear to the representatives of

reaction in religion. The victory, however, was not won without a struggle. To be brief, on the 28th February, 1874, the Council of State authorised the *publication* of the declaration of faith adopted by the Synod. It is important to note the terms used by the Council of State:—"Est autorisée la *publication* de la déclaration de foi votée par le Synode Général. . . . &c." The Council of State, therefore, while authorising the publication of this Confession, does not in any sense or degree give it the force of law before which all Protestants belonging to the national Church shall be compelled to bow. Every sensible man must acknowledge that this is the only possible, admissible, and honest interpretation of the Council's decision. Hence it appeared that this "publication" need not in anywise affect the position of the Reformed Church. Besides, had not the Orthodox themselves declared that they did not wish to impose their Confession of Faith by force? Above all, had not the Minister of Worship, who had convoked the Synod in the name of the President of the Republic, declared that this Synod was purely *consultative*, and, consequently, that it could not, and must not, assume to legislate? Yes, undoubtedly; but events have shown that it was with political reaction and the pertinacity of reactionary Orthodoxy that the Liberals had to deal. Here begins one of the most melancholy phases of the long struggle which has agitated the Reformed Churches of France. Every day for the next five years, the Liberals who form at least half, if not more than half, of the whole number of French Protestants, asked themselves whether they were not on the point of being ejected from their Church. The leaders of Orthodoxy, who were all-powerful with the politicians who came into power after the fall of M. Thiers, laboured with all their might to get the Confession of Faith imposed upon all Protestants without distinction.

The means to this end were not far to seek. All the Councils of the Church are newly elected every three years. The Minister of Worship, in 1874, was a man whose ignorance was equalled only by his ardour in the cause of the Clericals and the Legitimists. Yielding to the advice and entreaty of the managing spirits of the Orthodox party, he delayed the parochial elections for three months, and imposed the decisions of the Synod as "electoral conditions." The ends of the Orthodox were now attained. Liberalism must submit to the yoke, or quit the State Church. Great, then, was the surprise of the Orthodox party when they saw that the orders of the Minister were met, almost everywhere, with an indomitable resistance. In fact, the Liberal Churches, as a rule, conducted their elections without paying the least attention to the prescriptions of the Synod, and confined themselves to the scrupulous observance of the provisions of the Law of Germinal and the Décret-Loi of 1852. The Minister retorted by annulling these elections; but the Liberal Consistories took no heed. Some Churches even appealed to the Council of State against the Minister's decision. Things remained *in statu quo*, and this strange posture of affairs was brought about, that there were Councils having no legal existence, the greater part of whose proceedings were legally valid; and in certain Churches this situation is still maintained. It seems now to have been resolved to starve out the Liberal party; and accordingly additional grants for extraordinary parochial expenses were lavished upon Orthodox, and refused to Liberal, Consistories; nor would it be difficult to cite yet harsher acts of the strong hand. In 1876, the strain in the political situation was slightly relaxed; a Minister of rather more liberal views was in power. Yet even he ordered that the triennial elections of parochial councils should be conducted in conformity with the decisions of the Synod. The Liberal Churches were

just then strongly influenced, in a manner to them both new and sweet, by promises of ministerial justice and good-will. The Minister of Worship gave emphatic utterance to his wish to see peace in the Church; and he asked the Liberals, for that end, to act in conformity with his predecessor's circular at the coming elections. In a spirit of conciliation, the great majority acquiesced. Some Consistories, however, did not accept the compromise, and ignored the Synodal prescriptions. All the elections of these recalcitrant Consistories were regarded by the *Sous-direction des Cultes* as null and void; and a certain number also of Synodal elections in Liberal Churches were annulled, on the ground, it was said, that the test of the Confession of Faith had not been *seriously* applied. Yet the whole of the elections of Orthodox Churches were approved, though in many of these no test whatever had been applied to the electors. A more flagrant case of using two weights and two measures would be hard to find. The proposals of the Minister, the concessions of the Liberals, and the general pacification which was to result thence, had come to naught. The demands of the Orthodox party now were what they had been before; it was clamorous for a new Synod, to finish the work of repression. From M. Dufaure, indeed, this was not to be got; but with the political reaction of the 16th May, 1877, the hope of triumph momentarily revived, to be again disappointed by the elections at the end of 1877, the new constitution of the Senate, and the elevation of M. Grévy to the Presidency, which gave a decisive check to the Orthodox reactionists. For the time, at least, they have given up the hope of procuring the convocation of a Synod; and a recent fact, which we must presently notice, has afforded them sufficient proof that a Synod after their own hearts is farther off than ever.

The foregoing sketch of the recent history of the Reformed Church of France will enable the reader to understand

clearly enough the position and tendency of each of the two main parties which divide the Church almost equally between them. It is easy to see which way the natural affinities of each party lie, in respect of politics as well as of religion. Whether Orthodoxy wishes it or not, it is a fact that the newspapers interested in political reaction count upon it as an ally; and the men who represent Protestant Orthodoxy in the Councils of the State act almost uniformly in opposition to the Republicans. Just in proportion as the party of liberty or the party of reaction has been in power, so has Orthodoxy been discredited or favoured. According as the Minister of Worship has been a partisan of authority or of Liberalism, Orthodoxy has been arrogant or humble, boastful or silent. At the present moment we have a Minister who is resolved to carry out progressive Liberal ideas, and we consequently hear very little from the Orthodox camp. There is no talk just now of the expulsion of the Liberals from the Churches. On the contrary, Orthodoxy now holds a language of pacification; it only asks that questions likely to provoke irritation should be abandoned, and even that "questions which might recall our ecclesiastical dissensions" should be forgotten. The Liberals ask nothing more. But who began the strife? The Liberal party opposes no practical improvement of the ecclesiastical organisation. It has no rooted objection to the regular convocation of Synods. It only desires that the functions exercised by these Synods should be *disciplinary*, and not *dogmatic*. It recognises no right, no power, vested in them, for the embodiment of the Protestant faith in decrees. And it is because the party which represents the Synodal majority rushes at an impossibility in its wish to decree articles of faith, that the present Government, whose Republican views cannot fail to become more marked as time goes on, will not permit a meeting of the Synod—unless, indeed, it be forbidden by a special law to formulate an obligatory pro-

fession of faith. A proof of the determination of this Government not to convoke the Synod again is to be found in the fact that it has just reconstituted the Central Council of the Reformed Churches of France, created by the law of the 26th March, 1852. This Council, which should be composed of fifteen members, had been reduced by deaths and retirements to less than half that number. By decree of the 3rd July last, the Council was reconstituted, the Minister nominating its members. He has, however, given assurance that a law shall be brought forward at an early date, which will vest the nomination in the representative bodies of the Church.

The friends of the Synod have killed the Synod by their high-handed action. The Orthodox now, indeed, begin to understand the situation, and they have ceased to ask for the Synod; they confine themselves to meetings of an unofficial character, to which the Liberal party can have no possible objection. The Orthodox are welcome to meet each other, to draw up professions of faith for their benefit; but seeing that we have our complete legal organisation, surely something better might be done. So long as the Church continues to be based upon the Concordat, the State is the regulating power, and it is its right and its duty to prevent the oppression of one section by another. The action of the present Ministry gives us a guarantee that the Republican Government will not evade this responsibility. Cannot the two parties, then, live together in harmony, and co-operate in the diffusion of those Protestant sentiments and principles which France is now once more disposed to regard with favour? The question presents itself to-day in terms widely different from those of two or three years ago. At that time, one party, supported by reactionary politicians, paraded its intention of crushing or ejecting the other. In such a condition of affairs, the expediency, and even the necessity, of separation were maintained in the public prints by the

writer of these pages ; but now the Republic is mistress of the situation, and she has said in unmistakable terms, "You have equal rights ; I will not permit one party to trample on the other." This exactly meets the Liberal demands. Now that liberty in matters of faith and manly self-respect are guarded from infringement, it will be easy to arrive at mutual understanding and co-operation, if the endeavour be made with pure and generous intention. There are numerous indications that this view is embraced at the present moment by a very large number of the Orthodox party themselves, who fully recognise the risk which would be involved by any further pursuance of that false policy to which the angry partisanship of certain of their leaders has hitherto pledged them. Pressing appeals have even been addressed to that *unofficial* Synod which will meet in a few days, praying that its deliberations may have special reference to pacification and concord.* Gladly will the Liberal party see the unity of the Reformed Church maintained ; it has always regarded separation as a step only to be taken at the last extremity. It will be readily understood that the great majority of the laity have been unfavourable to schism. Many of those most distinguished for character and learning, among the Orthodox as well as among the Liberals, have urged that the Church must be united if it is to be strong. From day to day the attention of the Protestant public is drawn to this vital question by special publications. One of these, which has recently appeared, is noteworthy ; published anonymously, it is evidently the work of an Orthodox writer, yet his truly Christian spirit wins our warmest commendation. Amongst other suggestions the author recommends :—

- "(1) The independence and fraternal union of Churches.
- (2) The erection in Paris of a central edifice, where both parties

* Since these lines were written, this prayer has been grievously disappointed by the uncompromising temper of the Synod.

may freely discuss the great religious and moral interests of Protestantism, and in which the administrations of our different Protestant agencies and associations may be grouped together. This building should be a sort of *Maison de la Réformation*. Founded by the benefactions of the entire Protestantism of France, it should become its property; a large hall should be appropriated to lectures, public meetings of religious societies, and every kind of service or festival which may be conducive to the progress and development of the Protestant spirit. Space should be set apart for a Protestant library, especially the Library of French Protestantism, which would then find a worthy home; and further, for reading and conversation rooms, in which French Protestants, or visitors from other countries, who from time to time may be in Paris, might meet their brethren. . . ."

These proposals have received the hearty concurrence of a man well known in France and abroad, a Liberal Protestant holding a high rank among contemporary *savans*, M. Charles Read, the founder of the Library of the History of French Protestantism, and promoter of the Establishment of the Central Council. He has opened a list of subscriptions towards the proposed building, to which he proposes to give the name of *Concordium Protestant Français*. The future will show us whether the members of the Reformed Church are wise enough to listen to such counsels and act upon them. We hope and believe that such will be the case, the more confidently because the same advice is being given simultaneously by many voices from many quarters.

Thus the great storm by which the Reformed Church of France has been tossed is almost stilled. That it may be succeeded by a complete calm, which the various currents of religious thought shall not seriously disturb, it is only necessary that the Consistory of Paris should return to the ways of justice and fair-play. This body has in reality been the promoter of discord; it was the first to drive Liberals from the Church; it took from them their places of worship, their pastors, and their electoral rights. If only it will give

back what it has taken away—and it must do so under compulsion, if it will not do it of its own motion—a complete pacification may be effected. Thus the Reformed Church may look forward to a useful and noble future. It is long since circumstances have assumed an attitude so favourable to her as at this moment. Serious thought, which seemed to be banished of set purpose from our country in the days of the Empire, is no longer without honour. Symptoms of a strong reaction against the gross superstition of the popular miracles, and the fanatical Catholicism of the Ultramontanes, are perceptible. Instances have occurred in some departments of the conversion of priests to Protestantism, and their parishioners have followed them. The people are not ill-disposed towards Protestant worship. Above all, Protestant thought is found to be in sympathy with that of a great number of thinkers, inquirers, and devoted friends of truth. It is among these that it must seek its natural allies; it is to this chosen band that its teaching and its preaching must appeal. If only the pulpits of Paris, of the Oratoire, of St. Esprit, &c., are thrown open to orators like Fontanès, Dide, and Vigié, the churches, now nearly empty, will be filled with attentive hearers, who will find there the healthy and invigorating nourishment which their religious nature requires. Then will Protestantism occupy in Paris that place of distinction to which it is entitled. With two or three exceptions, the official preachers in Paris are altogether unequal to the demands of contemporary preaching, especially for such a public. Matter, form, delivery, are alike inadequate; little thought, no style, no oratorical action. Hence, if the cultivated public ever finds itself by chance in one of the official churches, it is astonished to find Protestant preaching almost as flat, stale, and unprofitable as Catholic. French Protestantism possesses, indeed, orators of the first rank; but the official pulpits of Paris are closed against them. Those

who have excluded them have, in the wretched interests of party, silenced the voices which could give the most effective utterance to truth. Not till this policy is reversed will a Liberal faith obtain its own in Paris.

To sum up :—The two parties which compose the Reformed Church of France, after long years of incessant strife, have tacitly agreed upon an armistice, and appear to be upon the eve of a formal signature of peace. The Orthodox are making timid advances ; the Liberals are a little distrustful, because they do not wish to be duped as they have been before, but are quite prepared to hold out the hand of reconciliation, knowing that the Republican Government will preside at the signature of the treaty of peace and alliance, and that it is the settled intention of this Government to hold the balance even.

The foregoing exposition of the position of the Reformed Church of France would not be complete without mention of the transference to Paris of the Faculty of Theology of Strasbourg, which took place two years ago. Strasbourg had a mixed Faculty, which furnished all the pastors of the Lutheran Church and a large proportion of the Reformed pastors. After the war of 1870 and the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, it became necessary to make provision for the needs of the Lutheran Church. It was naturally proposed to reconstitute in France the Alsatian Faculty. The question was—Where ? Paris was suggested at first, but for nearly six years nothing was done ; the Ministry, persistently urged in an opposite direction, brought forward no scheme at all. While these matters were in debate, the interests of the Lutheran Churches were suffering. At last, on 27th March, 1877, the Minister of Public Instruction, M. Waddington, obtained the signature of the President of the Republic to a decree transferring to Paris the mixed Faculty of Theology of Strasbourg, the Faculty of Montauban being preserved intact. Great was the dis-

pleasure among the Orthodox at finding that the new Faculty was to be *mixed*—that, as at Strasbourg, it would include Reformed students, and educate pastors for the Reformed Church. They would have wished it to be for Lutherans exclusively. It is, indeed, obvious that the Faculty of Montauban, in which all the professors but one are Orthodox, is likely to lose a good deal of its importance. The Orthodox, however, cherished one last hope, which was to ensure the appointment to the Faculty of Paris of Orthodox Reformed professors. This hope was destined to be disappointed. They were dismayed when they read in the *Journal Officiel* of 19th April, 1879, the names of the two professors who, with two who had belonged to the Faculty of Strasbourg, were to be entrusted with the theological instruction of the Reformed students. Bitter complaints appeared in the Orthodox papers; there was some talk at the time of appealing to the Council of State to annul the two appointments. Whether such an appeal be still contemplated or not, it is perfectly certain that it has no chance of a favourable consideration on the part of the Council of State. The Strasbourg Faculty, thus reconstituted at Paris, is now well housed in the Boulevard Arago, not far from the Observatory. The official inauguration of the new buildings was performed on the seventh of November last by the Minister of Public Instruction, M. Jules Ferry, and was attended by a large number of persons eminent in science, literature, or politics. The Minister delivered an address, of which French Protestantism may well be proud; no nobler tribute could be paid to Protestant principles, and it was happiness indeed to hear justice so eloquently done to the Reformation by a member of the Government.

“You are a mixed Faculty,” said M. Ferry, “by which I understand that here one breathes an atmosphere of wide Liberalism and wholesome toleration; that the sectarian

spirit does not cross your threshold—that spirit of exclusiveness and jealousy, which is the shrivelling, and, if I may use the term, the ossification of the heart of religion, and a sheer caricature of the Gospel.” After speaking of the relations of Church and State in regard to education, the Minister concluded by saying: “Between the State and you, what room is there for disagreement? In modern history, Protestantism has been the first-born of liberty. Our political gospel is also yours; the Revolution of 1789, of which our Republic is the logical development and necessary conclusion, was effected partly on your behalf; it marks the date of your enfranchisement. We salute you, then, as a friendly power, as a necessary ally, which will not be found wanting to the cause of the Republic or the cause of liberty. You may count upon us as we count upon you; and be assured, gentlemen, that you will always meet not only with justice at our hands, but with profound sympathy.”

These words were greeted with overwhelming applause. Uttered in a Catholic country by the lips of a Catholic Minister, they are remarkable indeed. The Dean of the Faculty, M. Lichtenberger, spoke next, warmly thanking the representative of the Government. In conclusion, the Professor of Sacred Eloquence, M. Viguié, gave an inaugural lecture upon the “Oratory of the Reformers.” M. Viguié is himself one of our most brilliant pulpit orators; his eloquence won the admiration and applause of his distinguished audience and the highest compliments from the Catholic Minister himself.

That day, the seventh of November last, was auspicious for French Protestantism, for liberty, and for truth. Henceforth a clear course is open to serious theological study; and there is reason to hope that the Faculty of Paris will find no lack of students. They are urgently needed, for there is a dearth of pastors for the Reformed

Churches of France. The Synod of 1872 disgusted and estranged from the ministry a large number of young men who were intending to devote themselves to Theology, and who entered other professions in which they might at least be free, and not enslaved by a formula. Some years must elapse before the breaches in the Church can be repaired. But the future is on the side of the representatives of liberty and conscience—and the victory is sure.

D. CHARRAUD.

[The above Article must be read in the light of the unexpected obstinacy shown by the recent unofficial Synod, and of the still more recent ministerial disturbances which have taken place during the last few days.—ED.]

THE MIRACLES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

I.

THERE are two classes of readers of the New Testament to whom the miraculous narratives contained in many of its books are a serious embarrassment. In the first place, there are those who have definitely relinquished all belief in miracles, and who are at a loss to understand how such a mass of what they regard as fiction can have clustered round the apparently genuine and historical nucleus of the Gospel narratives and early Christian tradition. In the second place, there are those who are not in the habit of believing in miraculous events, but who have not yet definitely made up their minds to reject the miracles of the New Testament as unhistorical, though they cannot rest in them with any real satisfaction or security.

These two classes of readers agree in this: that they cannot see how to separate the miraculous from the non-miraculous, the historical from the fictitious elements of the New Testament narratives, so as to accept the one and reject the other. They differ in this: that the first are so fully convinced of the fictitious character of the miraculous narratives as to feel unable to place reliance upon anything that appears in close connection with them, even if it seems to bear the strongest impress of historical truth; whereas the others are so profoundly impressed with the fidelity of the central historical tradition as to be forced into a kind of half assent to even the most incredible statements which

seem to be inseparable from it. The result in either case is a sense of embarrassment, discomfort, and uncertainty in reading the historical books of the New Testament.

It is the object of these articles to enumerate and illustrate, in a brief and popular form, some of the different processes by which the miraculous narratives of the New Testament may be supposed to have sprung up. Could it be shown that, in an age avowedly prone to believe in marvellous events, a mass of miraculous tradition might grow rapidly and luxuriantly round a genuine historical trellis-work without altogether concealing its form (still less throwing doubt on its existence, which it pre-supposes and even demonstrates), then one important step would have been made towards enabling those who cannot heartily accept the supernatural to read the New Testament with renewed interest, comfort, and profit.

It is generally unwise, however, in my opinion, to attempt a confident and detailed explanation of the way in which this or that miraculous narrative actually came into existence. All we can safely do is to indicate the various processes of growth, and to illustrate them by showing that they *might* have given rise, in whole or in part, to such and such special narratives, without at all committing ourselves to the statement that this particular narrative *did* grow in the special manner indicated. In something the same way, the chain of natural phenomena of which *wind* and *rain* are links may be very satisfactorily explained in such a manner as to convince us that there is nothing capricious, abnormal, or preternatural about even the smallest changes of weather; but he would be a very rash meteorologist who should undertake to state why a special shower began at half-past three and stopped at a quarter to four, or why neither more nor less than three gusts of wind shook the elms round his house on a particular morning.

In dealing briefly with this important subject, under several heads, I shall not presuppose any detailed acquaintance, on the part of the reader, with the literature of Biblical criticism or Christian antiquities, and shall not shrink from dwelling upon facts with which the majority of students are already perfectly familiar.

What is technically known as the "Rationalistic" method of dealing with the miracles has for some time fallen into a not unnatural disrepute amongst scholars, though constantly revived, in isolated applications, by amateur critics. The typical expression of this system of interpretation is to be found in the once-famed "*Leben Jesu*" of H. E. G. Paulus, a book which may still be read with interest and profit, but hardly with assent. The conception by which Dr. Paulus endeavoured to solve all difficulties with regard to "the miracles" was that the *facts* had been correctly (though sometimes imperfectly) recorded, but that the *impressions* of the spectators had been intertwined with the narratives in such a way as to give them a supernatural appearance.

Thus, according to Dr. Paulus, the *facts* of the restoration to life of Jairus's daughter, of the son of the widow of Nain, of Lazarus, and of Jesus himself, are all given correctly; but the erroneous *impression* that these persons were dead (whereas they were really only in a state of coma) has given a supernatural appearance to the narratives. Again, in healing various diseases and bodily defects, Jesus is supposed by Paulus to have made use of natural means obscurely and imperfectly hinted at in the existing records, so that there was really nothing miraculous about the events described. Once again, when the Five Thousand were fed, Jesus saw that there was food enough amongst those assembled for the wants of all, and that nothing was needed but an example to make those who had provisions share them with those

who had not. This example Jesus gave, and this, we are assured by Dr. Paulus, is all that the Gospel narratives say that he did!

It is unnecessary to give further examples. As a wholesale method of interpretation, this "Rationalistic" theory breaks down by its own weight; and it has been almost completely superseded by the Mythical, the Symbolical, and the Polemical theories which will demand our attention hereafter. All these latter theories differ from the Rationalistic in denying that the miraculous stories are records of real physical events that actually took place at all. Nevertheless, several of the more recent Lives of Jesus still cling to the Rationalistic interpretation of some of the miracles which represent Jesus as controlling the laws and forces of inanimate nature—walking on the sea, turning water into wine, multiplying the loaves and fishes, and so on. Traces, more or less distinct, of this Rationalistic method are familiar to the English reader in the works of Furness, Ewald, Schenkel, and even Keim; but for ourselves we must confess to feeling little or no confidence in these applications of the old method, and to regarding all such attempts at exact explanations of this special class of miraculous stories as mere exercises of ingenuity without practical value.

In another direction, however, a modification of the Rationalistic method still seems capable of satisfactory application; and the present article will be confined to the consideration of certain facts which may be held to warrant us in accepting a very considerable amount of the Gospel narrative as substantially historical, without being compelled to accept any miracles as fact.

(i.)

In the first place, there is one great branch of the miraculous narratives which nearly all modern authorities

are agreed in treating upon principles closely resembling those of Paulus. I refer to the accounts of "casting out devils."

Here we may well believe that many of the stories in the New Testament embody fairly original and accurate traditions of what eye-witnesses actually saw and heard, or supposed themselves to see and hear, with such embellishments and exaggerations, in some cases, as would naturally arise in the passage of the tradition from mouth to mouth.

It is important to establish, in this connection, that about the time of Jesus, and for several generations afterwards, many diseases (especially of an hysterical, epileptic, mental, or nervous nature) were attributed to "possession," and that certain persons were supposed, by themselves and others, to have the power of "casting out" the devils from their victims.

A few well-known passages must suffice to represent the mass of evidence which exists on this subject.

Josephus, who lived about a generation later than Jesus, speaks more than once of the "possession" of living men by evil spirits, the souls of the wicked dead ("Jewish War," 6. 11, 2), and mentions the art of exorcising, as a flourishing and ancient institution, dating from the time of Solomon. "I once saw," he says, "a certain fellow-countryman of mine, called Eleazar, casting the devils out of those possessed by them, in the presence of Vespasian and his sons, surrounded by tribunes and other military men. And his method of treatment was as follows: Applying his ring, with one of the roots indicated by Solomon under the seal, to the nose of the demoniac, he drew out the demon through his nostrils as he smelled it. On this the patient instantly fell down, and Eleazar conjured the demon not to enter into him again, reciting the name of Solomon and the charms which he had composed. And by way of demonstrating to the

conviction of the spectators that he really had this power, Eleazar placed a little cup or basin, filled with water, in front [of the patient] and commanded the demon to overturn it as he came out of the man, showing the spectators that he had actually left him" ("Antiquities," 8. 2, 5).

With this exorcism we may compare and contrast a passage in Mark which describes the cure of a deaf man, who was also partially dumb. Observe that deafness and dumbness were sometimes regarded as the consequence of possession (Matthew ix. 32, Luke xi. 14, Mark ix. 17.) Indeed we may almost gather from Mark ix., that the gloomy silence or imperfect articulation of epileptic depression or hysterical excitement were regarded as "dumbness."

"And they bring unto him one that was deaf and had an impediment in his speech, and they beseech him to put his hand upon him. And he took him aside from the multitude, and put his fingers into his ears, and he spit, and touched his tongue; and looking up to heaven, he sighed, and saith unto him, Ephphatha, that is, Be opened. And straightway his ears were opened, and the string of his tongue was loosed, and he spake plain." (Mark vii. 32-35.)

The early Christians firmly believed that exorcism was practised with success amongst themselves, and appeal with absolute confidence to the test of actual experience. Thus Justin Martyr (died about 167 A.D.) dwells repeatedly on the potency of the name of "Jesus, who was crucified under Pontius Pilate," in the formulæ of exorcism, and declares that by using this name many Christians all over the world, *and in his own city*, were able to cure demoniacs whom all the other exorcists, enchanters, and drug-men had failed to relieve ("Apology" II. p. 45).

Tertullian (end of second century) is still more detailed and emphatic. He attributes the power of exorcism to all the Christians without exception, and is willing that the life of any Christian should be staked on his success in

commanding the demons. After arguing that the heathen deities are demons, he proceeds :—" But hitherto I have dealt with words. It is now time for me to come to the absolute demonstration of the actual identity of the spirits known under either name. Let any man who is admitted to be vexed by a demon be produced here in the public courts of law. The spirit, on being commanded to speak by any Christian whatsoever, will truly confess himself a demon with an alacrity equal to that with which on other occasions he falsely asserts himself a deity. Or, again, let any of those who are supposed to be inspired by a god be produced in like manner, . . . and unless they confess themselves demons, not daring to lie to a Christian, then pour out the blood of the impudent Christian on the spot. What can be plainer than this demonstration? What proof can be more infallible? . . . Will you say that it is done by magic or some such trickery? Nay; your own eyes and ears would refute such a thought. What can be urged against a demonstration conducted in such naked sincerity? . . . Now, all this authority and power which we have over them are derived from the naming of Christ and the rehearsing of those pains which the demons look to suffer before long from God at the sentence of Christ. Fearing Christ in God and God in Christ, they submit to the servants of God and Christ; and, therefore, being seized by the thought and image of that fire, as soon as we touch or breathe upon them, they depart, against their will, and in grief, and blushing in your presence, from out of the bodies" ("Apologeticus" cap. 23).

Subsequently the exorcists became a recognised order of the lower clergy (apparently next above the "readers"), and they are dealt with by numerous councils. Many questions also rise in connection with the demoniacs under their charge, such as whether and under what conditions they may be admitted to baptism and communion.

We also find it distinctly recognised in this later period that the state of "possession," even when under the treatment of the proper exorcists, is often more or less chronic, not yielding permanently or perfectly to the exorcising formulæ. The fourth council of Carthage (A.D. 398), for instance, treats the possessed as a permanent class. The articles xc.—xcii. run as follows:—"The exorcists are to lay their hands upon the possessed every day. The possessed are to sweep the floors of the houses of God. Daily food is to be administered by the exorcists, at a suitable hour, to the possessed who sit in the house of God."

The vast mass of evidence, of which I have given a few specimens, induced the learned Bingham to declare, "There is nothing more certain than that in the Apostolical Age, and the next following, the power of exorcising, or casting out devils, was a miraculous gift of the Holy Ghost, not confined to the clergy" ("Antiquities," Bk. iii. ch. iv. Sec. 1). And, though we cannot endorse the assertion in this form, we may safely say, 1st, That in and after the times of Jesus certain derangements were regarded as resulting from possession by demons; 2nd, That certain persons were supposed by themselves and others to have the power of casting out devils and that eye-witnesses might assert, in perfect good faith, that they had seen devils cast out.

It is not difficult to understand how these beliefs might be maintained. It is well known that hysterical, epileptic, and mental derangements are, in many instances, subject to more or less complete control by those who have acquired a moral ascendancy over the patient; nor can it be doubted that some persons have a special facility in acquiring this ascendancy. We have only to suppose that famous exorcists possessed a power of soothing nervous and mental diseases analogous to that which is often displayed in our own day, in order to obtain a satisfactory general theory of the

circumstances under which striking effects might be produced that would be described by eye-witnesses as the miraculous casting out of devils.

We have already seen reason to believe that when the demoniacs came to be continuously observed and tended, it was seen that the effects of exorcism were often transient and amounted to no more than a temporary alleviation of the derangement.

Indeed, it is curious to note the naïve disregard displayed in the Gospels of the essentially recurrent and intermittent nature of the phenomena of possession. One of the most vivid and detailed accounts of exorcism contained in the New Testament is neither more nor less than a faithful record of the progress of a severe epileptic fit, nor does the narrative give us any reason to suppose that the fit was either shortened or relieved by anything that Jesus did, or any assurance that the patient did not afterwards suffer from renewed attacks. Jesus does, indeed, *command* the demon not to enter the boy again, but the Evangelist is so far from seeing that everything hangs upon this very point, that he does not so much as state that the command was obeyed. And yet this scene is represented (no doubt truthfully) as producing upon the disciples the impression of a most extraordinary casting out of a devil (Mark ix. 14—27). Matthew, who is much less graphic and detailed, implies that the cure was permanent (xvii. 18).

With such evidence as this before us, we are surely justified in saying: Jesus (probably on the ground of his possessing a special power of soothing and controlling nervous and mental derangements) had the reputation of being a great exorcist, and a number of the accounts of his "casting out devils," and of his "healings," may, very probably, be historical, in the sense of representing, with more or less fidelity, the actual impressions produced on eye-witnesses.

Round this historical nucleus a floating mass of heightened and embellished tradition would inevitably gather.

A certain repugnance is often, and not unnaturally, felt towards this account of some of the mighty works of Jesus, on the ground that it seems to class the Master with a set of men who, even when perfectly free from all suspicion of imposture, have not been remarkable for spiritual, moral, or intellectual gifts. It is undeniable that, although we can easily imagine the possibility of moral and spiritual strength and serenity giving a man the power of controlling the manifestations of possession, yet, as a fact, the association is by no means uniform or close between a noble and exalted character on the one hand and the power of assuaging mental and nervous disease on the other; nor can we deny that the occupation of an exorcist appears unworthy of the dignity of Jesus.

But is it not quite in keeping with this, and is it not a striking evidence of the fidelity of the Gospel tradition, that we should still be able to gather from many passages in the Gospels that Jesus himself often felt the strongest repugnance to the exercise of this power, and again and again, and sometimes even with indignation, commanded those whom he relieved not to spread his fame as an exorcist? He would not refuse to do any deed of mercy, but he was constantly alive to the danger of his being forced from his true work of preaching the Gospel into the comparatively unworthy position of a wonder-worker.*

(ii.)

Any one who has dipped into the lives of the saints must

* Compare especially the opening chapters of Mark, showing how Jesus endeavoured to escape the crowd of miracle-hunters. The authorised version in Mark i. 43, very feebly renders the severity of the prohibition in the original.

On the general subject of demoniacs, nearly all that I have adduced, and much more also, will be found quoted or referred to in Middleton's "Free Enquiry" and the portions of Bingham's "Antiquities" there indicated.

have been struck by the great number of saintly miracles vouched for by good authorities, though never claimed by the saints themselves as entitling them to any special consideration or deference. Here and there we can lay our finger, as it were, upon these legends in the nascent state, and can observe the extreme facility with which they might combine with all kinds of other elements, and the various directions in which they might be developed.

Thus we are assured by the biographers of Wilfrid of York (died 709, A.D.) that when that holy man reached the heathen court of Adgil, King of Friesland, he found the land so "salt" that it was hardly fit for man or beast to dwell in. But no sooner did the Frisians become Christians and "abound in good works," than the land also began to "abound in produce" and the value of the fisheries increased greatly. Now, we happen to know from another authority that on another occasion Wilfrid had saved some English peasants from starvation by teaching them how to *make and use fishing nets*. We also know that in the time of this Adgil of Friesland the sea was for the first time dyked out of the pastures. Wilfrid was a man of wide experience, sound sense, and practical energy, and we can well understand how it was that people whom *he* had converted found their agriculture and fishing miraculously improved by his blessing. (See Moll's interesting work on the "Early Ecclesiastical History of Holland," Vol. I., pp. 198, 469.)

The life of St. Eligius, or Eloy, by his friend and contemporary, Audoënus, or Dado, will furnish us with one or two specimens of the genesis of miraculous stories. Eligius lived in the seventh century, and was a man of position and influence. Innumerable miracles are related of him, but we are repeatedly assured that he himself took every opportunity of "modestly" renouncing his supposed miracles—sometimes with a touch of humour, which is far

more common amongst the saints than amongst their biographers.

On one occasion Eligius was giving alms, after his custom, to a great host of indigent folk, when he came to one who had his [right?] hand withered, and who, therefore, held out the other. "Not that hand!" said the saint. The beggar displayed his cramped and withered hand as his excuse. Eligius "began to pray to Christ *in his heart*, rubbed the arm from the elbow downwards, drew out the hand, straightened the bent fingers as the muscles relaxed," and, in a word, restored the hand to a healthy condition. Noticing, however, that the spectators attributed the event to the favour he enjoyed from heaven, and wishing as usual to conceal his gift, the modest saint remarked, "I thought he was shamming to get an alms from me all the more readily!"

Here we are witnesses of the manufacturing process, and can actually see a miraculous story being made.*

Eligius had obtained leave from King Dagobert to cut down and bury any executed criminals whom he found exposed on the gibbets when passing through the country. On one occasion he found a man near Strasbourg who had been hanged that very day. As his companions were preparing to bury the body, Eligius examined it, and immediately began to rub it from head to foot. Life soon returned, and Eligius, again desirous to escape the reputation of the miracle, exclaimed, "Oh, how great a crime we might have committed, had not the Lord helped us, in burying this body while the life was still in it!" Eligius had considerable difficulty in protecting the man from a second execution, and had to get him a special certificate from the king. (See the "Life of Eligius," Book I.,

* In the next chapter but two we are told of a distorted cripple whom Eligius restored by his passionate prayers and entreaties, "all who were present *hearing* (!), with the utmost amazement, his joints and muscles and all his bones" recovering their position.

chaps. xxiv., xxvii, xxxi., in D'Achery's "Spicilegium," Vol. II.)

These instances show how easily miraculous events may be reported in perfect good faith on the evidence of eye-witnesses; and nothing could be more natural than that the tradition of such events should be passed from mouth to mouth, still associated with the genuine sayings of their hero, and still preserving general traits of his character, but gradually dropping the minute details which enable us to understand their true nature, but which had no special significance to those who observed and recorded them.

It is curious that an almost exact parallel to this feat performed by Eligius is recorded in the one historical document in the New Testament which modern criticism allows us to accept as the authentic narrative of an eye-witness. I allude, of course, to the fragments of the diary of Paul's companion embedded in the Acts, and still distinguishable amidst the mass of less authentic matter that surrounds them, by the use of the first person plural "we" in the direct narrative.

In this document we read:—

"And upon the first day of the week, when the disciples came together to break bread, Paul preached unto them, ready to depart on the morrow; and continued his speech until midnight. And there were many lights in the upper chamber where they were gathered together. And there sat in a window a certain young man named Eutychus, being fallen into a deep sleep: and as Paul was long preaching, he sunk down with sleep, and fell down from the third loft, and was taken up dead. And Paul went down, and fell on him, and embracing him, said, Trouble not yourselves; for his life is in him. . . . And they brought the young man alive, and were not a little comforted" (Acts xx. 7—12).

Here, as in the life of Eligius, we detect a natural circumstance in the very act of passing into a miraculous record.

The same unimpeachable authority gives us the details of another supposed miracle. A serpent fastened upon Paul's hand, but he suffered no harm. This was a circumstance which would still be greeted as a miracle by the ignorant rustics of many districts in England, who are firmly convinced that every kind of snake is "poisonous," as well as newts and toads.

It is not a little curious that this document relates in detail two events which were regarded as miraculous, but which we can see were perfectly natural. The second passage is followed by a statement that Paul healed the father of the governor of the island and "others also." Here we are made witnesses (by the writer himself, or perhaps by an editor who abbreviated his narrative) of the actual transition from a circumstantial account of a natural event which was looked upon as miraculous to the general assertion of miraculous powers exercised by the apostle. (Acts xxviii. 1-9.)

(iii.)

The cautious and candid student of history is sometimes compelled to avow his inability either to accept as true certain statements which he finds in his authorities, or to give any reasonable account of how they came there, if untrue. He is driven to the assumption that there must be an error somewhere, though he cannot see how there is room for it to have crept in. Meanwhile, he does not necessarily withdraw his confidence from those who vouch for the incredible occurrence which he rejects, or disbelieve the narrative with which it is inextricably intertwined.

A typical instance is furnished by the healing of the blind man recorded by St. Ambrose and St. Augustine.

In the year 378 A.D., in the city of Milan, at the height of the contest between the Empress Justina and St. Ambrose, when the latter was supported by his faithful flock in resist-

ing the imperial sentence of banishment, the bodies of the martyrs Gervasius and Prothasius, "of gigantic mould, such as the former age produced," were discovered by Ambrose under the divine guidance. Ambrose himself writes "to his sister, Omina, whom he prefers to his life and eyes," an account of the whole affair, in which occur the words: "The next day we took them to the Basilica, which they call the Ambrosian. As we were taking them there, a blind man was cured." This letter (*Epistola lxxxv.*) is rather brief and hurried in its narrative, and contains an abstract of the sermon addressed on the occasion to the concourse of people. We possess, however, a later sermon, delivered when the events were already matter of controversy. It appears that the Arian opponents of Ambrose denied the miracle; but Ambrose himself is defiantly and triumphantly emphatic and precise. "They say that the blind man did not receive his sight; he himself says no such thing. He says:— I see, and I was blind. . . . He is a well-known man, who held a public appointment as long as he was sound. His name is Severus; he was a butcher by occupation. He gave up his business when his sight failed. He calls to witness the people by whose charity he was formerly supported. He calls the same people to bear witness to his seeing who were the witnesses and judges of his blindness. He declares that as soon as he touched a thread of the vestment of the martyrs in which the remains were clothed, his sight was restored. . . . What room is there for fraud or suspicion of deceit?" (*Sermo xci.*)

Augustine, as yet unbaptized and "unconverted," was in Milan at the time, and has given us a graphic description of the event ("Confessions" Bk. ix. ch. vii.), from which it appears that, though probably not an eye-witness, he had the closest and most immediate cognisance of the whole affair.

He tells us that it was during those troubles that the regular chanting of the Psalms was introduced in the

Milanese Church to solace and encourage the faithful in their long and anxious vigils. Augustine's mother was in the church with others, prepared to die with Ambrose, and Augustine himself, "though still unwarned by God's Spirit," was excited by the general commotion of the city. He tells us that Ambrose was directed by a vision to the place where the martyrs were buried, and after recording other circumstances, continues :—"A certain citizen who had been blind many years, and was perfectly well known in the city, inquiring and learning the cause of the tumultuous joy of the people, leapt forward and told his guide to conduct him to the spot. When there, he gained such admittance as to be able to touch with his kerchief the casket of the death of Thy [God's] holy ones, precious in Thy sight; and when he had done this, and applied the kerchief to his eyes, they were instantly opened." Augustine goes on to say that the fame of the miracle cowed the persecuting fury of Justina, and to reproach himself with not having been more moved by the miracle at the time himself. A year afterwards his tears were all the more profuse, because of his former callousness. In the "*De Civitate Dei*" (Bk. xxii., ch. vii., sec. 2) Augustine speaks of this miracle again as a well-known event, which took place in Milan when he himself was there, when the Emperor was also there, and in the presence of a host of witnesses.

Again, in his "*Retractationes*," Augustine, towards the end of his life, passes all his own works in rapid review, correcting or qualifying anything in them which does not meet with his mature approval, or which seems liable to misunderstanding. In the thirteenth chapter of the first book he reviews his treatise, "*De Vera Religione*," and calls attention to this passage in it: "Nor have miracles been allowed to continue into our own times, for fear that the soul should constantly demand visible signs, and that the very things which set mankind aglow by their novelty

should chill mankind by their familiarity." Augustine now explains that these words refer to such miracles as the gift of the Holy Spirit by the laying on of hands, the power of speaking foreign tongues, the cure of sick folk by the passing shadow of the preacher, and other such things. "But," he adds, "my expression is not to be understood as supporting the belief that miracles are now never wrought in the name of Christ. For, at the time I wrote that book, I myself already knew that a blind man had received his sight by the bodies of the Milan martyrs in that same city, as well as sundry other things, such as happen frequently even in these times, so that we cannot possibly be acquainted with them all, or enumerate all with which we are acquainted." (*"Retractationes,"* Book i., chapter xiii., section 7.)

Paulinus the Presbyter, the secretary and biographer of Ambrose, details the circumstances of the same miracle, in strict accordance with Ambrose and Augustine, adding that Severus was still (probably 411 A.D.) serving God devoutly in the Basilica Ambrosiana, where the remains of the martyrs reposed. He tells us also that Justina and the Arians ridiculed the miracles, and declared that Ambrose had bribed people to impersonate demoniacs who were relieved by the sacred relics (*"Divi Ambrosii Vita,"* p. 2). This aspersion may be taken as an additional testimony to the exorcisms related by all the authorities in connection with the healing of Severus.

The fame of these events long survived, and at the close of the fifth century we find Sidonius Apollinaris still referring to the discovery of the martyrs by Ambrose as a signal manifestation of the divine favour, with few parallels in modern times. (Ep. Bk. vii. 1; or in Baret's Edition, vii. 12.)*

* Most of the original passages are given or referred to by Dr. Peirson at the beginning of his *"De Oorsprong der Moderne Rigting."* Compare also Gibbon, Chapter xxvii.

Here, then, we have a miracle, vouched for by an eye-witness of the highest authority (Ambrose), supported by two other witnesses (Augustine and Paulinus), who were specially well-qualified to speak, and treated as a matter of notoriety during many years of the life of its subject (Severus).

The miraculous event is closely interwoven in the authentic narratives with the contemporary history of the struggle between Ambrose and the imperial family, with the origin of psalmody in the churches of Italy and the West, and with the personal spiritual history of St. Augustine.

I do not see how disbelievers in miracles can well avoid the following conclusions :—

1st. The miracle did not take place as recorded.

2nd. It was not an imposture.

3rd. It would be waste of ingenuity to attempt to ascertain exactly what it was that really did happen.

4th. Although we reject the miracle, we may accept with undiminished confidence the historical, personal, ecclesiastical, and spiritual facts and experiences which cluster round it in the authentic records.

In reading the New Testament records, then, I think we are justified in believing—1st. That Jesus possessed a remarkable power of soothing and controlling the nervous and mental system which gained him the reputation of a great exorcist ; and that it is difficult to say to what extent this power might produce effects, which, when reported in good faith by eye-witnesses, whose beliefs did not aid them in distinguishing between essential and unessential circumstances, might produce the impression of marvels. 2nd. That, by the alternate processes of generalising from special facts and filling in the details of general statements, it is quite conceivable that genuine utterances and, above all,

genuine traits of character, may be preserved in connection with recorded events that have lost their historical form and become fabulous. 3rd. That if we possessed the original records of well-qualified eye-witnesses of the deeds of Jesus, it is quite possible that we should find amongst them narratives, not only incredible, but inexplicable, closely intertwined with historical facts and spiritual experiences, on which we should still feel justified in relying.

If these propositions can be accepted, the most resolute disbeliever in miracles need not reject the whole Gospel tradition as unhistorical, and the firmest believer in a nucleus of history at the centre of the Gospel tradition need not be driven to an uncomfortable and half-hearted acquiescence in a philosophy of miracles which in very truth he rejects.

In a future article some of the processes may be briefly indicated by which miraculous narratives that have no foundation in physical fact may be supposed to have found their way into the New Testament.

PHILIP H. WICKSTEED.

A LIBERAL COUNTRY PARSON.

IN MEMORIAM P. C. S. DESPREZ.

THE Country Parson has often been the theme of outside criticism of various kinds. He has been depicted in idyllic colours as the embodiment of religion and charity, culture and refinement, and he has been assailed as a tyrannical "Black Dragoon," the impersonation of greed, worldliness, intolerance, and religious coercion. It may be safely affirmed that neither of these ideal portraits represents the average country parson as he exists in the 19,000 and odd parishes of England. As a rule, he is not the ecclesiastical bigot and selfish tyrant portrayed by demagogues; nor, again, is he the model of culture and progressive enlightenment which enthusiastic friends would have us suppose. As to the latter point, if truth be told, his mental characteristics are not "sweetness and light," so much as staleness and a sombre, ecclesiastical twilight. His general environment being stagnation and immobility, those qualities imperceptibly colour his intellectual processes and conclusions. He is just as distrustful of novelty in science or theology as his neighbour, the squire, is of political innovation, or as his agricultural parishioners are of new-fangled methods of farming. His ideas recur with the monotony of the seasons and the occupations of country life. Removed from great centres of population and intellectual activity, he stands aloof and apathetically watches

the currents of speculation as they sweep past. New discoveries are made, new theories mooted, new truths established, oftentimes bearing the closest relation to traditional Christianity; but they pass on and leave no trace on the placid surface of his mind. Probably he regards intellectual fermentation as a temporary disturbance of the normal course of things as it is stereotyped in his own ideas and in the traditions of his order. He watches the unquiet thought-streams as they rush past with the same hope as Horace's countryman, and doubtless with the same result:—

“Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis; at ille
Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis ævum.”

Into such a current of new truth, even when it has manifested clear proof of perpetuity—a “volubility” destined to endure—he is not inclined to precipitate himself. In short, he is no more stirred by the movements around him than his weather-beaten church-tower is moved by a passing gale of wind.

No doubt there are manifold causes, the operation of which serve to account for, if not altogether to justify, this intellectual apathy and stolidity. Into these it is not our present purpose to enter. We merely wish to note the fact that there are occasional exceptions to this ordinary type of country parson. For that matter, it would be nothing short of a miracle if there were not. It is quite inconceivable that the greatest possible stress on uniformity of teaching, the most rigid dogmatic requirements, the most stringent discipline, should succeed in repressing all spontaneity and individuality in a body so numerically large as the English clergy. Accordingly, we have a few rare specimens—veritable black swans—among country parsons, of men who are well abreast of the foremost culture of the age, whose intellectual susceptibilities are keenly alive to every undoubted advance in science, philo-

sophy, or Biblical criticism; who cordially welcome new truth, not as antagonistic, but as supplementary to the old; who vary their pastoral work with studies of such writers as Renan, Baur, Ewald, Kuenen;—men who, with the genuine scholar's instincts, prefer the Hebrew or Greek texts of their Bibles to the best commentators; and who, among interpreters, have recourse to those whose opinions are likely to be free, rather than to exegetes who are committed to foregone conclusions, and whose views may therefore be predicted with an exactitude which renders actual consultation superfluous. No doubt a cleric of this type labours under some difficulty in adapting the results of his learned leisure to the edification of his rustic flock. In this respect his condition is vastly inferior to that of his town brother, who can generally command at least a small percentage of intellectual and appreciative hearers. But, happily, the press is free, and the country parson who has anything worth saying on the subjects of theology and literature will have no difficulty in securing an audience.

One of these exceptional country parsons was the late Vicar of Alvedistone, to whose life as a thinker of quite modern sympathies a few pages of *The Modern Review* may not unfittingly be dedicated.

Mr. Desprez, as his name indicates, was of French extraction. His father, René Charles François Soulbieu, was a French Refugee of good family, who played a not undistinguished part in the bootless struggle of La Vendée. He fled to England about the year 1800, and ultimately settled at Clifton, where he opened a school for noblemen's sons, and where Philip, the subject of our memoir, was born in the year 1812. After a home education instinct with more than the usual elements of liberal and refined culture, Philip was sent to school to Dr. Goodenough, in College Green, Bristol, where he remained seven or eight years. At the end of that time

as he was not very strong, his parents were advised to send him on a sea voyage. Accordingly, he sailed for Jamaica, with some idea of settling in that island as a coffee-planter. A nine months' residence sufficed to make such a career absolutely distasteful to him, and he returned home recruited in health, and with the firm resolve to devote his life to study and the earnest pursuit of truth. His own wish now was to go to Cambridge, but, unhappily, he was diverted from this purpose by his father, who had obtained promise of preferment for him conditionally on his acquiring the Welsh language. Accordingly, he was sent to St. David's College, Lampeter, and after passing through the curriculum of that institution with a facility that afforded him much food for amusement in after life, he was ordained Deacon in 1835, and licensed to the curacy of Llangorse, in the diocese of St. David's, where he remained nearly two years. In 1837, he was appointed to another Welsh curacy in the same diocese. In these two parishes he was accustomed to preach in Welsh every Sunday; but it cannot be said that his affection for Wales or its language had been increased by his somewhat forced acquaintance with them. In after years he was wont to mourn this Welsh episode in his career as a waste of valuable time so far as general culture was concerned. The language had no literature that rendered its acquisition worth making, and he often wished he had given to German the studious hours devoted to it. The retrospect was the more unsatisfactory because he ultimately failed to obtain the preferment which he had been promised. In 1837, he married Caroline, the only daughter of William and Mary Carden, by whom he had a numerous family, six children being now living. In 1838 Mr. Desprez left Wales, and removed to the parish of Biddestone, in North Wilts, where he remained twelve years, and left behind him a restored church and parsonage as mementoes of his parochial activity. During the whole

of this time no marked change seems to have taken place in his convictions. His intellect was of that eager, receptive kind which is willing to meet new teaching half way, but which, on account of its mobility and warmly sympathetic nature, performs its functions best when acted upon by external agency. There was little of this intellectual excitement to be obtained in a sequestered agricultural parish. Nevertheless, real mental activity must find some outlet for its discharge. Beliefs that it cannot or will not change in substance it can remould in form. Mr. Desprez was as yet a staunch Evangelical; but even now he began to assert his independence and love of freedom by the singular originality and freshness which characterised his presentation of his chosen doctrines. He was also a cordial hater of everything that bore the semblance of Romish superstition and tyranny.

Mr. Desprez's intellectual career may be said to have commenced on his removal to Wolverhampton, in 1850. Here he received, for the first time in his life, those intellectual *stimuli* of large congregations and crowds of sympathising friends, that were so congenial to a man of his warm, sensitive, and vivacious temperament. He held the curacy of St. George's Church, an enormous building, capable of seating 8,000 people, which, however, he soon managed to fill. He was also appointed to the Evening Lectureship of the Collegiate Church. These influential posts furnished him with a motive for severe mental labour, which he had hitherto lacked. He was naturally induced to take greater pains with the composition of his sermons and lectures. The additional study thus necessitated brought him face to face with his dogmatic standpoint, and a process of disintegration now set in, which in the course of the next few years reached a point he could never have anticipated. About this time, too, he developed that talent for pulpit oratory, which subsequently gave him a high position as a

popular preacher in London. He possessed, probably in virtue of his parentage, just those aptitudes for elocution and oratory which we are accustomed to identify with the highest order of French pulpit oratory. His sermons were marked by the clearness of thought and diction, the Gallican *verve* and vivacity, the alternate fire and pathos which are generally recognised characteristics of French preachers, from Bourdaloue to Lacordaire. Add to this, that his voice, though not powerful, possessed infinite varieties of subtle inflection; while an ear exquisitely sensitive to music enabled him to use his vocal organ with the greatest effect. These various gifts made him also well known in his private circle of friends as an admirable reciter of poetry, whether serious, pathetic, or humorous. Few who heard him will forget his inimitable manner of reciting portions of Scott's "Marmion," and his reading of "John Gilpin" imparted a new zest of humour to Cowper's well-known ballad.

Mr. Desprez was finally roused from his "dogmatic slumber" by a diligent study of the question with which his name will continue to be identified in the theological literature of the present day—that of the Second Advent. A series of lectures he had projected on the later chapters of the Apocalypse drew his attention to the works of Cumming and Elliot. Dissatisfied with their arbitrary interpretation of the "vials," "seals," "trumpets," and other phantasmagorical conceptions of the sacred visionary, he determined to prosecute the study of the Apocalypse from the very beginning. This he accordingly did, and the lectures he delivered as the outcome of his studies he afterwards collected and published in a volume having the title, "The Apocalypse Fulfilled in the Consummation of the Mosaic Economy and the Coming of the Son of Man." The argument of the book may be succinctly defined as making the Fall of Jerusalem the end of the Mosaic and

Christian dispensations, and finding in the same event the fulfilment of all passages foretelling the end of the world (*i.e.*, of the age) in the New Testament. The view had already been propounded by scholars of no small eminence—Mr. Desprez acknowledged his own obligation for the first suggestion of it to Moses Stuart—but no one ever elaborated the theory so fully or carried it so unreservedly to its extreme logical implications as he himself did.

The spirit of intellectual independence with which he undertook the work is so characteristic of his general method, that we must quote a few sentences nobly expressive of it from his Preface :—

My sole aim and object has been to elicit truth, and to attain this I have done what my readers must do likewise. I have renounced all dependence upon commentaries, canons, councils, or Fathers, and have searched the Scriptures for myself. The result is the exposition now offered. If it is to be condemned for its novelty, that novelty may be considered as an indication of the genuine Protestant feeling which has prompted such an investigation. To affirm that progress may be made in mental, moral, physical, but not in spiritual science is a thought worthy of the dark ages.

This work forms a turning-point in Mr. Desprez's life. Its novelty, which he was not afraid to avow, was less in the general theory than its detailed application. Here the neology became distinct and embarrassing, for the result of his Apocalyptic studies was to change, at least in their speculative and authoritative aspects, all his conceptions of Christian doctrine. Inasmuch as the teaching of Christ and his apostles was entirely directed, according to his opinion, to the "end of the age"—*i.e.*, "The Fall of Jerusalem,"—this event must be accepted as the consummation and conclusion of the original Christianity of the Gospels. The doctrines of the Christian faith had their destined range limited by the same events, and could only possess for after ages a partial and unauthorised significance. This was the standpoint from which Mr. Desprez's confidence in the distinctive

dogmas of Evangelicalism first became undermined. His estimate of them related not so much to their inherent truth, or their practical value, as to their validity from the point of view of Christ and his apostles. No doubt, other considerations subsequently helped to confirm his prepossession. The injustice and immorality of some of the dogmas of Evangelicalism, the needless mystery of others, were inherent attributes which must needs have affected his final depreciation of them, added to which the tide of German thought with which he came in contact about this time supplied a critical element to his dogmatic relaxation, and helped to sunder him still further from his old creed. He was in later life fond of boasting that before German theology had obtained footing in England, and long before "Essays and Reviews" had been heard of, he had himself, *ex proprio motu*, arrived at some of the best-ascertained results of English liberal theology. His boast was doubtless true, though his starting-point was more eschatological than rationalistic. He did not, however, recognise for the time that the issue of German speculation was just as adverse to his particular view of the exact and literal fulfilment of New Testament prophecy as it was to the more accredited dogmas of the Christian Church; nor did he foresee that the German enlightenment which he welcomed as an ally was destined eventually to undermine and destroy in his own convictions, his theory of Christianity.

As Mr. Desprez afterwards found reason to abandon the views enunciated in his "Apocalypse Fulfilled," no criticism of them need be here attempted. The defects of his hypothesis as a full and reasoned conception of Christianity are striking and palpable. It makes no distinction between the standpoint of Christ and that of his apostles on the subject of the Messianic kingdom. It ignores the important facts of Christ's repeated refusal to assume the Messianic office as it was conceived by his countrymen, and his repeated repression of Messianic

expectations on the part of his disciples. It leaves out of consideration the spiritualisation of Messianic hopes—in harmony with Christ's general inversion of Jewish teaching—indicated by the notable words, "The kingdom of God is within you." It offers no reason why the predictive powers of Christ, recognised so fully up to A.D. 40, should be limited by that date. It makes the subsequent history of the Christian Church a riddle baffling solution. It takes no account of the more permanent bases, ethical and spiritual, on which the religion of Christ was really founded, and which alone are adequate to account for its growth. It overlooks the fact that Second Advent expectations have in reality exercised an inappreciable influence on the growth of Christianity as a whole, their action being generally spasmodic and temporary. If any reader is inclined to ask the question—in what light did Mr. Desprez regard the doctrines of the Christian Church which he professed to teach?—the answer may be given in his own words. Speaking of the alarm which might be created by his theory that the Second Advent was already past, he says, "It remains to be tried whether the ideas of a finished salvation, a perfected Christianity, an open kingdom of heaven, a life-state in Christ, an eternal reign in an eternal kingdom already set up, might not have a more constraining influence upon mankind than the questionable theory of an uncertain coming." *

Notwithstanding its startling conclusions, Mr. Desprez's work achieved a fair measure of literary success. The book speedily ran through two editions. Evidence from all sides convinced him that, whatever the defects of his work, it supplied a real want. It helped to dissipate the periodical terrors which Advent prognostications, such as those of Dr. Cumming, tended to create, and it offered a reasonable interpretation of some of the most difficult passages in the New

* Pref. to 3rd ed. of Apoc. Ful. p. 14.

Testament. Its conclusions were also adopted by many who refused to see in them any polemical relation to the ordinary dogmatic teaching of the Church. On the other hand, the book caused some disquiet among the timid members of his own flock, and this was probably not allayed by the modified tone of Mr. Desprez's pulpit teaching and his gradual adoption of a different standpoint in dealing with Christian dogma. He therefore deemed it expedient to quit Wolverhampton. Before doing so, he published a little work on Jonah, which was a popular synopsis of Mr. Layard's Nineveh discoveries. This book seems to have had a considerable sale. He used to say that of all his writings this had paid him best.

In 1858, then, Mr. Desprez left Wolverhampton, to the great regret of many of his parishioners, who presented him with a valuable testimonial. Removing to London, he was licensed to the curacy of St. Barnabas, King's Square; but he only retained the cure for a few months. He next took the curacy of St. Paul's, Walworth, when his parish labours and eminent pulpit abilities met the appreciation they merited. His incumbent being compelled to leave the parish, the congregation presented a petition to the Bishop that he would confer the benefice on Mr. Desprez; but the petition was, *more episcoporum*, refused. His congregation followed him, however, to his next cure of Emmanuel Church, Camberwell, where again his labours and oratorical talents were fully recognised, and where he experienced much kindness from his people. On leaving this parish for his first preferment, he was presented with a testimonial, consisting of an address together with a purse of one hundred guineas.

In the early part of 1863, Mr. Desprez was offered, by Dr. Rowland Williams, Vicar of Broadchalke, the incumbency of Alvedistone. After some deliberation, he resolved to accept it. The parish—a very small one—is situate nearly

midway between the towns of Salisbury and Shaftesbury. The village may be described as a number of tree-sheltered houses occupying the centre of a broad amphitheatre formed by a circle of rounded Wiltshire downs, with outlets to the east and west. The church and vicarage—adjoining each other, and partly hidden by trees—stand a little way up on the northern declivity, and command a picturesque view of the cottage-besprinkled groups of trees in the valley beneath. In this secluded spot Mr. Desprez settled down as a country parson for the remaining seventeen years of his life. Although there were some serious deficiencies in his new lot—the chief of them being the smallness of the living and the absence of those excitations of intellectual society and crowded congregations so welcome to a man of his ardent, sensitive nature—these were in some respects counterbalanced by the greater independence of his position and by more abundant leisure for the studies which had now become a necessity of his existence.

Mr. Desprez's first occupation on arriving at his new parish was the completion of his vicarage-house, he being the first resident incumbent of the parish. To this necessary work he was able to add, some years afterwards, a new church and new schools. But together with these works of material reconstruction and parochial organisation there was proceeding *pari passu* a movement of an opposite tendency in his own thought. Like every genuine truth-seeker, Mr. Desprez had no objection to retrospective analysis of long-cherished convictions. Though no one held more tenaciously to a belief than he did, especially when it was the self-evolved product of his own research and intellectual exertion, he readily admitted that every conviction of a reasoning man should be founded upon as much demonstration as the subject-matter admitted of. He was not like those spurious truth-seekers who, having once erected their thought-system, afterwards evince the most

insuperable dislike to having any portion of it criticised or tested—a position, it may be added, which of right pertains not to truth-search, but to dogmatic infallibility. Up to the year 1865, or thereabouts, Mr. Desprez was firmly convinced of the truth of the position he had adopted in “*The Apocalypse Fulfilled* ;” but he now began to review his theory. He commenced systematically to read foreign authorities on the subject of his studies. For the first time in his life he read the works of Renan, Colani, Strauss, Hilgenfeld, Langen, and other writers of various schools of thought who had treated the Messianic question. On this occasion, therefore, he approached the subject from a different and broader point of view. The issue was no longer between himself and the disciples of Cumming and Elliot. He was no longer the outspoken advocate for the literal fulfilment of all the prophecies in the New Testament—indeed, his growth in liberal ideas made him indifferent to the establishment of a theory which would satisfy the exigencies of plenary inspiration. Accordingly, the question presented itself for his decision, Was it possible that the Apocalypse he had once declared to be “fulfilled” was never fulfilled at all? Were all the eschatological passages in the New Testament the outcome of national hopes and aspirations of the Jews, destined never to be realised? He considered the question long and carefully, and at last—though not without severe mental trial—he came to the conclusion that the theory he had held so long, and on the elaboration of which he had spent the best years of his life, was groundless, and must be abandoned. This resolution involved a fresh start in his theological inquiry, as well as a wider field for his survey; but he immediately set to work to reconsider the whole Messianic question from the beginning. He now commenced a systematic study of the Book of Daniel, which he rightly styled “*The Apocalypse of the Old Testament*.”

The result of his investigation was his complete satisfaction that this Book, together with other cognate literature of the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, forms the chief point of departure for the Messianic beliefs of the Jews. His interpretation of the Book he gave to the world in his work called "Daniel: or, The Apocalypse of the Old Testament," and his neighbour, Dr. R. Williams, wrote an "Introduction" for it. But Mr. Desprez's adoption of the Messianic theory necessitated a re-reading of the Book of Revelation—the Apocalypse of the New Testament. That mysterious Book had to be studied afresh, not as a problem with a foregone solution, but as a question which for the most part was still "open." It had to be re-considered, not by the steady light of Josephus and the actual historical events that took place at the fall of Jerusalem, but by the flickering *ignis fatuus* of Jewish imagination and Theocratic aspiration. Mr. Desprez's interpretation follows in the main those outlines which, originated by the Tübingen school, have been generally accepted by the leading commentators of the Continent, and which may be said to centre round the expectation of the return of Pseudo-Nero. In this part of his task Mr. Desprez derived great assistance from M. Renan's well-known work, "L'Antichrist."

A final recast of these two treatises and their combination in a single volume, was the crowning effort of Mr. Desprez's literary life. Hardly more than twelve months before his death he carried through the press his "Daniel and John," the work which must now be regarded as containing the last phase of his intellectual development. While readily acknowledging the value of this remarkable book, it is our opinion that it would have been better if Mr. Desprez could have undertaken the study of the whole question, without having committed himself to the hypothesis of "The Apocalypse Fulfilled." There are traces, for instance, in his "Daniel and John" of the polemical and aggressive

tone employed in his former book against Second Advent fanatics. The latter work also suffers from the incorporation of notions which, however suitable to the earlier, were inconsistent with his ultimate standpoint.

If, for example, he gave up the theory that the Second Advent was already passed, he might have allowed, as a mere contingency, the possibility of some similar event, the product of the natural evolution of Christianity, in the yet remote future. The finality which arbitrarily closes the region of imagination and possibility to human speculation is less tolerable in religion than in science or philosophy. Again, he still regards the Church and its teaching from his old standpoint as an afterthought, an unauthorised survival of the genuine Christianity that ceased at the fall of Jerusalem; whereas, if the Church perpetuates the moral and spiritual teaching necessary to humanity, nothing can be more assured or more enduring than its basis. Indeed, this aspect of Christianity is brought home to Mr. Desprez so vividly in "Daniel and John," that he cannot help acknowledging it; and he accordingly does so in one or two passages of great eloquence and beauty. Here is one:—"While Jesus certainly founded his Messianic career upon the apocalyptic model presented in the Book of Daniel [a hazardous assertion, self-confuted by what follows], this was neither the essence of his doctrine, nor the secret of his power. For these we must look to his sublime conceptions of the Fatherhood of God, the superiority of his matchless sayings, the loveliness of his pure and devoted life, and the grandeur of his self-sacrificing and heroic death. Unwisely, therefore, do they imperil Christianity who would make it answerable with its life for every adventitious circumstance, whether of miraculous event or of Messianic hope with which it stands connected. Above and beyond all these, its adaptation to the religious instincts and spiritual wants of man.

afford at once a proof of its divine origin and a pledge of its continuance."* It is hard to see what basis of inherent authority, what guarantee of perpetuity could be stronger than this. Mr. Desprez might also have allowed a somewhat wider margin for theories allied with and yet different from his own. A less slavish deference to the co-equal authority of every passage in the New Testament—a relic of his plenary inspiration period—might have suggested the propriety of discriminating between the actual utterances of Christ and those attributed to him by his followers, for nothing is more conceivable than that Christ's expressed forecast of the ultimate moral supremacy of his Gospel might have been sensualised by disciples, whose sole conception of power and sovereignty was material. Here and there, too, there is an unnecessary tone of dogmatic certainty as to interpretations which have been fruitful of diversity of opinions in the past. While allowing the overwhelming probability that Daniel's "Little Horn" refers to Epiphanes, and John's "Antichrist" to a Nero redivivus, it seems unreasonable to enounce these hermeneutic likelihoods in terms of certainty, which could not be exceeded if their object were an axiom of Euclid. But it must be conceded that this overstraining of a probable theory was inevitable to a man of Mr. Desprez's ardent temperament. The very clearness and vivacity with which he seized on new truth, and which enabled him to present it in its most vivid and apprehensible form, rendered him comparatively indifferent to objections or qualifications. Like some other eminent thinkers, he seemed inclined to narrow his range of vision in order to acquire greater perspicuity and sharpness of definition. It is quite in harmony with this intellectual idiosyncrasy that he never could see the use of philosophy, and always professed his inability to understand metaphysics.

* "Daniel and John," p. 148, cf. p. 390.

But, notwithstanding these incidental defects, Mr. Desprez's "Daniel and John" remains a work of which English hermeneutics may well be proud. For the first time in England the eschatological passages, which take up so great a part of both the Old and New Testaments, have received a consecutive and systematic exposition. The book is marked by the fulness of research, the fearless independence of thought and method which, though common in Germany, Holland, and France, cannot be said to be as yet acclimatised among ourselves. Its style, like all Mr. Desprez's writing, is marked by clearness and flexibility, and is perpetually enlivened by passages of fervid declamation or calm, sustained eloquence. As to the novelty of its conclusions to the English reader, its author rightly regarded this, when necessary to the paramount interests of truth, as a characteristic of Protestantism.

With the publication of "Daniel and John" Mr. Desprez's literary career came to an end. He had achieved what he regarded as a satisfactory termination of his life-study. Years before, he had been anxious to unite in a single completed work all his Apocalyptic labours, and his ability to accomplish this was to him a source of heartfelt gratitude. But with the accomplishment of his work came the cessation of life. During the spring and summer of 1879, his health rapidly deteriorated. His great mental powers began to succumb to successive attacks of paralysis. At last, on Sunday morning, the 5th of October, he placidly slumbered into Eternity. He had exchanged a terrestrial "Apocalypse," dim, dubious, uncertain, "unfulfilled"—the fitful fluctuating vision of a lifetime—for a celestial and definitive "Apocalypse Fulfilled."

As men in mythic story died of light,
So in full day, Death quenched the thought-dimm'd life
While—emblem of his errand, mercy-rife—

The Sabbath sun-rise chased away the night.
What vision fairer to the yearning sight
Worn with Earth's dimness—and the weary quest
For Truth supreme—the Soul's Divine unrest—
— The finite "groaning for" the Infinite?
"More light!" the poet cried, saluting Death,
Withal bewailing Life's Truth-hiding mask,
— The twilight-doubts that share its vital breath.
Truth-seekers, hence be not your ardour blenched;
What nobler meed of effort can you ask
Than that your light in light of Heav'n be quenched?

JOHN OWEN.

THE TIDES OF THE INNER LIFE.*

IT is an old complaint that there is infinite difficulty in keeping those "heights which the soul is competent to gain;" nay, in preventing ourselves from falling from their sunlit summits into the dark gulfs below. Whether there may have been on earth human spirits, so supremely faithful and blessed that from the first upspringing within them of the fountain of life, its waters have flowed on in unbroken, ever-widening, ever-deepening stream, "sliding towards the ocean of God and eternity," it is not for me to say. But assuredly for the majority of religious men and women the course of the inner life is far different from this. It is, if I mistake not, even in true saints, subject to strange and scarcely accountable fluctuations, causing them to pass from conditions of rapturous faith and immediate vision into states of comparative coldness and depression, when they walk no more in the direct sunshine, but rather in the twilight of a day which has set; nay, even in the dark shades of night till their Sun arises once again. And for lesser and weaker souls, for the great mass of us all, the case is worse than this. There is an alternation of strong emotion and vivid interest in spiritual things and keen sensitiveness of conscience and power of prayer, followed by dryness and coldness of heart, and return upon earthly passions, and deadness

* This short Paper was written a few years ago, and printed by a friend in India. It is so unlikely that it can be known to more than a very few English readers, that I have willingly consented to the kind wish of the Editor of *The Modern Review* to republish it, with a few alterations.—F. P. C.

to the sense of sin, and inability to proffer any petitions which (even to the supplicants' consciousness) have a chance of being heard on high. For one week, one month, in specially happy cases, perchance, for one or more years, the man lives with the sense that religion is the supreme reality in a world of shadows; the next he spends as if it were a shadow in a world of realities. At one period the smallest lapse from his ideal of duty causes him sharp pangs of remorse. At another epoch he commits serious transgressions, and breaks every rule he has laid down for his conduct, doggedly and indifferently, like a blind and deaf man seeing and hearing nothing. Now he seems to breathe the airs of Paradise in a world where even sorrow and pain turn to joys in the sight of the Divine Love, and over which bends the blue sky opened wide to his prayer, even up to the heights of the Eternal Throne. And now he suffocates amid the vapours of sin and doubt, while the heavens above him are brass, and the earth beneath him, iron.

It is needless to give words to the longing of every man who has felt these dread oscillations, to put an end to them for ever, to compel the needle of his soul to point evermore truly to the pole of God's goodness, and to prevent himself from falling again into that state of moral syncope which, like an intermittent disease, seizes him at often recurring intervals. The tears shed in youth over such lapses are not all bitter, for they are poured only over the unworthy past, and there is confident hope of better things for the future. But as years go by, and the days of "withered prayer" and indifference and unfaithfulness recur again and yet again, the grief with which the man contemplates them is deepened almost to despair by his growing sense of inability to contend against their inroads, and his experience of the futility of his resolutions and of the transitory nature of even his strongest emotions. When the days have come and gone in which the soul has been admitted to such perception of

the Divine Love as that it has seemed to grasp it as the Life of Life, and the man has said to himself, "Surely, surely it is evermore impossible that I shall sin against Love like this," and after a little while the vision (though never forgotten) has failed, and he *has* once more sunk into coldness and carelessness and sin—when this awful chapter of mental history has been gone through, it seems as if there were no room more for expectation of permanent amendment and restoration, and nothing left to do but to let the slow tears drop on the grave of the heart's holiest hopes. If it were possible to know how to prevent these deadly seasons of coldness from returning to kill the blossoms of autumn, even the winter of life might bear its fruits. But the case seems well-nigh beyond help. All the ancient and positive religions of the world—notably the Judaic, Brahminical, Moslem, and Catholic Christian religions—have elaborately provided for these fluctuations by the machinery of frequently recurring seasons of penitence and rejoicing, confessions, fasts, and festivals. For those of us who cannot accept at second hand such a framework of times and seasons wherein to set our lives, and who feel that God alone, speaking in our hearts, and not the lips of any priest, must tell us when to rejoice and when to be sorrowful—for us, I say, all such machinery is of course inapplicable, and we are compelled to bear with our own unaided strength the strain of these oscillations. When our hearts are left bare and dry, and the rain and the dews of heaven fall not upon them, we have no artificial engines of revivals and penance, no Eucharist or Soma Sacrifice, no Passover or Ramadan, wherewith to refresh them; nay, rarely an Apollos to water what a Paul has planted. Yet more—those of us who believe in the goodness of God, as the followers of no traditional creed are wholly permitted to do, knowing Him to be altogether lovable, cannot but regard our own lapses into indifference and coldness with double-

edged horror and shame. It seems as if there can be nothing of good left in a heart which can be dead to such an appeal; and no hope for a soul which, having once tasted of *that* heavenly grace, can be false to the vows it has made to it. Where, then, is help for us to be found, since we cannot, will not, accept the sentence of eternal banishment? What shall we do to bind ourselves with chains of iron in our waking hours, so that when the deathly sleep falls on us, we shall not wander away in our heavy trance to sin and destruction? It is for souls which have solved this solemn question (if such there be amongst us) to give us their reply, for which, I, for one, should bless them from the depths of my heart. I have but intended in writing this paper to point out the nature of the great trouble (since somewhat is gained when we thoroughly recognise "that no temptation has befallen us but that which is common to men"), and to point out one or two mistakes often made about it, which, I apprehend, tend not a little to deepen the gloom it throws over many of us to our spiritual hurt.

It seems very important that we should distinguish the nature and origin of such alternations of religious feelings as those which I have described. Apparently there are, at least, three or four causes at work which produce them.

First.—There are such oscillations of the emotional parts of our nature, unquestionably due to physical causes over which we have little or no control, and regarding which it is idle to torture ourselves with regrets or repentance. An immense number of fatal mistakes have been made in this matter in bygone years by pious souls, who have rushed to a priest when they needed a physician, and counted themselves debarred from Heaven's love, when all they needed was Heaven's own sweet air and light from which they shut themselves out. In our time there seems little danger of this class of error, for the materialism of modern science

has permeated all our minds, and we are much too ready to say that the "spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak;" when the "flesh" on which we lay the blame is strong enough, were the spirit truly faithful to duty. Still, there are, doubtless, states wherein persons, in imperfect health, pass a definite portion of life in which there is actual physical inability to rise to the higher or warmer phases of emotions. The individual is in an effete, dull, enervated condition. The intellectual powers may appear to be in working order, but the sentiments are as if a sponge had been passed over them, and the man may, with perfect coldness and indifference, think of a topic which, in his normal state, moves his soul to its depths. In such a strait, it is obvious that the sufferer can, in no way, be responsible for feeling numb and dead to the claims of religion, and no better advice can be offered than that, while keeping as near to God as his sad state permits, he should distinctly absolve himself of wilful sin or negligence, and accept the sorrowful blank as a trial to be patiently endured, not a lapse to be repented. Those who have known such experiences have borne the testimony that if when it was utterly impossible to rouse the soul to *love* God, there was yet the will and effort to lie passive at His feet, to do and bear all His will; then, when the cloud was lifted at last, the joyful discovery was made that greater spiritual progress had taken place through the hours of darkness than in long periods of happier life. But here the caution seems very needful that we should be quite sure it is the body, and not the spirit, which is in fault, and the test of this seems plain enough. If, while we are dull and cold towards God, we retain all our human affections, warm and clear and vivid, if we are alive to every motion *except* those connected with religion, then we have only too good reason to doubt that it is our physical frames which cause our state, and are bound to look further, even deep, into our consciences for its explanation.

Secondly.—Overwork has very nearly the same effect on the spiritual condition as the languor of disuse. The man who, in the fulfilment of his duties, labours with brain or hands from dawn till night, and, harassed by a thousand cares, scarcely finds a solitary half-hour in the day wherein to be alone with his thoughts and with God, inevitably soon experiences a numbness of soul analogous to the weariness of the invalid. The emotions of awful reverence, of tender gratitude, and of solemn penitence cannot swell the heart in the midst of a crowd of busy thoughts, any more than a man can be affected by music heard in the rattle of a noisy street; and by degrees such sentiments, if not exercised, dwindle and disappear. The question asked by his Evangelical friend of the abolitionist, Clarkson: "Was he not afraid of neglecting his own soul amid his labours for the cause of the Negroes of Jamaica?" had thus a grain of real meaning, albeit every true Theist must applaud Clarkson's reply, "that he left God to take care of his soul while he did His work." How far the ordinary duties and pursuits of life should be permitted to encroach on the narrow margin of time, which religious men have nearly always reserved for "entering into their closets and shutting the door" on the world and its cares, is one of the most difficult of practical questions in many a life. To find that religion is receding from us while earthly interests grow keener, and heaven is farther away while "the world is more and more," is surely warning enough that something is wrong with us, and that we must revise the plan of our days.

Thirdly.—There is the great and terrible cause of religious fluctuations,—actual negligence and sin. Here there can be no exculpation, no question of whether we are to blame for the lapse from the pure air and serene stillness of the mountain tops to the clouds and storms of the valley. We may have made the descent either in one wild plunge, or in a series of imperceptible slidings through vanity and self-

indulgence into selfishness and sin. The result is the same, and nothing but retracing our steps with bleeding feet can restore us to our former place. How often this can be repeated, how many times God will have pity on us and call us back quickly, or how long we may be left to descend, and into what abysses we may fall, ere the Almighty arm lift us up all bruised and stained, who shall foretell? Here is the real terror—the one tremendous terror—of the religious life. Where is the saint amongst us who will teach us how to deal with it, how to keep on climbing higher and higher towards righteousness and truth and love, since if we but stand still upon the steep ascent we unfailingly slip down and fall?

As it is nearly always in our relations to our fellow-men that such lapses begin, as it seems as if we should always remain faithful to our vows, could our lives be spent alone with God, it would appear that it must be by the introduction of some new and higher law of charity that our safeguard must be found. As I have said elsewhere, "He who will teach us *to love the unlovely* will lead us into a land where our sun shall no more go down." But how this is to be done, I cannot tell. The Christian world to which its great Instructor tried to teach it eighteen centuries since, seems not to have begun to learn it yet. We shall, indeed, have God for our Father; when we have really taken to heart the Brotherhood of Man.

And, *lastly*, there is, I believe, a cause for the oscillations of the spiritual life different from any of those which I have named. There are surely a Divine flood-time and a Divine ebb-tide, no less than there are periods of human fluctuations. Not that God can really change or be nearer to us at one time than another. Such a thought is idle. But it may, and (as it would appear) it *does* please Him to act on our spirits intermittently, to let us sometimes feel His nearness, and sometimes "lift lame hands of faith and grope," and find Him not. Sometimes it is a light touch suddenly melting the heart with a glow of gratitude or penitence;

sometimes yet more and fuller revelation which is granted, and which for the time lifts up the soul into that true heaven, which has no need of the sun to lighten it. And then, again, months and years pass away, and no such sense is vouchsafed to us; no spark of love comes to kindle the fuel in our hearts, and we dwell in the shadow where once we rejoiced in the light. Like the prophet of old, we are called to live in the strength of the mysterious bread which has been given us for forty days of fasting. Why it should please our Father in Heaven to make this the law of our spiritual being (at least in the lower stages of progress), is not for us to say. Perhaps we may see that only by such means can we really undergo the education of this world, seeing that no pain could affright, no pleasure tempt, no trial touch the soul, while lasted for us the high meridian hour of communion. Even such a spirit as that of Christ came under the same law, since even he endured upon the cross the sense of absence and loss. In Gethsemane, when the resolution of self-devotion is made, there come angel-thoughts to strengthen the martyr. But on Calvary there is no voice to say, "This is my beloved Son," but "darkness over all the land," out of which comes the cry, "My God, why hast Thou forsaken me?"

If these things be so, we need neither fear nor be astonished when it befalls us to lose the higher happiness of religion, and to pass our days on the dry and dusty road of duty, instead of on the Delectable Mountains. If we are ever so happy as to stand self-acquitted of negligence or conscious lapse into sin, then the withdrawal of the vivid sense of the Divine presence need not alarm, however much it must grieve us. We may well "wait patiently for the Lord," for He will surely return and refresh us in His own good time. Nay, is He not near as ever to us even now with a double blessing in His hand for the obedience which is rendered in the hour of deadness of heart and dimness of vision?

FRANCES POWER COBBE.

A RECENT DISCUSSION OF ROMANS IX. 5.

AS the Editor of this Review is able to allow to his contributors a little more of the "liberty of prophesying" than is to be found in the pages of the *Expositor*, I avail myself of this advantage to offer the reader some account of a discussion, as to the punctuation and purport of this verse, which was recently published in the Magazine just named, between Canon Farrar and Dr. Sanday on the one side and myself on the other; as well as some further elucidation of the subject which the Editor of the *Expositor* did not consider admissible as a part of the second paper which he published with my signature.

In the *Expositor* for March last Canon Farrar has an article entitled, "Various Readings in the Epistle to the Romans," in the course of which he notices this verse, rendering it thus:—"Of whom according to the flesh Christ came, who is over all, God blessed for ever." Of this rendering Canon Farrar remarked, "That it is correct I myself believe, because (1) it is the most natural way of taking the words; because (2) it was so understood by the Early Church; and because (3) in all liturgical ascriptions to God the Father the word 'blessed' (*εὐλογητός*) comes *before*, and not (as here) *after*, the word 'God' in the original. But since in *most* uncials there is no punctuation worth speaking of, and in some cursives the stop is placed after 'according to the flesh,' so as to make the following words an utterance of praise (*God who is over all be blessed for*

ever!); and since Julian positively asserted that Paul has nowhere called Jesus God; many eminent modern commentators reject the punctuation of our Authorised Version."

This statement was evidently not sufficient to place the question of the punctuation of the verse fairly before the reader; and in the May number of the same Magazine I was permitted to offer some remarks on the subject. Of these the following is the substance:—

The words may properly be rendered thus: "Whose *are* the fathers, and of whom Christ *came*, as concerning the flesh. He who is God over all *is* blessed for ever." This is exactly the Greek order; the words "as concerning the flesh" standing, not before "Christ *came*" but after, a circumstance which is evidently in favour of the separate punctuation of the verse.* For the Authorized pointing it is urged by Canon Farrar (1) that it is the most natural way of taking the words. But how does this appear, seeing that St. Paul, although in his Epistles he has used the word God nearly six hundred times, has nowhere applied it to Christ, except in this very doubtful instance, and in one other which is equally disputable?† The word *εὐλογητός*, again, is never applied to Christ in the New Testament, but only to God. If, then, we may judge from the usage of the Apostle, the rendering of the Authorised Version is clearly *not* the most natural.

For the same rendering, it is further alleged (2) that the words were so understood "by the early Church." This statement requires qualification; but for the moment it may be conceded, and a few remarks on the point are reserved for a later part of this paper. Meantime, it may

* A still closer rendering of the words is this, "Whose *are* the fathers, and of whom *is* the Christ, as concerning the flesh. He who is over all God *is* blessed for ever;" and this rendering is preferable both for grammatical reasons and on account of the context.

† Tit. ii. 13.

be observed that even the ancient Church, as represented by the Fathers who quote or refer to the words, was by no means infallible. How little its testimony may be worth, Canon Farrar has himself informed us in the same article which has given occasion to these remarks. He tells us, in so many words, that "even the Fathers are often led by theological prejudice to insincere handling of the Word of God." It may be added that their philosophical speculations and, in particular, their theory of the Logos incarnate in Christ, exercised a great and misleading influence on their interpretation of the New Testament. These ancient writers are, in truth, often credulous and uncritical, and it easily follows that their testimony in a question of this kind is by no means conclusive, and may properly be disregarded, provided always that sufficient grounds exist (as in the present case) for disregarding it.

(3) As to the position of the word *εὐλογητός*, this is said to show that the words are not a doxology. This may, in a certain sense, be granted. The words are not an exclamation, nor are they a doxology in the optative sense, but only in what has been termed a declarative or affirmative sense. In this respect, they are closely parallel to Rom i. 25—*τὸν κτίσαντα*, *ὃς ἐστὶν εὐλογητός εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας*, and to 2 Cor. xi. 31: *ὁ Θεὸς . . . ὁ ὢν εὐλογητός εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας*. In these two instances, the words are introduced in much the same incidental and parenthetical manner as in the case before us, and *εὐλογητός* stands in a similar position.

In regard to the evidence of the manuscripts, it is clearly incorrect, or rather it is not the whole of the truth, to say that "there is no punctuation worth speaking of." Dr. Liddon had previously said, still more carelessly, that "two cursive MSS. of the twelfth century are the first that have a stop after *σάρκα*." The fact is, that of the four most ancient and important uncials Aleph, A, B, C, the latter three (which are referred to the fifth, the fourth, and the sixth

centuries respectively) contain the stop, leaving the following words to be read as a distinct sentence. A and C have not only a stop, but a space to make room for it. C has also a space, but the small cross which stands for a stop in that manuscript is doubtless from some hand much later than the date of the MS. There may have been a point originally;* but this manuscript, as is well known, is in places much discoloured and difficult to read, and it is so in this passage. Whatever doubt there may be as to a point having originally existed, there can be no doubt as to the space, which is the more important consideration. In the Alexandrine MS. (A) both space and stop are *a prima manu*. Nor are these the only MSS., uncial or cursive, in which this break, either stop or space, is found, although they are the oldest and most important. The most eminent modern authorities—such critics as Lachmann, Winer, Meyer, Tischendorf, Davidson, Jowett—have adopted this punctuation, and some of them have expressly defended it.† A recent commentator on the Epistle to the Romans, Dr. Sanday (in Bishop Ellicott's *Commentary*), thus sums up his observations on the question here discussed:—“Weighing the whole of the arguments against each other, the *data* do not seem to be sufficient to warrant a positive and dogmatic conclusion either way. The application to our Lord appears, perhaps, a little more probable of the two. More than this cannot be said.”

The foregoing remarks having in substance been sub-

* Since writing as above, I have been informed that the point may be perceived; but I did not myself see it when examining the MS. some time ago in the Bibliothèque Nationale.

† Very many other modern scholars of the highest authority (nearly all the most important) might be enumerated as having taken the same side. They are certainly not orthodox English clergymen like Dean Alford and Canon Farrar; but the list includes such names as Paulus, Bretschneider, Fritzsche, Ewald, De Wette, and I do not know that their want of orthodoxy, from the English point of view, need be considered as a disadvantage in any of them in a question of this kind.

mitted by the Editor of the *Expositor* to Canon Farrar and Dr. Sanday, these gentlemen replied to them in the same number of that magazine. In effect, both writers held that the fact of the presence of the stop in the uncials above mentioned does not add any appreciable weight to the case for a new punctuation of the verse. That fact, at the most, simply amounts to this—that some few unknown copyists in the centuries named deviated from the construction generally received by the Fathers, and are entitled to little or no consideration in comparison with the latter. But even granting this, still, if the punctuation of the manuscripts be referred to at all, it should at least be accurately and fully given, and not passed over in the hasty and misleading way in which Canon Farrar referred to it, as “not worth speaking of.” Evidently, it *is* worth speaking of, and not uninteresting; although different opinions may fairly be held as to its value. This must be admitted, seeing that stops occur in the MSS. in places where we should not expect to find them, and sometimes where it is not possible to recognise any break in the construction such as is now understood when a full stop occurs. But, on the other hand, this is not always the case. Not unfrequently these stops correspond exactly to the sense, as in the case of the full stop which is found in the Vatican MS. (B) after the word ἀμῆν at the close of Rom. ix. 6. One thing appears to be quite clear—the occurrence of the point in MSS. belonging to the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries respectively should render it impossible to speak of this punctuation as a “modern innovation,” as I have heard it termed, or as occurring for the first time in cursive MSS. of the 12th century.

Whether, again, we should attribute a full distinctive value to the stop after σάρκα, should surely depend, not on the interpretation followed by speculative Fathers full of the Logos philosophy, but on the context of the passage itself,

and most especially on St. Paul's actual use of the word *θεός*. On this latter point there can be no doubt whatever, for the case of Titus ii. 13 can by no means be made to appear an exception to that usage.

The objection to the authorised punctuation founded upon the Apostle's use of *θεός* is met by Canon Farrar in a way which is too curious to be passed over without notice. I give his words:—"We quite fearlessly assert that our Lord's full Divinity is found implicitly and explicitly asserted in every single Epistle of St. Paul, as well as writ large in the Epistles of the second imprisonment and the Pastoral Epistles. With 1 Thess. iii. 11; Phil. ii. 6; Coloss. i. 15, ii. 9; 1 Cor. iv. 4-6; 2 Cor. xiii. 14; Ephes. v. 27, &c., before us, who can have one moment's doubt that St. Paul would hesitate to speak of Christ as God?" With these passages full in view, and very carefully considered, I have certainly the very utmost doubt. But to say this will appear to be only to set assertion against assertion, and this determines nothing. Yet at least the fact remains untouched, that St. Paul has nowhere in express terms spoken as Canon Farrar thinks he would not have hesitated to speak; and further, there is not one of the passages referred to which, when looked at a little below the surface, will justify any very certain inference that he could ever have done so. For when so looked into, one by one, they are found either to have no bearing on the question in dispute, or the only inference they warrant is one to the *opposite* effect.

We may take as examples three of these passages which are the most likely to be thought effective as proof texts by orthodox readers.

(1) Philip. ii. 6. Paul here recommends the Philippians to be lowly-minded, because Christ was so; "who, being in the form of God, thought not the being equal with God a thing to be seized, but emptied himself." Here,

evidently, the writer does not "speak of Christ as God," but only says that he was "in the form of God." These words are doubtless obscure; but the obscurity is not removed by adopting an explanation which surely involves what is incredible, implying as it does that the Eternal Being put off His Deity for a time and appeared on earth as a man in lowly circumstances; and that for this self-abasement He was in some mysterious way exalted and rewarded by having a name given Him which is above every name! *This* interpretation, at all events, does not remove the difficulty, or clear away obscurity, or leave any resulting meaning which can give satisfaction to a thoughtful mind. Most probably the Apostle does not mean "the form of God;" but "the form of a god;" and this may simply refer to the Messianic exaltation which St. Paul everywhere shows us that he conceived to attach to Jesus Christ. By virtue of this, Christ was, and to the Apostle's view might have been, "in the form of a god." He was entitled, as the Messiah, to the rights and glories of that great character; yet for a time he gave up these, did not claim them, but emptied himself, and lived on earth as a common man. For this his obedience even unto death, God exalted him (the Apostle says) and gave him a pre-eminent name. This interpretation of the passage at least makes sense of it. It corresponds also to the historical circumstances of the case, and the high terms in which Paul everywhere speaks of the risen Christ. But it does not make him "God," and it may still be held that the Apostle at least did not commit himself to any such conclusion, whatever may have been done by ill-judging Fathers and others of later times.

In opposition to this interpretation it may be said that the words *ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων*, being in the form of God, and in particular the word *ὑπάρχων*, denote an original or essential existence, as distinct from outward appearance, and

what can it refer to except that hidden, mysterious nature which was for a time abandoned? Such a force of the word *ἐνδύχων* is extremely questionable in New Testament and Pauline usage; for the word occurs in numerous cases in which it will be found to be impossible to ascribe to it any such meaning.* But, granting its existence in this instance, the original or prior condition which it may imply is simply that belonging to the Messianic character, which for the time was laid aside.

(2) In Col. i. 15, also appealed to by Canon Farrar, Christ is spoken of as the "*image* of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation." Whatever this may mean, it surely does not warrant the assertion that St. Paul would not "hesitate to speak of Christ as God."

(3) In 2 Cor. xiii. 14, the reference to the Apostle's language appears to be equally unfortunate. It is, indeed, more than equally inapposite. It is conclusive against the assertion here in question. "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, *and* the love of God." What can more clearly show that the writer here again, as elsewhere, conceived of Christ and of God as two separate objects of thought? That they are here joined together in one sentence can by no means justify the conclusion that Paul conceived of them either as one and the same Divine Being, or as each separately and equally God.

But Canon Farrar not only holds that St. Paul would not hesitate to speak of Christ as God, but he has also his evidence ready to show that he could have termed him even "God over all." The usual proof texts are at hand for this purpose; and they are about equally conclusive with those which have just been considered. Canon Farrar asks the question, "Is not 'over all' the conception of

* The reader will easily see this in a Greek Concordance; compare, for example, Rom. iv. 19. In such cases *ἐνδύχων* is simply equivalent to *being*, *existing*, and can mean nothing more.

Isaiah ix. 7; Daniel vii. 13, 14; Matthew xxviii. 18; Ephesians i. 20—23; 1 Peter iii. 22; Hebrews i. 8, &c.?" In reply, I would observe as follows:—Isaiah ix. 7 does not refer to Christ at all, and is never applied to him in the New Testament. In the verses referred to in Daniel and in Matthew xxviii. 18, 19, the "Son of Man" in the one case, and Jesus in the other, are represented as having all power "given;" and how does such an expression show that he to whom it was *given* was conceived of as "God over all?" The "all" may, indeed, be limited, as Canon Farrar suggests, by referring it to the fact that the Messianic dominion was to be over unbelieving Jews and Gentiles, as well as Christians; but still he who holds that dominion evidently, in the conception of the writer of these verses (Matt. xxviii. 18, 19), does so by the gift, the appointment, of another, and such expressions cannot, therefore, justify the application of Rom. ix. 5 to Christ. In Ephes. i. 20, Christ is said to be raised from the dead and "set" on high, and here again to receive all that is ascribed to him by the gift of One that "hath put all things under his feet." Similar remarks apply to 1 Peter iii. 22, and very specially to Hebrews i. 8, 9, in which we see that the "Son" is a God who has "fellows," and that there is even One who "appointed" him and "anointed" him; and so here again therefore the conception cannot be that of a being who was originally and in his own nature "God over all." In all these passages, I submit, the words referred to by Canon Farrar entirely fail to justify the argument which he would build upon them.

There remain still a few words to be said in regard to the interpretation put upon this verse by the Fathers. There can be no doubt that most of these writers, from Irenæus downwards, did apply the words, "God over all," to Christ. But most probably they did so in the sense in which they appear to have been accepted by Epiphanius. An expression

of this Father shows us that Christ was so described, because of his own words, when he said, "All things are committed to me by my Father." "On this account," Epiphanius adds, "He is God over all" (See Tischendorf's quotation from Epiphanius, in his long, critical Note on Rom. ix. 5). Eusebius, too, speaks of Christ as "the only beloved and only begotten Son of Him who is the only God and over all" (See the words in Tischendorf, in the same note). The Fathers, holding the Logos doctrine, could easily, and would almost of necessity, apply the words to Christ; but then the Logos was God, with the earlier of these writers, in no absolute sense, but only in an inferior and secondary sense; Christ, therefore, as the Logos incarnate, was "over all" by delegation only, as the representative of the invisible God, not as being himself the absolutely supreme and only true God. This may be illustrated from two passages cited, one from Origen and the other from Eusebius, in Norton's "Statement of Reasons," in which those Fathers term it a rash and a daring thing to say that Christ was God over all, Origen adding, "We believe him [the Saviour] when he said the Father, who sent me, is greater than I." In another place Origen speaks of Christ as the "image of the invisible God," and also of "the holy prophets and apostles" as his "fellows" (Origen de Princip. II. vi. 3, 6). From such expressions it seems clear in what sense the earlier Fathers looked upon Christ as God and as "over all." It could, by no means, be a supreme divinity which they attributed to him, but only the same kind of communicated, representative God-head which had already long before been attributed to the Logos by Philo. In the statements of this writer it may, indeed, be a question whether even a separate personality is really attributed to the Logos. Of this, however, there can be no doubt in the case of the Fathers, because of the separate personality of him in whom, as they said, the

Logos became incarnate. And, in truth, this is the one new element which the Fathers added to the ancient conception, as it is also the special addition made to that conception in the Fourth Gospel.

This Gospel, however, as Canon Farrar is careful to inform us, is the authority which he follows in his doctrine of the divinity of Christ, and not the Fathers. The distinction does not appear to be of great importance: for what if the whole conception of the Logos, whether in the Fourth Gospel or in the Fathers, is essentially artificial, a mere mode of thought, substantially corresponding to nothing really existing, so far as we can know, in the nature of things human or divine? Believing it to be so, with all due respect to the Fathers and to any other writer of ancient times who adopted the same mode of thought, we may decline to follow them in speaking of Jesus of Nazareth as "God over all," even in the Logos sense. They are no adequate or authoritative exponents of the teaching either of Paul or of Christ. And I say this partly for the reason before stated as given by Canon Farrar himself, when he speaks of the "theological prejudice" of the Fathers, and their "insincere handling of the Word of God;" and partly for a reason already alluded to, which is even more weighty, and which is as applicable to the Fourth Gospel as to the Fathers. This is the impossibility of regarding as the central and most characteristic essence of the Christian Gospel a doctrine which in its origin and development was so entirely a product of Greek speculative philosophy, and which in all essentials was held by Philo long before a word of either Gospels or Epistles was written. The fact that the writer of the Fourth Gospel, whoever he was, adopts the same mode of conception, gives no conclusive authority to the Logos doctrine as one to be permanently received as divine truth. The source of that doctrine remains the same, not in Christian

teaching, but in Gentile philosophical speculation. It may be termed a graft upon Christianity, a corruption, we may say, of the simplicity of the Gospel, but it does not belong to its essence. And, indeed, very probably, with the fourth Evangelist it was no more than a way of saying what Paul also says, that God was with Christ and in him, the divine source of his wisdom and power; not that Christ was God, in any proper sense of this word, but simply that he was the Instrument, the Minister, the Son, through whom God spake in these latter days to the world, as in former times He had spoken unto the fathers by the prophets.

In conclusion, it is clear that neither Canon Farrar nor Dr. Sanday insists upon the Authorised punctuation in this passage; but, although with an avowed leaning in its favour, they both allow that the other is properly admissible. I have already quoted the words of Dr. Sanday to this effect as found in his Commentary on the Romans. In his second paper in the *Expositor* (September, 1879) in reference to the proposal to place a stop after *σάρκα* and commence a new sentence with the following words, he observes, "I do not doubt that the words may be properly, that is grammatically, so divided and so interpreted." This is all that I contend for. Canon Farrar expresses himself much to the same effect, writing at the close of his May paper (*Expositor*, p. 402) that he had come to "the very same conclusion" as Dr. Sanday in his "Commentary." Here the matter may very well be left. The Authorised punctuation is no longer insisted upon as necessary, but admitted to be at least doubtful, and a matter only of personal preference; and this by two English scholars so competent and so orthodox as Canon Farrar and Dr. Sanday.

Both these gentlemen express their surprise that any one should be in doubt as to St. Paul having held the doctrine of the Logos, and refer to the introductory verses of the

Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians as affording conclusive evidence that he did so. The question is too large for discussion as a part of the present paper, and must stand over for some future opportunity. I will only observe that, even with the two passages just named fully in view, it is to me by no means certain that the Apostle was a holder of the Logos philosophy. The contrary conclusion I think by far the more probable.

G. VANCE SMITH.

FARRAR'S ST. PAUL.*

HE is a bold man who proceeds to write a life of the Apostle of the Gentiles within ten years after publishing a life of Christ. A writer who deems half that period adequate for the preparation of an account of St. Paul's career covering thirteen hundred pages, displays, certainly, that self-confidence which is an indispensable condition of a rapid and brilliant popularity. Yet we fear that such fluency of pen may prove fatal to solid and enduring fame.

In endeavouring to form a judgment of Canon Farrar's large and handsome book, we are met at the outset by a certain difficulty in determining for what class of readers it is intended. Its style and tone would seem to indicate that it is addressed less to students than to the great mass of those who read the Scriptures for edification, and in this aspect we are able to extend to it a great measure of approval. It is stated in the preface that the object of this work is to do for the Acts, and the thirteen Epistles of St. Paul, what the author's *Life of Christ* was intended to do for the Gospels—namely, to enable the reader to obtain “a definite, accurate, and intelligible impression of St. Paul's teaching; of the controversies in which he was engaged; of the circumstances which educed his statements of doctrine and practice; of the inmost heart of his theology in each of

*The *Life and Work of St. Paul*. Two vols. By F. W. Farrar, D.D., F.R.S., &c. Cassell, Petter, Galpin, and Co.

its phases ; of his Epistles as a whole, and of each Epistle in particular, as complete and perfect in itself." The whole subject is accordingly woven into a narrative, in which the Epistles appear in what is thought to be their proper places, the more important parts of them being presented in a new version, which is meant to reproduce as closely as possible, without regard to elegance, the exact force and form of the original. Canon Farrar could not execute this task without producing a work in many ways interesting. We have the same vividness of treatment, the same wealth of illustration, the same vigour of statement and exuberance of style as in the former work. An extensive knowledge of the history and antiquities of the period is brought to bear on every point. The author's Talmudical reading is constantly, and often effectively, made use of. Illustrations and parallels are brought from the literature of all ages. A wonderful air of reality is often given to the story by indicating how the events appeared from the point of view of each different actor. To many this ingenuity in attempting to satisfy a natural curiosity will have its charm. We often feel disappointed that the story stops where it does, and Canon Farrar is not a writer who follows too strictly the Hebrew apophthegm which he quotes—"Learn to say, I don't know." He benevolently suggests the continuation, and helps us to imagine what arrangements Paul made with the High Priest after his conversion ; in what terms Gallio may have written to his brother Seneca after the Apostle had been brought before him ; what thoughts may have filled the mind of the Apostle as he made his way from that interview back to "his lodging in the squalid shop of Aquila and Priscilla ;" and why Luke did not wake up Eutychus when he saw him falling asleep. Those who are interested chiefly in the external and personal elements of the New Testament history will find in this work an illustrated guide, which will meet many of their wishes. In reading it they

will also reap this great advantage—that the Epistles, those of them especially which bring us in contact with the real life of the Churches, will speak to them not as doctrinal treatises, but as the living words, dealing with great questions, of an intensely-living man.

But this work claims to be more than a commentary and a repository of illustrations. The view which it sets forth of the life and work of the Apostle Paul is based upon a certain position in criticism, and is appealed to as a justification of that position. The author claims that the truthfulness and consistency of his sketch prove the soundness of his views regarding the Acts and the Epistles (i. 11). It is stated that the object of these volumes is not controversial; yet they contain a good deal of controversy. The names of the great Tübingen scholars, and of their followers in France and in this country, frequently appear on the pages. The writer asserts that he has carefully studied the objections urged against the authenticity and the statements of the New Testament writings. He has remained unconvinced by what he has read. This is not to be wondered at, as the modern criticism has appeared to him in the light of a pure work of destruction. In its character as a work of construction, as an attempt to find the central line of development of Christian thought and life to the creed and structure of the Church, there is no evidence in these volumes that he has comprehended it. His criticisms deal only with points of detail. In reading the works of Baur and his followers, he appears to have kept his mind strictly on the defensive, noting down the rejoinders which could be urged at each particular point. By criticism such as this, it is well known that the Tübingen theology refuses to be judged. The attempt has been made in this century as it never was made before, to show that in the early history of Christianity there was a real development to which an energetic con-

flict of parties and of views within the Church materially contributed, and in their relation to which the New Testament writings are to be arranged if we are really to understand them. This theory has been worked out in many different ways, and in points of detail its upholders are far from being agreed. It rests its claims not on its details, but on the consistency and likelihood of the picture which it gives of the first Christian century. Canon Farrar is right in appealing to his sketch of the Apostle Paul as a whole in proof of his critical opinions. But should he not have judged the Tübingen theology in the same way? The question is whether the Paul of the Tübingen theology or the Paul of Canon Farrar, or any other who may yet appear, will best approve himself as a reality to the mind of an age like this—which of them is fittest to survive? Of course, the picture which will at last prevail must be consistent with the sources, duly sifted and weighed; but it must also be thinkable, and have a living connection with what went before and what came after. It is from this point of view that Canon Farrar very naturally wishes his work to be judged.

Our author's critical position must first be stated. It is a very simple one. He holds that we have thirteen Epistles by the Apostle Paul. With regard to each disputed Epistle, it is stated that the arguments against its authenticity have been carefully examined and found wanting. On the Pastoral Epistles there is less confidence of tone, their case being discussed in a separate excursus of sixteen pages. The Acts is held to be a homogeneous work, compiled by Luke, the author of the third Gospel. Here, however, some notable concessions are made to modern criticism. The author is able to allow that the work was "an ancient Eirenicon, intended to check the strife of parties by showing that there had been no irreconcilable opposition between the views and ordinances of St. Peter and those of St.

Paul ; " " that subjective and artificial considerations may have had some influence in the form and construction of the book ; " " that it gives a picture of essential unity between the followers of the Judaic and the Pauline schools of thought which we might conjecture from the Epistles to have been less harmonious and undisturbed ; " and that in it we " more than once see Paul acting in a way which, from the Epistles, we should have deemed unlikely " (i. 8). We also find it said that Luke had a purpose which guided him in the choice of his materials (ii. 294), and that his object was to show the fundamental unity which existed among Christians, and not to dwell upon the temporary differences which unhappily divided them. In spite of all this, it is held, nevertheless, that in its main outlines the work is a genuine and trustworthy history. From the fact that the Apostle refers to a number of events in his experience which are not recorded in the Acts, it is seriously inferred that his life was too many-sided to be fully recorded either by himself or his biographer, and that there may have been phases of character which have not left a distinct reflection in the Epistles. In cases where the Book of Acts contains apparent contradictions, these, it is argued, must be unimportant, or else so careful a writer would not have left them side by side. Thus the history, as Canon Farrar writes it, partakes of the character of a harmony, and labours under all the disadvantages of that system. For remarkable feats in the way of harmonising, we may refer to the account of the gift of tongues, and to that of the conversion of the Apostle Paul.

One word more before we leave this part of the subject. In a note at the end of the second volume, p. 608, we find it admitted that pseudonymity and literary deception were regarded in antiquity as very different things, and that the word " forger " is inaccurate as applied to authors of pseudonymous Epistles. An author holding such a view

would have done well to avoid the use of an opprobrious term, and to employ some circumlocution. The use of the word "forger" in connection with Epistles of the New Testament, implies an argument on the question of their authenticity, which Canon Farrar allows to be an illegitimate one. Yet we find the word used without explanation in the text and notes of earlier parts of the work, with reference to the authorship of the Colossian and the Ephesian Epistles (ii. 454, 486, 488). In the latter passage, the argument implied in the word is actually stated and relied on. We are told that an imitator must have "deliberately intended to deceive the Church and the world;" that "the spirit in which a forger would have sat down to write, is not the spirit which could have poured forth so grand a Eucharistic hymn," and that the writer, if not the Apostle Paul, must have "deliberately sat down with a lie in his right hand to write a false superscription." The word "fraudulent" is also applied to the author of the Acts (i. 113), should the statement be inaccurate that Paul was a scholar of Gamaliel. In this connection it may also be noted that Canon Farrar twice imputes to those critics who question the genuineness of Pauline Epistles, the motive of wishing to get rid of doctrines contained in these works (ii. 451, 540). Their position may surely be accounted for on other grounds.

When we turn to the picture of the Apostle Paul, with which we are presented in these volumes, and on which their author relies as justifying his critical position, we find it often somewhat difficult to know exactly what is the gist of Canon Farrar's statements; the abundance of his rhetoric makes it hard to define his positions; but perhaps it may be possible to state the broad outlines of his picture, so far as they concern our purpose, without serious misrepresentation.

The first thing that strikes us about the Paul of this book

is, that his life is determined, not from within, by the necessities of his thought, but mostly from without, by the various influences which act on him from time to time. Each change in his action, each development in his doctrine is explained by considering the circumstances in which at that time he happened to be placed. Beginning with his conversion, we find that there had been a certain mental preparation leading up to it; that his contact with the Christians had been causing him to glide into their doctrines, and that his conscience revolted against the business on which he was coming to Damascus. His seeing Jesus is accounted for by the well-known hypothesis of a vision, which was not produced by any external object. His conversion, however, was an absolute miracle; it was by the direct intervention of God that he became convinced of the resurrection of Jesus, and of his power. The belief in his mission to the Gentiles did not spring at once by a logical necessity from his belief in a crucified Messiah; it was miraculously introduced into his mind along with a number of other beliefs and expectations, and it was capable of wavering. After his conversion, he at once sought retirement in Arabia, partly with the view of assuring himself, on the spot where Mosaism originated, that he was really in possession of a truth capable of supplanting that system. In this retirement, the painful malady began, which, throughout the rest of his life, depressed him, and rendered his consciousness morbidly sensitive. On returning to the world, he did not preach to the Gentiles, but preached to the Jews at Damascus a gospel precisely similar to that of the twelve. He went up to Jerusalem expecting to find great pleasure in the society of the brethren there, and learned much from Peter about the life and teaching of the Lord. But, failing to gain a footing among the body of the disciples, he might at this time have been lost to the work of the Church, had not Barnabas come forward to vouch for his sincerity. He

then preached in Jerusalem the same doctrine as at Damascus. Retiring to Tarsus, he lived, for a time, in seclusion, waiting for the call to preach to the Gentiles, which it had been promised that he should receive. The beginning of his preaching to the Gentiles occurred at Antioch, where that work had been going on for some time before his arrival. He had before this been pondering the subject of a mission to the Gentiles, and finding evidence in favour of it in the Old Testament Scriptures; yet it was Barnabas who now for the second time saved him for the work of Christianity, and placed him face to face with the occupation, which otherwise he might not have taken up. By the ordination of the Church of Antioch, he received the full title of Apostle, and was accredited to the Gentile mission. There was nothing novel in his earlier preaching. His sermon at Antioch in Pisidia was formed on the speech of Stephen, which he had heard, and the preservation of which, in the Acts, we owe to his reporting, and on that of the Apostle Peter. It contained the germ of his later doctrines.

At this period of his activity the Apostle preached circumcision as a rule for the Jews, as a charitable concession for the Gentiles. He preached a Gospel of Universalism, as Peter had done before him, representing God as one to whom the son of Abraham was not dearer than any one in any nation who feared Him and worked righteousness; and it was implied, rather than stated, that circumcision was not essential for a Christian. What first led him to regard the question as one of capital importance, was the espionage of the false brethren at Antioch; but even at this point his views on the subject were far from being final, and he went up to Jerusalem not without misgivings that he might be wrong. He went there to obtain a decision on the question, and was confirmed in the conviction that he did right in dispensing with circumcision, by the discovery that the Apostles there

had no clear light to throw on the subject. After gaining over the pillar-Apostles to his view, he yielded to the clamour of their bigoted and undisciplined Church, and caused Titus to be circumcised. This was not a surrender of the position he had now become resolved to maintain, but merely a stretch of charity: the rule being proved by the exception. His words to the Galatians on the subject have an apologetic tone. He returned to Antioch clear in his views and conscious of his power, and inspired the Church there with his own convictions. He discharged a painful duty in his rebuke of Peter's tergiversation. It is not certain whether the words in which, in narrating this occurrence, he goes on to state his own position of justification by faith only, were spoken to Peter or not. In spite of this painful scene, he always maintained friendly feelings towards Peter and the other Apostles of the Jewish Church, which they did not fail to reciprocate.

His thought and teaching after this point took such directions as the circumstances of his travels and the needs of the Churches impressed on them. To the hindrance which altered his route (Acts xvi. 6), the visit to Galatia was due; and Canon Farrar concludes very strangely that had that hindrance not been interposed the Epistle to the Galatians might never have been written, and the whole course of Christian theology might have been entirely changed. At Athens we are told that he preached the Gospel of the Kingdom of Heaven, and that he preached the Cross. The latter statement, however, is contradicted a few pages further on. At Corinth the subject of his preaching was the Messiahship of Jesus, and the broad fact of a Redeemer crucified for sin. The vow which he undertook at this time is "significant as a proof of his *personal* allegiance to the Levitical institutions, and his desire to adopt a policy of conciliation towards the Jewish Christians of the Holy City."

Such is Canon Farrar's account of the earlier ministry of the great Apostle. At this point we reach the firmer ground of the four great Epistles, of which the author considers that the two to the Corinthians were written first. We venture to think that the treatment of these Epistles is the most satisfactory part of the work. Canon Farrar is at home in the rich and varied incident to which they introduce us. He excels in breadth of treatment rather than the minute matters of criticism or in the power of tracking the Apostle's path through his elliptical and unfamiliar arguments. Here we sometimes notice a tendency to escape to some theological notion with which we are more familiar. Nor will the position taken up with regard to the disturbers of the Churches of Galatia and Corinth hold water, that they were isolated and unaccredited fanatics, against whom the Apostle might have appealed had he chosen—(why did he not choose?)—to the unbroken sympathy felt for him by the head of the Church at Jerusalem. In spite of that drawback, however, the biographer is very capable of sympathy with the Apostle, and possesses both the generosity and the intensity which are needed for entering into the practical position, and making the old words assume once more the light and heat with which they glowed at first.

After enjoying the Epistles under Canon Farrar's guidance, it is a painful change to be taken forthwith to the scenes of the last visit to Jerusalem, where the Apostle is made to appear in a sadly different light, and parts at once with his doctrine and his pride. The argument for the impossibility of the Apostle having made a public exhibition of his conformity to the law is stated, indeed, with great force and candour; but we are presently told that two principles laid down in the Epistles are sufficient to explain the Apostle's action, the first being his willingness to waive what was indifferent for the sake of charity, and the second

the propriety of each man's remaining in the state in which he was. He did not think it worth while to cease to be a Jew. Yet Canon Farrar betrays his sympathy with John Knox, whom he quotes as asserting that on this occasion the Apostle did wrong. In speaking of Paul's finesse before the Sanhedrim, he acknowledges that the Apostle was guilty of conduct unworthy of him. In extenuation it is pleaded that our strict ideas of veracity are peculiar to the Anglo-Saxon race, and cannot be looked for in the ancient world. By a doubtful piece of exegesis it is also suggested that the Apostle afterwards expressed regret for his conduct on this occasion. Before Festus we find Paul preaching with the force of long familiarity, and with intense conviction, the same doctrine as that of Peter in the first days of the Church at Jerusalem.

Canon Farrar believes that the Apostle escaped the Neronian persecution, and wrote the seven later Epistles from a second captivity in Rome. The reason why the teaching of these is so different from that of the great Epistles, though all the eleven were written within a period of ten years, is again that new circumstances had arisen and called for the statement of new doctrines. It is asserted that the Christology of the Epistles to the Ephesians and the Colossians is to be found in the earlier letters too. These Epistles were due to the rise in Asia Minor of a tendency to Gnostic views, in which, though it had not assumed the dimensions of a heresy, the Apostle foresaw great danger to his Churches. In the Pastoral Epistles, Canon Farrar allows that there is a marked failure of vigour on the part of the Apostle, and that the distinctive characteristics of his energetic years have receded to the background. Such is the picture of the great Apostle of the Gentiles which we are asked to regard as so consistent and satisfactory that it justifies the critical position on which it is based. What are we to say of it?

Great as the merits of Canon Farrar's work are in some

directions, it would be going too far to say that he has succeeded in bringing the figure of the Apostle clearly before us. To a certain kind of skill it might not be impossible to work into one history the Paul who wrote to the Galatians, the Paul of the Acts, and the Paul of the later Epistles. Canon Farrar does little to show the unity of these several characters. He deals with each in succession, and argues that it is not impossible that they may be the same, but his art wants subtlety to fuse them into one. His Paul, therefore, it must be said, is devoid of any living continuity; his days are not linked each to each by natural piety; we see neither the root of his growth nor the unity of his form. He is a personage without a backbone either of thought or principle; his views are formed, not by the operation of an intensely logical mind, but by the pressure of varying circumstances. Many of his acts are forced on him by influences against which his higher nature rebels, and for some of them, and these are not the least important, he has to seek an apology.

Did space allow, we could point out that Canon Farrar's delineation rests on an exegesis of the Acts and the Epistles which, for the sake of the harmony believed to exist between these sources, is forced at some points to do violence to their natural meaning. It is of more moment to point out how impossible it is to realise to our minds the history as he states it, and how, for want of an internal principle of growth, he is frequently obliged to call in the supernatural to help on the course of events, even where the texts do not suggest it. Let it be considered, for example, how it is possible that the Apostle's great doctrines could ever retire to the background of his mind. They have held their place in the history of the Church, and appeared again and again as the watchwords of true religious revivals, and it is not likely that their author could himself

forget them by change of scene or by the advance of age. Before his principles had sunk to quiescence in the minds of his followers, and long before the zealots of Jerusalem, whom the Apostles were so little able to control, had desisted from their hostility, how could the Apostle write Epistles on the unity of the Church in which Jew and Gentile appear standing peacefully on one platform, and the new doctrines are softened down so as to be inoffensive to every one? It is impossible to compress such a development as this within the limits of ten years.

The reason of Canon Farrar's failure to produce a lifelike representation, in spite of all the liking he has for his subject, lies primarily in a deficient conception of the progress of theology in the times of the Apostles. The first authority for the life of Paul lies undoubtedly in his own Epistles; there, and there only, do we receive any information as to the history of his mind and the growth of his thought. And the life of Paul was the outcome of his thought, as few lives have ever been. His doctrine and himself were one. He was prepared for it from the beginning, and it was no mere theological opinion, but a great spiritual impulse of the age which took up its residence in him. And he who would know Paul must know his doctrine. He must understand what was the logical outcome to the Jew of the notion of a crucified Messiah, and see how the earlier Apostles were not logical enough to apprehend the meaning of Christ crucified, and therefore fell into inconsistency. Then he will not fail to see that to Paul, Christ crucified and the mission to the Gentiles were not two doctrines, but one, and that there could be no doubt for him, after his conversion, what he was to do, and little doubt, perhaps, even at the beginning of his ministry, what battles he would have to fight. What was precisely the belief of the original Apostles? What was precisely the difference between that belief and the

doctrine of Paul? Without clear views upon these questions, no living grasp of the history of the Apostolic age is possible. In the absence of a strict discipline in this part of the subject, such as the labours of Holsten have made more possible to us than before, the work of Canon Farrar has fallen into great confusion. The preaching of the older Apostles at the very outset of Christianity is credited with notions which were the mature result of Pauline thought, and Paul is represented as preaching to the very end the elementary doctrine which, from the first, he had felt to be an inadequate rendering of the great fact of Christ crucified.

And as the foundation of this work is not laid deep enough in the great elements of the Apostle's thought, so its superstructure is dwarfed and cramped by the supposed necessity of confining all the stages of Pauline thought in the New Testament to the short space of the Apostle's lifetime. To a writer whose hold on the great standards of Paulinism contained in the principal Epistles is but loose, it appears the natural policy to accept all the works which have come down in the Apostle's name, and to set himself to account for their changed subjects and tone as best he may. To one who finds it hard to persuade himself that works so different from the great Epistles as some of these are, can proceed from the same hand, and who has apprehended the conditions of authorship in ancient times, as Canon Farrar himself has stated them, a much wider and more imposing view of the history of the first Christian century reveals itself. The forces at work within the Church sufficed for the production not only of hymns (which are frequently referred to in the second volume of this work), but also of great Epistles in which the new thought of the Church was so adequately expressed, that believers admitted these productions to a place beside the first documents of their faith, and did not frown upon the fiction that they

were written by the hand of the mighty dead. In like manner, the desire was satisfied to obtain a representation of the history of early times which might better correspond to the growing sense of unity than the glimpses of a stormy epoch to be found in the earlier Epistles. The materials were collected for this end from various quarters, and so the Church obtained its Eirenicon, a history not perfect but suited to its needs, in which old controversies were dimmed over, and a picture was held up on which an uncritical and peace-loving generation could gaze with satisfaction. There were brave men before Agamemnon, and there were noble writers after Paul, who owe it to their own modesty, as well as to the literary habits of their age, that their names are unrecorded.

From Canon Farrar's frankness and openness of mind, we are persuaded that he will be glad of an opinion on his work written from a point of view which he has not seen fit to adopt.

ALLAN MENZIES.

THE ANCIENT BUDDHIST BELIEF CONCERNING GOD.

THE Buddhist movement owed its origin to a man who would be more accurately described as an earnest thinker than as a social and religious reformer. This alone would go far to explain its far-reaching and abiding influence. Political and theological reformers who are only just in advance of their generation are most useful—nay, indispensable—agents in the rise of humanity; and they reap, for the most part, substantial rewards from widespread sympathy and popular acclaims. But just as the politicians of to-day carry into effect—and this, too often, slowly and inadequately—the results arrived at by the thinkers of a previous generation; so it is to earnest thinkers on the deepest mysteries of life, men unknown or neglected in their own time, that the popular leaders of each generation of religious reformers owe the inspiration and the influence which enable them to carry their tiny, temporary, measures of reform. The children's children of those who despised them build gorgeous sepulchres to these men “of the divine eye.” And they also do their best, alas! to bury away out of sight, under a gorgeous covering of fairy legend and wondrous tale, both the true history of their lives and the true record of their thoughts. But the influence of their lives survives through all, and their thoughts—often misunderstood, misrepresented, twisted into the support of fantastic notions, and even grievous wrongs—are a guide,

meanwhile, to many an inquiring heart, and only die out at last in giving birth to newer and larger ideas, in which the old are still the greatest part.

It is strange, and somewhat sad, to notice how many generations—even many centuries, pass away, before the greatest thoughts of the greatest thinkers reach their full fruition in becoming thus the starting-point of a new progress. This was the case, as in so many other instances, with the teaching of the Buddha regarding the gods, a doctrine the originality of which can only be understood by a comparison with the belief out of which it arose, and which, for a time, at least, it was able to supplant.

These previous beliefs had run in India a course very similar to that which had resulted in the corresponding beliefs in other lands. It is true that the Vedas, the oldest record of Indian beliefs, show us already an advanced stage in the growth of theology; but they afford satisfactory evidence of the previous stage, common to the Aryans and to the other races of mankind. The Aryans had come to believe (most probably through the influence of dreams) in the existence of another self, different and distinct from man's bodily self, which continued to exist in some vague way, and for a time, at least, after death. At the same time they had acquired a belief in a similar kind of ghost or spirit residing in outward things, and especially in all things that moved, such as animals, trees, and heavenly appearances. It is in this stage of "animistic" belief that most of the present so-called savages are now found. But it should never be forgotten that, compared with what Man through countless ages before them had been, these believers in animated nature had really made a very enormous progress. Nor should it be overlooked that, compared with what Man may be, with what he almost certainly will be, they stand at a level not so very different, as is commonly supposed, from our own.

The next stage of belief is one common also to the Aryans and to all other races who have advanced at all beyond the animistic stage. The more powerful of the spirits of the outside world became objects of greater fear than the rest, they were endowed with higher attributes, and were promoted to be kings, as it were, among the spirits. This has almost always been the lot of the spirits of the air, or of those animating the heavenly bodies; and in the great majority of the Rig Veda hymns we find such spirits worshipped and invoked.

In this polytheistic stage the other gods survive, however, as naiads and dryads, spirits of the streams and trees, demons, goblins, angels, and fairies, good or bad. The old belief, too, in mysteriously animated objects survives in the belief in magic, in sorcery, and in charms of various kinds; and it is with these matters that the Atharva Veda is principally concerned.

It is instructive to reflect how difficult it has been for the most enlightened teachers in spite of much progress in material things, and even in education, to raise the bulk of mankind entirely above this range of ideas. But a further step has been very generally taken, and always in the same direction—from polytheism, that is, to monotheism. The Jews were probably the first people who, as a people, made this advance. It is, however, by no means easy to specify the exact time at which the belief in one god and one god only became firmly and generally established among them; and scholars are not yet agreed whether they owed the transition entirely to national feeling, or to the influence also of Egyptian philosophy.

A similar step was afterwards taken independently, and at about the same time, among both the Greeks and the Indian Aryans; but among them the change was brought about by philosophical speculation, and in consequence,

perhaps, was mostly confined to the educated classes, and to schools of philosophy. The previously existing polytheistic form of animistic belief continued to exist long after the monotheistic idea had become paramount in the schools, and the more advanced notion never became the exclusive and common view of the whole nation.

In speaking of these later beliefs, so nearly related to our own, it is difficult to make use of terms not liable to some misconception. It would be possible to maintain that the Jewish belief in an evil spirit, side by side with the Great Spirit, and in subordinate angels and archangels, good and bad, is sufficient to render inaccurate any description of them as monotheists; and certainly the most advanced thinkers among the pre-Buddhistic Hindus never became what would now be called Pure Theists. They could better be called Pantheists, but this, again, only in a peculiar sense.

They continued to believe in the souls or spirits supposed to exist inside the human body, and in spirits supposed to animate trees and rivers, the ocean and the air. But they held all these and all matter to be the mere sportive emanations of a Supreme Spirit, who was unconscious, and was led by causes beyond his (or rather its) control to manifest itself in these temporary and changing forms. None of our Western names will accurately describe such a belief. Those names are applied to ideas which have grown out of popular theories somewhat different from (though related to) the polytheistic notions, of which Indian Pantheism was the outgrowth and the explanation.

The above mere outline of the existing beliefs with which the Buddha had to deal will make it perhaps possible to understand his peculiar and quite original and antagonistic position.

He was an Agnostic. And here for the first time we meet with a European word which fits an Indian thinker. A

European—I had almost said a Christian-Agnostic—says with respect to all the arguments and statements of theologians concerning the nature and attributes, the power and action of God, “We do not know.” Gautama’s attitude, in the face of the discussions and statements of the Indian Pantheists regarding their Great Spirit and First Cause, was the same.

But we must still, as Thomas Aquinas would say, “distinguish.” There is a well-known algebraical puzzle by which the assumption that nothing equals nothing leads to the unexpected result that one equals two. Negation of knowledge is common to Gautama and the Agnostics; the things said to be unknown—the personal emotional deity of the Christians, and the neuter, unconscious deity of the Hindus—are different. Modern Agnostics, too, have to deal with Monotheists, whose ardent personal devotion to, and exalted moral conception of, God have long ago destroyed the last remnants of a belief in the other spirits anciently believed to animate the outside world. Gautama lived at a time when the other gods of India were still as real and as powerful as their relations, the gods of Greece and Rome. He denied their power, denied their eternity, reduced them to the rank of angels or fairies, called them weak and ignorant, held that they could only escape from their unfortunate condition by becoming men, and taught men to ignore and disregard them. The highest being known upon earth was not any spirit of any kind, but the man who had reached the state of intellectual and moral perfection called Nirvāna, by inward self-culture and self-control. There is a relation and a contrast very real and very instructive between the widely different ideas that the Son of Man is God, and that the best and wisest of the sons of men are really, That which “the voice of the common world hath called Divine.”*

T. W. RHYS-DAVIDS.

* See the Devadhamma Jātaka (Fausbøll, No. 6).

SIGHT AND INSIGHT.

“**W**HEN the sun rises you see something like a golden guinea coming out of the sea ; I see and hear likewise an innumerable company of angels praising God.” If this fine saying of William Blake appears to any one obscure, and he should ask what it means, he may be warned at once that this paper is not for him. Whether the lack of power to appreciate the speech of the mystic is due to congenital defect, or to that gradual ossification of the spiritual nature which arises from the absorption of the mind by the gross and palpable aspects of life, the result is the same—that we have a large number of persons in our midst to whom the inner significance of nature and the mystic susceptibilities of the heart are as foreign as the language of the Cocqcigrues. Just as we are all familiar with people who are more or less “ colour blind,” and with others who have no “ ear ” for music, so we number among our acquaintances some who seem to have no aptitude of sensibility, let us say, for the finer moods of Shelley or the sympathetic insight of Henry Vaughan. Eminently respectable, cleanly folk, they yet live the life of the tame Philistine, their eyes for ever on the decencies of the turnpike, and never uplifted to the witchery of the blue sky. Not that congenital defect, or that worse fate, acquired disability through the long denial of the better instincts, is in any case absolute. It is well known that things to which at one time we are blind, flash upon us with a wonderful light, as we

suddenly turn some corner in our lives. Distinguished musicians assure us that no ear is so dull but care, attention, and, above all, early training, may develop the power of hearing, enjoying, and unweaving the subtlest harmonies. So we may well believe that in minds apparently lacking every requisite for appreciating the fervours of the mystic and the visions of the imaginative life, there are germs of capacity which in a kindly soil, perhaps a sunnier clime than this, might come to bud and flower. Certainly if it is possible, as we know by experience it is, to educate a taste for real poetry where it did not previously exist, we have reason to hope that the quickening touch of some crisis, or the long and awful experience of years of discipline, may set free and develop the spiritual faculties which now are wrapped in sevenfold cerements and buried in the earth.

Sight and Insight, Letter and Spirit, Outward and Inward, these are for ever and ever the differences between life on a high and a low scale of being. The sight of the eyes, the most precious of all a man's physical gifts, is only a parable of that truer sight of the soul which makes a man a poet, an artist, a lover, a spiritual creature. To "see the unseen" is the paradox of religion as it is the crowning glory of man. "Seeing is believing," says the Philistine. "We endure as seeing the invisible" replies every disciple of the spirit. Properly speaking, Sight and Insight are not two antagonistic tendencies, but opposite poles of one and the same magnet. Practically they are too often dissociated, exclusive attention to the one faculty killing out the sense of the other. In Browning's "Sordello" there are four simple lines, which, found in the midst of a very tough piece of reading, are like Bunyan's arbour on the hill Difficulty.

God has conceded two sights to a man :

One of man's whole work, Time's completed plan,

The other of the minute's work, man's first

Step to the plan's completion.

We look upon the far-off ideal, but not to the exclusion of the present reality; we gaze on the hills in the distance to which we direct our course, but we observe also the wild flowers and milestones of the high road. We have the far sight and the near. Only be sure man's danger is rarely that the far sight will shut out the near; rather it is that the near—the minute's work, the dusty highway—will blind us to the mountain range, unutterably bright. Men often pride themselves on the shrewd common sense which, resolutely sticking to the so-called "facts" of life, denies that there is such a thing as the vision of the invisible, while they think their firm adherence to facts qualifies them to look down from the height of a better wisdom with a patronizing tolerance upon your moon-struck Dantes and Wordsworths. So utterly and fathom-deep blind are they to what are facts. For a little closer inspection of the poets will show that they too, root and ground themselves in facts, only their world includes another series of facts, of which those that are "seen and temporal" are the faint adumbrations, the far-off and imperfect symbols. So-called facts are seen to derive more than half their significance because they stand as images of our spiritual life. Bread and water, rain and sunshine, are invested with new relations, and while valuable for the lower life, are chiefly valuable as furnishing pictures, and so helping to make us conscious of, the food, the hunger, and the sunshine of the soul. Slowly we are led on to discover how outward shows exist for the very sake of being parables of inward realities, and that ultimately there are no facts but thoughts—thoughts which in their infinite variety flash upon us aspects of the one ineffable, all-embracing thought of God. As our eyes are opened we observe that all natural objects, from the blowing clover at our feet to the golden fires in the midnight sky, have a mysterious relation to the soul's experiences. Hence, the highest expression of which moral and spiritual truth admits lies in the symbolism of

nature. Our common language is mystical to the last degree; the very names of the most familiar objects are images. The well-known story of the poor woman who, upon being asked what part of the Gospel story she liked best, answered, "I like best the *likes*," betrayed that the true secret of touching the heart is by a free use of the correspondences between man and nature. With Jesus of Nazareth everything was *like*; every outward feature of sky and sea, hill and plain, growing corn and flying cloud, was like some phase of the soul's history. In speaking of Himself, indeed, He finds the correspondence closer still, for He is not like, He *is*; dealing with symbols in direct and logical forms of speech. He is not like bread, but "I *am* the Bread of Life;" or like a vine, but "I *am* the True Vine;" or like light, but "I *am* the Light of the World." No teacher was ever so simply yet profoundly mystical, as Jesus in sayings like these.

Let us not be cheated by the sticklers for so-called facts and realities. What are realities? Are not the thoughts suggested to the soul by the pine forests on the Alps as much realities as the fires they feed on our hearths? Is not the sense of God's exceeding peace brought to the mind by the still, deep lake among the hills, as great a reality as the water we run from it into our cisterns? He who in communion with nature feels himself standing before a Shining Presence, is surely dealing with realities a thousand-fold more than one to whom the earth is only a stable, and its fruit so much fodder? Is it because the sea is a convenient water-way that its wild white waves fill the breast with a tumultuous emotion? It is from no consideration of the value of a ton of hay that we feel such a thrill of pleasure when looking at a field of buttercups tossed and re-tossed in the wind. No sense of utility can explain the sorrow and triumph, the rapture and despair, of which a stormy sunset is the intense expression. The infinite

delight and the indefinite desire kindled within by flying clouds across a depth of blue, producing glory after glory, bear no relation to their primary purpose—a well-watered earth. Are not thought and feeling, the light and flame of aspiration, facts more enduring than the corn we grind and the grapes we crush? The chief and ultimate use of the natural world is to furnish a medium of expression for the inexpressible life of the soul, or to be a visible, yet thereby an imperfect, incarnation of the Ideal Perfection.

Mr. Matthew Arnold has pointed out how greatly Jesus was above the heads of His reporters. Familiar as it might be supposed they were with His parabolic and mystical way of putting things, when He warned them of the "leaven of the Pharisees," their thoughts rose no higher than the kneading-trough and the baker's oven. They were so dull and prosaic, that it did not occur to them that He was using the word "leaven" as an image, so that leaven might not, indeed, be leaven at all, but teaching. They did not understand, because the imaginative faculty within was as yet buried beneath the earthly mould and stony slabs of a matter-of-fact, material nature. Therefore they could only give a superficial interpretation to the great, deep words of their Master.

In like manner nature's voice is constantly receiving a superficial interpretation. There is a sound in the air, but to how many is it inarticulate? How often, in drawing-rooms as well as in slums, do we come face to face with the veritable Peter Bell:—

A primrose by the river brim,

A yellow primrose was to him.

But, to say nothing of these human pachyderms, how many there are, having some susceptibility to the beauty of nature, who yet are blind and deaf to the real glory of her revelations, and are only dimly conscious of something going on in which they have no part or lot; just, indeed,

as there are people who admire a landscape in photography more than a picture of Turner's. One man, looking out upon a fine scene, sees clearly enough the flowing curve of the hills, the changeful glories of the sky, the tender shadows, the laughing ripple of the foliage, the "many-twinkled smile of ocean" in the far distance—can, indeed, give a fairly accurate description of it, and is not insensible to the charm of it. Yet he never gets any further than the outside of the show. His favourite poet is Thomson, who, like a superior, polytechnic person, neatly catalogues for us the various features of the panorama, to which he acts the part of appointed showman.

Now the day

O'er heaven and earth diffused, grows warm and high,
Infinite splendour! wide investing all.

How still the breeze! save what the filmy threads
Of dew evaporate brushes from the plain.

How clear the cloudless sky, how deeply tinged
With a peculiar hue! The ethereal arch

How swathed immense, amid whose azure throned

The radiant sun how gay—how calm below

The gilded earth!

Here is the showman pointing out the "beauties" of the scene, like a lecturer with a white wand. True, he is an artistic showman, admirably correct, minutely photographic, but a showman still—heavy, cold, mechanical. He has never pierced to the heart of the mystery—is scarcely conscious that there is a mystery. To another these same sights and sounds speak in a spiritual language, making him partaker of a deeper secret. They bring him "authentic tidings of things invisible"—he sees with inward eye

A Presence which disturbs him with the joy

Of elevated thoughts—a sense sublime

Of Something far more deeply interfused,

Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,

And the round ocean, and the living air,

And the blue sky, and in the mind of man :—
A motion and a spirit that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.

That is quite immeasurably different from the other. In Thomson the poet stands apart and describes nature ; in Wordsworth the poet is in communion with nature, like a lover with his mistress ; his life is interspersed with hers ; the living soul within him is beating in unison with the living soul of the universe ; he and nature are alike parts of one awful life, one organic being ever melting on the skirts of consciousness into the impersonal. Sight sees in the fair scene the handiwork of God ; Insight sees God Himself, and knows that while God infinitely transcends—God *is* in all he beholds.

It is scarcely possible to consider Sight and Insight without bringing into the field of discussion the interpretation of the Bible ; for no book in the world can be less understood, according to the sight of the eyes, than the Bible ; no book requires more insight, the power to read between the lines, the fine discrimination which knows how to distinguish the essence from its surroundings, the kernel from the shell, the local and temporary from the eternal and world-wide. People who judge according to sight will make the mystic, suggestive, emotional language of the Bible rigid and dogmatic. It is a distinct peculiarity of many of the sayings of Jesus that they cannot be taken literally. They must be interpreted in a rich, deep, imaginative way. Many of them are almost devoid of intellectual outlines ; as ideas they exist in solution, and to attempt to harden them or crystallise them into solid blocks of logic is to rob them of their heat and vitality. They never can be explained so that you can say of them, " There, that is what they mathematically mean." The sermon on the mount is much admired, and justly, for its simplicity, humanity, and direct bearing upon life ;

nevertheless, there is no part of Scripture, from the beginning to the end, which it is more impossible to interpret according to Sight and letter. If we would read it at all, we must read with Insight, discerning between the soul and the body of the parable. To such a spiritual phrase, the most beautiful sentence perhaps in all literature, as "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God," we must take a spiritual faculty. Grammars and dictionaries are of no avail; no logical analysis will help us; if we do not see into its meaning by an inward vision, we do not see at all. Many of the alleged facts and occurrences of the Bible are only of use to this far-off generation just in so far as they are spiritually discerned. Even with those who receive and accept them, the miracles of the Bible have long ceased to have any evidential value; they are of use only as parables of spiritual teaching, the drapery of ideas. The feeding of the five thousand, considered as an actual event, is so full of incongruities as to give a shock to the belief of the most credulous, when once the attempt is made to realise in the imagination what is involved. It is not only that the far-receding gradations of natural law are dispensed with, but that the artificial processes of manufacture, the plough, the flail, the mill, the oven, are superseded in a manner which sets both experience and conception at defiance. Sight surely sets itself an unprofitable task when it contends here for the event as it is recorded; on the other hand, it is not only an unprofitable, it is an odious and repulsive, task when Sight picks it to pieces simply as an idle tale. The true value of such a story for us is neither in an affirmative nor in a negative demonstration of it, but in its spiritual suggestiveness, as a parable of Christ Himself, the Bread of Life, the ever-sustaining food of humanity. In St. John's gospel it is evidently told, solely for the sake of the discourse which follows, and which it epitomises in an allegorical form. Every detail of the story symbolises some

aspect of the Church in breaking the bread to a hungry world, or some property of the bread itself. Sight sees only a bald wonder hard to believe; Insight discerns great ideas embodied in an emblem; the mystical truth of what Jesus is to those who feed on Him, set forth in picture-writing. The story is the outer husk of which that grand saying, "I am the Bread of Life," is the kernel.

Once more, what shall be said of the many angelic appearances recorded in the Bible? Interpreted according to sight, they hinder rather than help our faith; for, as they no longer occur, we are forced to the conclusion that the heavenly world and heavenly sustenance are further away from us than they were from the patriarchs. If they are insisted upon as literal events, they yield us no inspiration, because we have no right to take them as indicative of the guidance we may expect. But let us take Insight to them, and immediately they are seen to picture the eternal fact of the communion of God with the soul; accepted as a parable of the spiritual influences that come forth from His presence, charged with benefaction for man, they become of enduring worth. Insight perceives them to be poetical representations of critical experiences in the soul's history. Their objective value is nothing. The lessons of Divine Providence they contain are infinitely more important than the forms in which they are depicted. When Elisha's servant cried out in great fear because of the near approach of his master's enemies the prophet answered, "Fear not, for they that be with us are more than they that be with them. And Elisha prayed, and said, Lord, I pray Thee open his eyes that he may see. And the Lord opened the eyes of the young man, and he saw; and behold the mountain was full of horses and chariots of fire round about Elisha." Now to dwell upon the form of that story, to magnify and give that the chief place in our thought, is to deface and disfigure its immeasurable grandeur. It is to be

among the number of those who, having Sight, are yet blind, because they have no Insight. Sight will show us nothing but an isolated and preternatural wonder. Insight will show us that the real power of this narrative is of permanent value, since it is the vivid apprehension by the soul that the moral and spiritual forces of the universe are far more real, active, and powerful than the brute, material force. It for ever gives the lie to the big battalion theory. Wrong has a myriad allies; but in the long run nothing is so clear as this—more are they that be for right than they that be for wrong. The righteous soul may be encompassed by difficulties and enemies, but on his side are arrayed the majestic and invincible presences of Light and Truth. It is a vision which every one may see for himself. When a man, gazing on the wide, open page of history, and upon its glowing picture of human life, passion, and movement, sees only a set of disjointed events having no unity and not working out any definite purpose, he is blind while he sees. When a man looking out upon human affairs sees only how victorious are trickery, fraud, violence, and oppression, he is blind while he sees. When a man is so possessed by the world, the flesh, and the devil as to believe that money is more powerful and more valuable than ideas, he is blind while he sees. But when a man has not only Sight, but Insight; when through all the march of events that crowd the page of history he sees at work “an Eternal Power that makes for righteousness;” when, taking into account the greatness of the scale on which God works, he sees that Truth is never in the long run defeated; when in all shapes of human energy, in all exaltations of the spirit, in all flaming aspirations of the will, in the conflict of strenuous greed with self-abandoned love, of illimitable appetite with God-like renunciation, he sees that the ideal of human perfection is ever working itself clear; when he

sees the great moral law of the universe steadily and irresistibly asserting itself; when this sublime and edifying conception dawns upon him with glorious vision, that the unseen ideas of Justice, Mercy, Truth, and Love are mightier to prevail than ten thousands of gold and silver and thousands of thousands of guns and legions—then “behold the mountain is full of horses and chariots of fire round about him.”

JOSEPH WOOD.

FRAGMENTS.

IF Wordsworth* was long in being admitted to his place amongst the Immortals, there can be no doubt that he has at length reached it. The final verdict of Time, as to the value of all literary work of the first order, is unerring. It may be delayed, but the form which it at length assumes is more just and dispassionate from the delay. At length, our most discriminating critic assigns to Wordsworth what there can be little doubt posterity will regard as his true place in the roll of English poets. That place is third on the line. Mr. Arnold maintains that Wordsworth "has left a body of poetical work superior in power, in interest, and in the qualities which give enduring freshness," to that of any English poet, excepting Shakespeare and Milton; and, with the exception of Dante, Molière, and Goethe, superior to any European poet of the modern age. It is true that this is not, as yet, Europe's verdict; but Mr. Arnold confidently anticipates the time when it will be universally acknowledged. It is difficult to escape from our insular way of looking at things, so as to find a cosmopolitan test of literary merit; and there is so much inequality in Wordsworth's work—his inspiration at flood-tide rising to the very highest, but at its ebb falling proportionately low—that we need not concern ourselves as yet with his place in the great European Hierarchy. Enough if we keep to our own literature; and here, I think, it is unquestionable that the truth of the matter lies just as Mr. Arnold has put it. No more appreciative essay has ever been written on the genius and work of Wordsworth. Even after all that has been said on the subject within the last ten years, there is much in this delightful preface that has the charm of novelty, in addition to its wisdom and insight. Specially noteworthy are the following sentences:—"Wordsworth's poetry is great, because of the extraordinary power with which he feels the joy offered to us in Nature, the joy offered to us in the simple

* Wordsworth's Poems. Selected and edited by Matthew Arnold. Macmillan.

elementary affections and duties; and because of the extraordinary power with which, in case after case, he shows us this joy, and renders it so as to make us share it." "Nature herself seems to take the pen out of his hand, and to write for him with her own bare, sheer, penetrating power."

There are, however, two critical opinions expressed by Mr. Arnold, on which a remark may be made. The first is that Wordsworth's poems can never produce their due effect until they are "freed from their present artificial arrangement, and grouped more naturally." In this Mr. Arnold states a conviction which is very widely felt, and has often been expressed. The arrangement, in the edition of 1815 and subsequent ones, "Poems Founded on the Affections," "Poems of the Fancy," "Poems of the Imagination," "Poems of Sentiment and Reflection," "Sonnets," "Epitaphs and Elegiac Poems," &c., was altogether unnatural; and only less grotesque than the notion, expressed by the poet in the preface to *The Excursion*, that his minor poems might be so grouped around *The Recluse*, as to resemble the oratories, cells, and sepulchral recesses in a Gothic minster. Mr. Arnold's arrangement is, certainly, every way superior to the poet's own, even although it may not be quite adequate. What arrangement can be wholly satisfactory? He divides the poems thus; "Poems of Ballad form," "Narrative Poems," "Lyrical Poems," "Poems akin to the Antique, and Odes," "Sonnets," "Reflective and Elegiac Poems." A strictly chronological arrangement, however, without any grouping into classes, would be really the best, even in the case of a *Selection*, such as this volume gives us. But when is the world to possess a Library Edition of the entire Works? Such an edition, chronologically arranged, with every various reading of all the successive editions noted, and with the requisite critical biographical and topographical matter supplied, would be one of the best possible monuments to the poet's memory. Mr. Arnold's selection of the poems for this Golden Treasury Series is managed with admirable tact. But why is *The Poet's Epitaph* omitted? and why is that exquisite fragment, beginning "The sheep-boy whistled loud,"—referring to his brother John, and their parting place at Grisdale Tarn,—left out?—especially when *The Anecdote for Fathers* is included! The last is certainly not one of the poems which posterity "will not willingly let die."

The other point is one in regard to which many will differ

from Mr. Arnold altogether. It is his rejection of Wordsworth's philosophy. He says, "We cannot do him justice, until we dismiss his philosophy;" and, it is doubtless because he rejects it, that he places *The Excursion* and *The Prelude* so far below the minor poems in permanent value. I do not think that Mr. Arnold has selected the happiest examples to prove his point. His first illustration is a well-known passage from the fourth book of *The Excursion*, in reference to Duty, in which Mr. Arnold remarks that instead of "a sweet union of philosophy and poetry," we have "a tissue of elevated but abstract verbiage alien to the very nature of poetry." In that passage Wordsworth is certainly not at his highest point of inspiration; but, in it, he shows a singularly clear grasp of one of the root principles of the Kantian philosophy. If he fails, it is an accidental failure in poetic form, but his philosophy is not to blame for the failure, and the result is far away from "verbiage." It can only be maintained that the lines in question "carry us really not a step further than the proposition which they would interpret," if we are, by the conditions of the case, limited to that very elementary and common-place proposition, "duty exists." In the second quotation, which Mr. Arnold thinks shows us the "centre of Wordsworth's philosophy," we have the ordinary theistic doctrine of the providential oversight of the world, expressed, it is true, rather cumbrously. Granting, however, that it is badly expressed, that it has none of "the characters of poetic truth," this is neither from any fault in the philosophy itself, nor from the poet's attempt to give a poetic form to the truth which filled his mind. It is simply due to a failure in poetic expression, to an accidental literary short-coming at this particular point. Then the great *Ode* may contain an unverifiable hypothesis within it—viz., the surmise or conjecture of our pre-existence. But that notion—accounting, as Wordsworth imagined, for the early and intense delight he felt in Nature—is not the central thought of the *Ode*, or of Wordsworth's philosophy of Nature. The philosophy of Nature which Wordsworth teaches—and which was to him both alpha and omega—amounts to this, that Nature and Man reflect each other, that there is a pre-established harmony between them, with relations of reciprocity and even of kindredness; and this philosophy comes out, not only in *The Excursion* and *The Prelude*, but also in those lyrics of matchless force, simplicity, and freshness, on which Mr. Arnold specially rests the poet's claims to immortality.

Instead, therefore, of saying, with his latest critic, that we cannot do justice to the poetry till we dismiss the philosophy, I prefer to say, with Mr. Leslie Stephen, that "under every poetry there lies a philosophy," and that the greatest poet is he "whose imagination is most transfused with reason." Mr. Stephen tells us that the explanation of the satisfying and enduring worth of Wordsworth's poetry is that he is not only a "melodious writer," but also a "true philosopher," and that "his poetry derives its power from the same source as his philosophy." In this, I believe that Mr. Stephen is unmistakably and altogether right. Mr. Arnold fastens upon outlying and secondary features of the philosophy of Wordsworth, not upon its central characteristic; and thus, notwithstanding the exquisiteness of his critical preface, at this point he is unmistakably and altogether wrong. Wordsworth's moral insight, his building upon the sure basis of human nature's lowliest yet deepest needs, his grasp of the law of moral continuity, his perception of the identity between our childish instincts and our most enlightened Reason, his discernment of the advantages to be won by serious thought, retirement, and tranquillity, his profound sense of the self-sufficingness of all genuine communion with Nature, and of the simple pleasures to be found in that communion, with his recognition of the sanctifying power of human sorrow—these are the elements or fragments of his philosophy; and it is manifestly beside the mark to seek for it in any lesser truths which he may happen to have held or taught. But, with this one objection to Mr. Arnold's estimate of the poems, it may be safely said that no finer or juster criticism has appeared since the poet passed away, none more appreciative, none more judicial. It is such criticism that informs and educates.

WILLIAM KNIGHT.

WE do not know how far Mr. Copner's translation of the "Praise of Folly"* into readable, racy English has fulfilled the writer's earnest desire that it might "contribute towards reviving public interest in this remarkable work;" but we should be glad to think it had done so, at least to some small extent. It is true no satire can retain its popularity after the abuses against which it is levelled have died out or changed their form, and it is hardly to be expected, perhaps, that Eras-

* The Praise of Folly. Translated from the Latin of Erasmus, with Explanatory Notes, by James Copner, M.A., Vicar of Elstow. Williams and Norgate.

mus's *jeu d'esprit* will be read much by those who are not otherwise interested in its author. Yet there is enough of sameness in human nature in all ages, and enough of modernness in Erasmus, to lend pungency to many of his touches; and it is only too true, as Mr. Copner remarks, that "while wise men are still few in number, Folly's votaries abound." "We see them everywhere," he adds, "in secular society, and we see them even within the sacred portals of the Church!" The following sentences, which describe a class of men not yet, it must be feared, extinct, will give some idea of the style of the work:—"Prudence would bid me, as I would avoid stirring up a stagnant cesspool, or handling an ill-scented weed, to pass over the parsons without a word of notice, for a more dangerous class of men to provoke against you it were impossible to conceive, so amazingly supercilious are they, and so astonishingly touchy. Breathe but some harmless sentiment that is not strictly conformable to their notions of orthodoxy, and lo, and behold! they are all up in arms against you at once, imputing to you a host of profane inferences which, may be, you never dreamt of, and summoning you, as you hope for salvation, to submit to a public recantation. Refuse to go through this humiliating ordeal, and—woe betide you! Forthwith you are undone, indeed! Against your devoted head is hurled that terrible weapon of theirs, wherewith in a trice they silence those whose opinions they dislike, that most awe-inspiring of ecclesiastical thunderbolts—the charge of heresy."

ROBERT B. DRUMMOND.

DO we religious people ever seriously think of our position and its responsibilities? What a number of sects we are broken into, and how little we know or care for each other, except in ways too sad to speak of! If Jesus could come amongst us, what would he think and say? What should we think ourselves, if we had courage to face the facts? Our religion is worthy only as it lifts us out of ourselves. The Christian name shames those of us who claim it, if we do not rise into the large liberty of the Christian spirit. The oldest of the creeds makes the Church profess its faith in "the communion of the saints," a profession now eighteen hundred years long, but how little reality of it has been attained! This is just what we want to-day, with the addition, that we should be better for a little communion with the sinners also. Whatever we may say and dream, practically our communion is almost limited to the narrow boundaries of each sect; frozen by petty conventionalities and absurd customs which are

less than our common sense, and out of sight of our religious ideals. Men whose hearts are aching to love each other dare not fraternise, because they have to maintain a reputation for fidelity to the opinions of their Church. Noble sympathies are still-born, holy emotions starved, and aspirations, large and pure as heaven, are trampled in the wretched mire of controversy, in the interest of matters of which we can know next to nothing. We can work together in politics, in educational and in civic matters; can enjoy together social intercourse, amusement, intellectual pursuit; can eat and drink at the same table, and warm ourselves by the same fire; but how hard it is to fraternise on the supreme matters of the soul, in the worship of God, in high, spiritual thought and religious emotion! The world has learned to laugh, and we—alas! are not ashamed that our professions should be so loud and so empty. What divides us? Matters of opinion merely. On these we never can be entirely at one. "Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind." But upon what is highest we are at one; the love and fatherhood of God; our sonship to Him and brotherhood with each other; and the helpfulness of sympathy and affection. We boast of this, and use it as a comfortable excuse for acting as if it were not so. It is time we overleapt these notional barriers. They would vanish into air if we dared courageously to face them. It is the business of our religious teachers to lead the way. They would not fail: for even now, in all Churches, there are saintly men and women who are sick with utter weariness at the poor, cramped distortion which calls itself religious communion; and we are all glad in thought and imagination (though we may not in fact) to transcend sect-limits, and feel ourselves at one with all who strive after truth and righteousness. We cannot remain as we are. We lose strength, hope, comfort, and permanent good influence by our repellent attitude. We gain nothing. If we could put matters of opinion in their proper place, rise to the dignity of our calling and the claims of our work, and present to the world a front of united strength in love and sympathy, what is being now done would be as nothing to what we should do. Then, and not till then, may we hope to touch into religious reverence, faith, and duty, the great mass of people—also the children of our Father—now given up to indifference and sin. The true Church of God is larger than any thought of ours hitherto; it is, indeed, "the Church of All Souls," including saint and sinner alike, and when the saints have learned to hold truest religious fellowship with each other, they will wish to enter into

fellowship with the sinners; and the sinners may then begin to think that it is worth while to seek an entrance into the communion of the saints.

T. W. F.

READERS of Dr. Abbott's *Oxford Sermons** will find them marked by many of the qualities which gave such fascination to *Philochristus*. Here are the same enthusiasm, the same vivid realisation of the personality of Jesus, the same freshness in the treatment of Gospel sayings and incidents. Moreover, there are many happy applications of the principles of Christ's teachings to the intellectual and moral dangers of our time, and fearless words are uttered against sins which it is too much the fashion to ignore, such as the opium trade with China.

But the book is offered as a contribution to the better understanding of "Liberal Christianity," and presents a sketch of a new theology, the centre of which is the person and work of Christ. The lines of inquiry into the origin of Christianity are laid down after the manner of the little treatise on Buddhism, by Mr. T. W. Rhys-Davids, and an attempt is made to answer the question, "What Manner of Man is This?" by the inductive method. The miraculous narratives of the New Testament, with the exception of a few cures, are regarded as having risen largely out of misunderstood metaphors, misinterpretations of prophecy, and similar causes; but, when all these deductions are made, the original tradition, the common element at the base of the three synoptical Gospels, records the life of "One who unquestionably offered Himself to His disciples as the source of forgiveness and peace, and the sustenance of the souls of men;" in other words, of One whom the Church rightly believes to be "very God of very God."

Such a result as this suggests many reflections, of which only two can be here noted down. Dr. Abbott expressly withdraws from the range of credence every instance of the authority of Jesus over the forces and objects of nature beyond certain cases of healing; and then, having taken care to show that Christ either did not possess any control over the physical universe, or, if he did, scrupulously refrained from exerting it, he appeals to us to believe that Jesus was no other than the Eternal Word by whom all things were made. The sermon entitled "The Word Not Yet Made Flesh" contains an outline of the development of

* Oxford Sermons, preached before the University, by the Rev. Edwin A. Abbott, D.D., formerly Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. London: Macmillan and Co.

the Cosmos under its guiding and transforming power. The next sermon, on "The Word Made Flesh," suddenly locates this power in Jesus of Nazareth, to whom, we are told, "things seen and unseen, heaven and earth, alike agree in bearing witness," yet who steadily refused to give any sign to those around him of the precious gift deposited with him. Surely there is here a leap which no inductive reasoning can overpass. No logic in the world, without other aid, can possibly justify the identification of Jesus of Nazareth with the creative and organising thought and will of the universe, whatever grounds of authority may be considered to support that identification.

Secondly, Dr. Abbott urges the worship of Christ as the Son of Man in preparation for the worship of him as the Son of God. We find ourselves entirely unable to frame any such distinction. It would seem, indeed, that Dr. Abbott uses the term worship in a loose sense. He describes it as comprising reverence, trust, and love, inasmuch as he says concerning Peter's declaration at Cæsarea Philippi—"Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God"—"Thus were the disciples led through the worship of the Son of Man to the worship of the Son of God." But we do not press this, because elsewhere the worship of Christ is clearly meant to imply the direct communion, through prayer, of the believer with his Lord. The matter is something more than a question of words; it amounts to this, Does real spiritual experience take any account either of what may be called the historical functions or of the internal economy of the Godhead? In the feelings of joy in the divine sympathy, of self-abasement before the divine righteousness, of forgiveness and peace after sin, can we say that they are directed towards, or inspired by, different persons—a Father and a Son? In the intensity of communion with God, can we discriminate Christ at all? and, if so, can we further apprehend him in one of two aspects, as mortal or divine? We believe both processes to be impossible. The identification of the spirit which, in Jesus of Nazareth eighteen centuries ago, laid the foundation of a new society, with the infinite Love which throbs in our gladness and our grief to-day, the infinite Holiness which rebukes our negligence and guilt, appears to us beyond the scope alike of reasoning and of spiritual discernment. To disengage Jesus from the limits of history, and erect him into a present Guide of souls, involves a logical leap as great as that which lifts him above the universe as its Maker and Lord. And the two tendencies only conceal an agnosticism

which is, in truth, the more dangerous because it veils itself under traditional forms, and, if Christ be taken away, has no divine Object left to receive our affection and sustain our life.

J. E. C.

THE higher Apologetics have assumed, in the decade now expiring, a new form. The Protean Apologetics of the lower orthodoxy, indeed, still flow from the Press, only more violently straining Hebrew phrases and Greek particles than of yore; but the Butlers and the Paleys of to-day are called to build up a fresh argument. Not astronomy and geology only, but the conservation of forces and evolution have to be built in to the new castle of faith—since they cannot be built out. The theistic philosophy faces new facts. It must assimilate them or perish. Mr. Brownlow Maitland has well understood the problem, and his "Theism or Agnosticism" rescued from intellectual barrenness the Society which did itself the honour to publish it. Mr. John Wright, in his "Grounds and Principles of Religion,"* has restated the theistic philosophy and exhibited afresh the theistic sentiment as they need to be stated and exhibited, if, in their several degrees, the readers or hearers of Matthew Arnold and of Clifford among the immortals, of Miss Bevington and of Charles Bradlaugh among the mortals, are to read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest the books that plead and strive for the first article of the Apostles' Creed.

MR. MALLOCK first attracts attention by "The New Republic," with its caricatures of eminent and earnest thinkers. He next amuses some readers and disgusts others with a vulgar burlesque of Paul and Virginia, in which his caricature of the Positivist professor, and of the Christian Bishop's wife, are equally offensive. At last he attempts to be serious, and to go to the root of the matter in the question, "Is life worth living"?† But he gets no further than another attack upon Positivism, and a very doubtful defence of Roman Catholicism. Under the head of Positivists, he includes Mr. Frederick Harrison and Professor Huxley, Dr. Tyndall and George Eliot, John Stuart Mill and—well, he speaks of Swinburne and Théophile Gautier as belonging to "a school which, starting from the same premisses as the Positive

* Williams and Norgate, 1879.

† Is Life Worth Living? By William Hurrell Mallock. London: Chatto and Windus 1879.

moralists, yet come to a practical teaching which is singularly different;" but he appears to consider their logic none the less accurate for that.

Positivism, in either its wider or its narrower and more personal sense, has its deficiencies and errors assuredly, and they are far too grave to allow of its becoming the final religion, or even the ultimate foundation of morals. But its assailants, and especially those who treat it with ridicule, seem generally to attack it just where it most resembles Christianity. The motto which appears from Mr. Mallock's "New Paul and Virginia" to strike him as supremely ridiculous, is "Live for others." Now, again, he objects to Positivism, that it requires imagination and unselfishness to be "indefinitely magnified," and that this involves a change in human nature, "which it has no spontaneous tendency to make, which no known power could ever tend to force on it, and which, in short, there is no ground of any kind for expecting." Surely Christianity is no less exacting in this respect than Positivism. But either Christian or Positivist will regard this demand, not as the *reductio ad absurdum*, but rather as the glory, of his system; for the one believes in the power of God to perfect man, the other in the power of Humanity to perfect itself. Mr. Mallock is assured, "that there is no ground of any kind" for expecting such a change in human nature. Probably it is the very steadiness of the movement that prevents him from seeing that the change has been going on for ages, and is going on now. It is not altogether unreasonable to suppose that the power, whether it be of God or of man, which has acted in this direction so far, will continue to act in the same direction till its goal is reached.

Mr. Mallock's apparent conclusion is that life will very soon not be worth living, unless we all become Roman Catholics. Not necessarily, it seems, that the teachings of that Church are true. Love of truth is another of the follies of Positivism. Would that Christianity could altogether return to that folly of its youth! How can any man who believes in God be afraid of truth or fail to rejoice in it?

The characteristics of Mr. Mallock's latest publication are timidity and confusion. The former, perhaps, he could not avoid. Had he avoided the latter, he would have escaped doing cruel injustice to some of the greatest and most earnest thinkers of the day.